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Incitations juridiques versus incitations normatives en présence d’erreurs judiciaires
No full textLegal versus Normative Incentives Under Judicial Error.
We analyse the complementarity between legal incentives (i. e., the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (i. e., the fear of social disapproval) in situations where instances of misbehaviour are not perfectly observable. We show that there may be multiple equilibria within a given legal regime, as well as multiple socio-legal equilibria in different legal situations. We argue that this analysis may explain some of the differences between common lawand civil lawregarding the notions of fault or negligence. Our approach also provides an explanation for trends currently observed in civil law systems, in particular the weakening of evidentiary requirements in tort cases.Nous analysons la complémentarité entre règles de droit (i. e. la menace d’être jugé responsable en cas d’accident) et normes sociales (i. e. la crainte d’une désapprobation sociale) dans les situations où les comportements répréhensibles des agents générateurs de risques sont imparfaitement observables. Nousmontrons qu’il peut y avoir des équilibresmultiples dans un cadre juridique donné, ainsi que des équilibres socio-juridiques différents dans des systèmes juridiques variés. Ceci expliquerait certaines des différences entre la common law et le droit civil concernant les notions de “ faute” et de “ négligence”. Notre analyse peut également expliquer l’affaiblissement des exigences relatives à la preuve en matière de responsabilité civile dans les systèmes de droit civil.Deffains Bruno, Fluet Claude. Incitations juridiques versus incitations normatives en présence d’erreurs judiciaires. In: Économie & prévision, n°202-203, 2013. Economie du droit. pp. 19-36
Adversarial versus inquisitorial testimony
Full text linkAn arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this party testifies. When the evidence is close to the prior mean, no party testifies. We compare this outcome under a purely adversarial procedure with the outcome under a purely inquisitorial procedure (Emons and Fluet 2009). We provide sufficient conditions on when one procedure is better than the other one
The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony
Full text linkAn arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify,
each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The ability to commit to an adjudication scheme makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence
Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts
No full textVictims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneysobserve the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reducethe probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs’ attorneys offer contingent fees providing incentivesto proceed with strong and drop weak cases. By contrast, defense attorneys work for fixed fees underwhich they accept all cases. Since the defense commits to fight all cases, few victims sue in the first place.We thus provide an explanation for the fact that in the US virtually all plaintiffs use contingency whiledefendants tend to rely exclusively on fixed fees
Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality
Full text linkTwo firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical character-
istic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels
determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenar-
ios: In the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they
send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm
advertises its own quality, under comparative advertising a firm adver-
tises the quality differential. In either scenario, under comparative ad-
vertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under
non-comparative advertising. Moreover, under comparative advertis-
ing firms do not advertise when the informational value to consumers
is small
Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs
Full text linkA decision maker relies on information of parties affected by her decision. These parties try to influence her decision by selective disclosure of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition between the informed parties constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to communicate. Our parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect on the decision. Some information is never revealed. In contrast to setups without communication costs, our decision maker can benefit by ex ante committing to an ex post suboptimal decision rule. Moreover, committing ex ante not to listen to one of the parties may also be beneficial for the decision maker
Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures
Full text linkAn arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The arbiter's ability to remain uninformed as well as sequential testifying makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence. (JEL D82, K41, K42) The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected], Oxford University Press.
Non-comparative versus comparative advertising as a quality signal
Full text linkTwo firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may signal the quality differential. In both scenarios the firms may attempt to mislead at a cost. If firms advertise, in both scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising
Strategic communication with reporting costs
Full text linkA decision-maker relies on information of parties affected by her decision. These parties try to influence her decision by selective disclosure of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition between the informed parties constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to communicate. Our parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect on the decision. Typically, they never reveal all information. A better outcome may be implemented if the decision-maker adopts an active stance by barring one party from reporting or through cheap talk allowing coordination on a particular equilibrium
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