1,721,200 research outputs found
Looking beneath the Surface: Differences in Decision-Making Structures across Processes
No full textThe previous chapter presented the overall decision-making structure in Swiss politics at the beginning of the 21st century. This provides us with a general picture and allows for a comparison over time with the decision-making structure in the 1970s. However, the analysis of the overall decision-making structure potentially neglects important differences between policy domains (Atkinson and Coleman 1989; Knoke et al. 1996; Kriesi et al. 2006a; Sabatier 1987). Policy issues vary across policy domains, as do the political actors involved. In addition, actors may hold different policy preferences from one policy domain to the next, and they may also collaborate with other partners depending on the policy domain at stake. Examining differences between policy domains is particularly appropriate in Switzerland. Because no fixed coalitions of government and opposition exist, actors create different coalitions in each policy domain (Linder and Schwarz 2008). Whereas important parts of the institutional setting are similar across policy domains, decision-making structures might still vary. As was the case with the cross-time analysis conducted in the two previous chapters, a stability of 'rules-in-form' might hide important variations in 'rules-in-use' also across different policy domains
Dominance, Competition, Compromise or Consensus? Explaining Decision-Making Structures
No full textThe previous chapter uncovered important differences between decision-making structures across the 11 processes investigated by this study. As we have noted, both historically and in much contemporary literature, the Swiss political system has been described as highly consensual. And yet, when we focus on differences between decision-making structures across different policy domains, important elements appear that point toward a more conflictual style of decision-making. Both when there is a power balance between coalitions and in the presence of a dominant coalition, coalition interactions are conflictual in the majority of cases. Based on the descriptive account of these differences in Chapter 4, the present chapter studies the conditions under which given decision-making structures emerge. Under which circumstances are actors able to form a dominant coalition, and which conditions lead to a situation where power is more evenly balanced between coalitions? Which conditions lead actors to develop a conflictual rather than a consensual type of interaction? Answering these questions can give us some indication of the factors responsible for different types of decision-making structures
Reactive, Slow and...Innovative? Decision-making Structures and Policy Outputs
No full textConsensus democracies like Switzerland are generally known to have a low innovation capacity (Lijphart 1999). This is due to the high number of veto points such as perfect bicameralism or the popular referendum. These institutions provide actors opposing a policy with several opportunities to block potential policy change (Immergut 1990; Tsebelis 2002). In order to avoid a failure of a process because opposing actors activate veto points, decision-making processes in Switzerland tend to integrate a large number of actors with different - and often diverging - preferences (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Including a variety of actors in a decision-making process and taking into account their preferences implies important trade-offs. Integrating a large number of actors and accommodating their preferences takes time and carries the risk of resulting in lowest common denominator solutions. On the contrary, major innovative reforms usually fail or come only as a result of strong external pressures from either the international environment, economic turmoil or the public (Kriesi 1980: 635f.; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Sciarini 1994). Standard decision-making processes are therefore characterized as reactive, slow and capable of only marginal adjustments (Kriesi 1980; Kriesi and Trechsel 2008; Linder 2009; Sciarini 2006). This, in turn, may be at odds with the rapid developments of international politics, the flexibility of the private sector, or the speed of technological development
Coalition Formation in Parliament and during the Policy Process
No full textIn modern democratic systems, usually no single collective actor is able to decisively influence political decision-making. Instead, actors with similar preferences form coalitions in order to gain more influence in the policy process. In the Swiss political system in particular, institutional veto points and the consensual culture of policy-making provide strong incentives for actors to form large coalitions. Coalitions are thus especially important in political decision-making in Switzerland, and are accordingly a central focus of this book. According to one of our core claims - to understand the actual functioning of Swiss consensus democracy - one needs to extend the analysis beyond formal institutions to also include informal procedures and practices. Coalitions of actors play a crucial role in this respect. They are a cornerstone of decision-making structures, and they inform us about patterns of conflict, collaboration and power among actors. Looking at coalitions is all the more interesting in the Swiss political system, since the coalition structure is supposed to vary across policy processes. Given the absence of a fixed government coalition, actors need to form new coalitions in each policy process
Who Is Influential and Why? The Determinants of Reputational Power
No full textPower is one of the most fundamental concepts in political science, and it is a crucial aspect of decision-making structures. The distribution of power between political actors and coalitions of actors informs us about who is actually able to influence decision-making processes. It is thus no surprise that power is a centerpiece of our assessment of political decision-making in Switzerland. In line with the main argument of this book, Chapter 3 has uncovered important changes in decision-making structures, which resulted in a rebalancing of power between governing parties, interest groups and state executive actors. Conjecturing about the reasons that may account for these changes, we pointed to factors of an organizational and institutional nature. For example, we put forward the decline of pre-parliamentary procedures oriented towards corporatist intermediation as a possible explanation for the weakening of interest groups. More generally, in several chapters it has been suggested that there is a relationship between the institutional design of a decision-making process, the related importance of decision-making phases and an actor's participation in these phases on the one hand, and the power of actors (and coalitions of actors) on the other. In addition, the analyses carried out in Chapters 2 to 5 draw our attention to the differences in power structure across decision-making processes or types of processes
'Going Public': The Mediatization of Decision-Making Processes
No full textIn most Western countries, the media are said to exert an increasing influence on the political game. This development, which has been described variably as a shift towards an 'audience democracy' (Manin 1995) or the 'mediatization of politics' (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999), emphasizes the increasing importance of the media for political actors and political decision-making. In such a context, political actors need to communicate with both the media and the public in order to gain support for their policy plans and to influence decision-making. The media were noticeably absent from Kriesi's (1980) in-depth analysis of political decision-making in Switzerland. This suggests that in the early 1970s, the media did not matter or mattered far less than they do today
Belief Conflicts and Coalition Structures Driving Subnational Policy Responses: The Case of Swiss Regulation of Unconventional Gas Development
No full textAlthough there are no immediate projects of unconventional gas exploitation using hydraulic fracturing in Switzerland, the issue is on the political agenda. In federalist Switzerland, cantons are responsible for attributing the respective concessions to private companies according to the usual regulatory procedure of mineral and gas extraction. Yet, policy change has happened in different cantons, including moratoriums and planned bans of hydraulic fracturing techniques. This chapter compares the cantons of Neuchâtel, Bern, and Vaud, where slightly differing regulations are currently in place. Based on the empirical analysis of coalitions, their beliefs and preferences, as well as political and technical information exchange among them, we aim to understand the current policy outputs in the respective cantons, as well as the potential for future policy change
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