1,721,140 research outputs found
Probability and uncertainty: the legacy of Georgescu-Roegen
No full textIn this paper we consider Georgescu-Roegen's approach to uncertainty, showing that his characterization of expectations cannot be reduced to any probabilistic decision-making model. Drawing upon Georgescu-Roegen's lesson a lexicographical utility function is proposed and analysed in the mark of his own peculiar scientific methodology. It is demonstrated that such a formulation can be useful in solving the usual failure of the expected utility model, such as the Ellsberg paradoxes. The epistemic limits of our re-construction are considered
A Firms-Government Coordination Game under Strategic Uncertainty
No full textA 2x2 coordination game under uncertainty is analysed. It is shown that specific equilibria can emerge given the specific players’ uncertainty attitude, namely, optimism or pessimism. In particular, when uncertainty is taken into account it is possible to discriminate between the equilibria that arise in the uncertainty-free game, on the basis of an exogenous parameter expressing players’ uncertainty. Moreover, it is shown that several other outcomes can be sustained in equilibrium as results of rational but pessimistic or optimistic plays, some of which are not even Nash-equilibria of the standard uncertainty-free game
Disuguaglianza, Pace e Struttura Istituzionale: un confronto tra paesi sviluppati e paesi in via di sviluppo
No full textNel lavoro si analiza il tema della relazione tra la diseguaglianza nella distribuzione del reddito e lo sviluppo economico, nell'ambito delle analisi di "Public Choice". Definiamo pertanto un modello "Politici-Cittadini", declineandolo in modo distinto per i Paesi in via di Svilupo rispetto alle economie più sviluppate. Si derivano risultati analitici circa le specificità dei PVS nella relazione summenzionata, e se ne propone una verifica econometrica su dati Banca Mondiale
Recensione di: Una politica a tutto gas. Sicurezza energetica europea e relazioni internazionali.
No full textRecensione di: Una politica a tutto gas. Sicurezza energetica europea e relazioni internazionali
No full textCOURNOT OLIGOPOLY UNDER STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY WITH OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC FIRMS
No full textIn this paper the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty is analyzed by means of the Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) theory. Firms are supposed to be either optimistic (CEU maximizers who hold concave capacities) or pessimistic (convex capacities). Reaction functions, equilibrium quantities, prices and profits are derived and compared for different degrees of uncertainty and uncertainty attitude (optimism or pessimism). It is proved that optimists make higher profits than pessimists whenever uncertainty is sufficiently low. If it is high just optimists participate in the market making losses. An interpretation of the main results in terms of the market's level of maturity is provided
A Firms-Government Coordination Game under Strategic Uncertainty
No full textA 2x2 coordination game under uncertainty is analysed. It is shown that specific equilibria can emerge given the specific players’ uncertainty attitude, namely, optimism or pessimism. In particular, when uncertainty is taken into account it is possible to discriminate between the equilibria that arise in the uncertainty-free game, on the basis of an exogenous parameter expressing players’ uncertainty. Moreover, it is shown that several other outcomes can be sustained in equilibrium as results of rational but pessimistic or optimistic plays, some of which are not even Nash-equilibria of the standard uncertainty-free game
Public Efficiency and Constitutional Constraints: a Contribution Towards an Extended "Leviathan" Model
No full textThe paper analyses the relationship among public efficiency, exploitation of private individuals by the government and the role of constitutional constraints. First, it contains an exensive review of the Leviathan model based on Inman's formalization of Brennan and Buchanan theory. Secondly, an extension of such a model is proposed, in which public agents are separated into politicians and bureaucrats. In doing so, a "new" efficiency-equity trade-off arises, namely, the achievement of Pareto-efficiency through constitutional constraints is obtained, at a cost of a possible exploitation of private individuals, while the non-exploitation allocation is coupled with a possible Pareto-inefficienc
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