201,326 research outputs found
Mission-oriented public organizations for knowledge creation
No full textThe purpose of this chapter is to investigate and discuss the role played by the state in enhancing technological progress, creating knowledge and fostering radical innovation. This catalyst function may take place in different ways.
The authors focus on two channels: (a) R&D of traditional state-owned or state-invested enterprises and (b) public procurement for innovation (PPI) through research infrastructures, which according to the authors are a new form of knowledge-based public enterprise.
Public enterprises and public organizations in general may in fact play an active role as inventors and innovators. Recent evidence published by Musacchio (2017), Sterlacchini (2012), and Clò, Florio and Rentocchini (2017) shows that public enterprises may innovate even more intensively than their private peers.
This is because government can act as a long-term investor while private firms are more likely to have a short-term view and be financially constrained. Moreover, the public sector adopts a more positive attitude to risk taking and engages in more risky research (see Mazzuccato, 2016): it can invest in breakthrough technologies, in pure research and in areas where discoveries may have less marketable applications. On the other hand, private companies are more oriented towards promising technologies with more immediate economic opportunities.
The authors shed light on these mechanisms and provide new evidence about the innovative capacity of state-owned enterprises by comparing their R&D and patent behaviours and propensities in high-innovation sectors with those of private companies.
A second relevant role for government is to stimulate innovation via public procurement. This is considered an important demand-side innovation policy (see Aschhoff & Sofka, 2009; Martin & Tang, 2007), especially when the development of sophisticated products is required.
PPI occurs when public authorities act as launch customers for innovative goods or services that do not exist yet or are not available on a large scale. Acting as first buyer, the government enlarges the size of the market and creates new segments. Again, this is crucial in economic fields characterized by high risk that cannot be borne entirely by the private sector.
Empirical studies have shown that PPI has a positive effect on firms’ R&D investment, with a greater demand-pull effect than that of other private contracts (Litchtenberg, 1988), and it is a possible complement or even an alternative to supply-side policies (Edler & Georghiou, 2007). PPI’s impact on firms’ expenditures on innovative activities is stronger than that of R&D subsidies and tax credits (Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015; Mazzuccato, 2016).
Particularly interesting is the case of procurement contracts for large-scale research infrastructures (RIs). The existing literature, mainly based on supplier surveys and case studies, suggests that PPI may generate significant technological spillovers accruing to (private) firms involved in the RI supply chain. This kind of analysis has been applied to different RIs such as CERN (Schmied, 1977; Bianchi-Streit et al., 1984; Autio et al., 2003; Autio, 2014; Florio et al., 2017), NASA (Hertzfeld, 1998; Chapman et al., 1989) and ESA (Schmied, 1982; Schenk et al., 2002).
Another relevant strand of the literature has applied cost-benefit analysis to research, development and innovation infrastructure (see Florio, Forte & Sirtori, 2016; Battistoni et al., 2016).
The authors critically review existing contributions and summarize their main findings
Cost–benefit analysis and the European union cohesion fund: On the social cost of capital and labour
No full textFlorio M. (2006) Cost–benefit analysis and the European Union Cohesion Fund: on the social cost of capital and labour, Regional Studies 40, 211–224. Cost–benefit analysis is a formal regulatory requirement for the evaluation of Cohesion Fund projects. It requires the calculation of shadow prices. Observed prices in less-developed European Union regions do not reflect the social opportunity cost of labour and capital because of market failures and policy constraints. The paper discusses simple rules for the calculation of financial and economic discount rates, and of shadow wages, i.e. the opportunity costs of capital and labour, in the context of the appraisal of infrastructure projects part-financed under the Cohesion Fund. It is argued that for the 2007–13 programming period, the European Commission should adopt a unique financial discount rate of 3.5% in real terms, social discount rates of 5.5% for the Convergence regions and 3.5% for Competitiveness regions, and a region-specific shadow wage rate. Cost–benefit analysis Social discount rate Shadow wage Cohesion Fund Florio M. (2006) L'analyse coût-bénéfice et le Fonds de cohésion de l'UE: à propos du coû t social du capital et du travail, Regional Studies 40, 211–224. L'analyse coût-bénéfice est une obligation légale préalable à l'évaluation des projets assistés par le Fonds de cohésion. Elle nécessite le calcul des prix virtuels. Les prix observés dans les zones de l'UE en voie de développement ne reflètent le coû t d'opportunité social, ni du travail, ni du capital, à cause de la distorsion du marché et des contraintes de politique. Cet article cherche à discuter des règles simples visant le calcul des taux d'escompte financiers et économiques, et des salaires virtuels; autrement dit les coû ts d'opportunité du capital et du travail, dans le cadre de l'évaluation des projets d'équipement financés en partie sous l'égide du Fonds de cohésion. On affirme que, pour la période de programmation 2007–13, la Commission européenne devrait adopter un taux d'escompte financier unique de 3,5% en termes réels, des taux d'escompte sociaux de 5,5% pour les régions de convergence et de 3,5% pour les régions de l'Objectif ‘compétitivité’, et un taux des salaires virtuels propre à chaque zone. Analyse coût-bénéfice Taux d'escompte social Salaire virtuel Fonds de cohésion Florio M. (2006) Kosten-Nutzenanalyse und der Kohäsionsfond der EU: Bemerkungen zu den Sozialkosten von Kapital und Arbeit, Regional Studies 40, 211–224. Kosten-Nutzenanalyse ist ein formales behö rdliches Erfordernis für die Evaluierung von Kohäsionsfondprojekten. Es bedarf der Berechnung von ‘Schattenpreisen’. In weniger entwickelten EU Regionen beobachtete Preise spiegeln nicht die sozialen Opportunitätskosten von Arbeit und Kapital wider aufgrund von Marktversagen und Policybedingten Einsdränkungen. Dieser Aufsatz bespricht einfache Regeln für die Berechnung finanzieller und wirtschaftlicher Diskontsätze und für Schattenlöhne, d.h. die Opportunitätskosten von Kapital und Arbeit im Zusammenhang mit der Einschätzung von Infrastrukturprojekten, die vom Kohäsionsfond teilfinanziert werden. Es wird der Standpunkt vertreten, dass die Europäische Kommission für die Programmperiode 2007–2013 einen einmaligen Finanzdiskontsatz von effektiv 3,5% einführen sollte, einen sozialen Diskontsatz von 5,5% für “Konvergenz” Regionen und 3,5% für “Wettbewerbs” Regionen sowie einen bestimmten regionenspezifisch zugeschnittenen Schattenlohnsatz. Kosten-Nutzenanalyse sozialer Diskontsatz Schattenlohn Kohäsionsfond Florio M. (2006) Análisis coste-beneficio y el Fondo de Cohesión de la UE: sobre el coste social de capital y trabajo, Regional Studies 40, 211–224. Los análisis de costes y beneficios son un requisito formal y reglamentario para llevar a cabo la evaluación de los proyectos del Fondo de Cohesión. Requieren el cálculo de los ‘precios sombra’. En los precios de las regiones de la UE menos desarrolladas no queda reflejado el coste de oportunidad social de trabajo y capital debido a fallos de mercado y restricciones polí– ticas. Aquí se exponen reglas simples para el cálculo de las tasas de descuento, según un valor financiero y económico, y los ‘salarios sombra’, es decir, los costes de oportunidad de capital y trabajo, en el ámbito de una valoración de proyectos de infraestructura financiado en parte por el Fondo de Cohesión. Se sostiene que para el periodo de programación 2007–2013, la Comisión Europea debería adoptar una tasa exclusiva de descuento financiero del 3,5% en términos reales, tasas de descuento social del 5,5% para las regiones de Convergencia, un 3,5% para las regiones de Competitividad y una tasa específica de salario sombra para cada región. Análisis de costes y beneficios Tasa de descuento social Salario sombra Fondo de cohesión
Italy
No full textThe case studies were commissioned by the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), and examine failures of forest management in Britain (Bateman, I.), Sweden (Wibe, S.), Italy (Florio, M.), Germany (Bergen, V.; Behrndt, M.; Pfister, G.), and Spain (Campos Palacín, P.). The commonest causes of market failures related to non-competitive markets, external effects, incomplete information and demand/cost errors, and public goods. The commonest causes of intervention failures related to erroneous reasoning, group interest, and incomplete information
Investing in science : Social cost-benefit analysis of research infrastructures
No full textA proposal for using cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the socioeconomic impact of public investment in large scientific projects.
Large particle accelerators, outer space probes, genomics platforms: all are scientific enterprises managed through the new form of the research infrastructure, in which communities of scientists collaborate across nations, universities, research institutions, and disciplines. Such large projects are often publicly funded, with no accepted way to measure the benefits to society of these investments. In this book, Massimo Florio suggests the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to evaluate the socioeconomic impact of public investment in large and costly scientific projects.
The core concept of CBA of any infrastructure is to undertake the consistent intertemporal accounting of social welfare effects using the available information. Florio develops a simple framework for such accounting in the research infrastructure context and then offers a systematic analysis of the benefits in terms of the social agents involved. He measures the benefits to scientists, students, and postdoctoral researchers; the effect on firms of knowledge spillovers; the benefits to users of information technology and science-based innovation; the welfare effects on the general public of cultural services provided by RIs; and the willingness of taxpayers to fund scientific knowledge creation. Finally, Florio shows how these costs and benefits can be expressed in the form of stochastic net present value and other summary indicators
The great divestiture : evaluating the welfare impact of the British privatizations 1979-1997
No full textThe privatization carried out under the Thatcher and Major governments in Britain has been widely (although not universally) considered a success, and has greatly influenced the privatization of state industries in the transition economies of Eastern Europe. Massimo Florio's systematic analysis is the first comprehensive treatment of the overall welfare impact of this broad national policy of divestiture. Using the tools of social cost-benefit analysis, Florio assesses the effect of privatization on consumers, taxpayers, firms, shareholders, and workers. His conclusion may be surprising to some; his findings suggest that the changeover to private ownership per se had little effect on long-term trends in prices and productivity in Britain and contributed to regressive redistribution.
After historical and theoretical overviews of privatization and a look at macroeconomic trends in the Thatcher-Major era, Florio considers in detail the microeconomic effects of British privatization on several key groups. In successive chapters, he examines firms and productivity changes; shareholders' windfall gains and evidence of underpricing and outperformance in privatized companies; workers, management, and changes in industrial relations; consumers and the quantity and quality of goods after the change to public ownership; and taxpayers and the interplay between privatization and tax reform. He follows these chapters with a case study of British Telecom—significant not only because it was the largest divestiture of the period but also because of its influence on subsequent telecommunications privatization elsewhere. The final chapter considers the overall quantitative impact of the Thatcher-Major privatization on all sectors and its relationship with regulation and liberalization. The Great Divestiture not only offers an exhaustive analysis of the effects of the British process of privatization but also illustrates a method of inquiry and a testable research approach that could prove to be useful in similar studies of other countrie
Teoria dell'illusione finanziaria, debito pubblico, privatizzazioni
No full textIl volume si apre con l'introduzione di Ranci, che indica il filo conduttore dei contributi successivi. Barca e Brioschi affrontano tre questioni centrali: la dimensione dell'impresa, la sua struttura finanziaria, l'allocazione della proprietà e del controllo. Tutti gli altri lavori mettono invece a fuoco i diversi aspetti della realtà contemporanea. Bianco e Trento confrontano i due grandi modelli di controllo societario: quello prevalente in Gran Bretagna e negli Stati Uniti e quello tipico della Germania. Termini verifica il ruolo dei fondi pensione, Florio esamina le privatizzazioni dal lato della finanza pubblica e infine Chilosi approfondisce il caso delle privatizzazioni nell'Europa dell'Est
Lessons learnt and directions for future research on risk and risk management in diverse settings
No full textThis chapter aims at underlining some key messages as well as the lessons learnt from the research contributions offered in the book on risks and risk management in diverse, unique settings. It also suggests directions for future research, which shall consider multiple perspectives
Neutralità fiscale, investimenti in crescita: oltre l'approccio King-Fullerton
No full textQuesto volume raccoglie alcuni dei lavori più rappresentativi presentati alla VII riunione scientifica della SIEP, svoltasi in Pavia dal 6 al 7 ottobre 1995, dedicata ad affrontare nei suoi multiformi aspetti la sempre attuale ed importante problematica della riforma tributaria.
Lo scopo non è soltanto di portare alla conoscenza di un pubblico più Vasto i risultati della meditazione di studiosi, ma anche e sopra tutto di stimolare la discussione su aspetti importanti della riforma del sistema tributario.
II volume è articolato in una prima parte dedicata all'esame dei progetti di riforma tributaria in Italia, con una breve riflessione sulla problematica delle riforme tributarie di A. Fossati e la accurata puntualizzazione del dibattito attuale sull'lRPEF di L. Bernardi.
Nella seconda parte, dedicata ai problemi generali delle riforme, è incluso prima di tutto il saggio di G. Vitaletti che propone, nella tradizione classica italiana, ipotesi di riforma del sistema tributario, basate sul principio del beneficio. In secondo luogo compare il lavoro di M. Bernasconi sulla problematica dell'evasione, con la quale ogni progetto di riforma deve comunque confrontarsi.
La terza parte raccoglie proposte di riforma su due singoli settori produttivi: sulla riforma dell'imposizione diretta nel settore agricolo (F. Lechi e M. Ferretto), e sul settore non profit (B. Bises).
Nella quarta parte sono raccolti contributi sulla discussione della tassazione del capitale, del reddito d'impresa e sugli intermedìari finanziari, rispettivamente affrontati da M. Florio, S. Giannini e R. Paladini.
La quinta parte, infine, è tutta dedicata a studi di riforma basati su tecniche di simulazione. In particolare B. Cavalletti, R. Levaggi, A. Ruocco e G. Pireddu utilizzano l'analisi in equilibrio generale, mentre, M. Matteuzzi e S. Toso, M. Baldini e C. De Vitiis con F. Di Nicola usano le tecniche della microsimulazione. Assieme considerati, questi studi costituiscono un'importante esemplificazione di come le moderne tecniche di analisi economica possano essere utilizzate per progettare riforme tributarie
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