1,725,918 research outputs found
Ferrarini, o l'armonia del colore
No full textIl saggio ricostruisce la cronologia e il corpus di opere dell'acquarellista mantovano Ferrarini durante i sessanta anni di lavoro lungo tutto il Novecento. Costituisce il nerbo del catalogo della mostra tenuta nell'Appartamento Vedovile di Isabella d'Este in Palazzo Ducale, Mantova
Angelus de Grassis, «Oratio panigerica dicta domino Alfonso» (1443). Edizione digitale
No full texted. imitativa a cura di E. FERRARINI, ed. critica a cura di F. DELLE DONN
Coniugi in religione: un primo e provvisorio bilancio
No full textPostfazione dei curatori alla raccolta dei contributi pubblicata come numero monografico della rivista «Quaderni di storia religiosa medievale» 23, 1-2 (2020
Corporate Boards, Incentive Pay and Shareholder Activism in Europe: Main Issues and Policy Perspectives
No full textThis is the first chapter in a volume on “Boards and Shareholders in European Listed Companies: Facts, Context and Post-Crisis Reforms” (M. Belcredi and G. Ferrarini eds., Cambridge University Press forthcoming 2013). We offer an overview of the volume, placing the same in the context of recent EU reforms and of corporate governance theory, and summarizing the main outcomes of the various chapters. In addition, we offer some policy perspectives based on the theoretical and empirical outcomes of the research project of which this volume is the product. We analyse four main topics in the corporate governance of European listed firms: board structure/composition and its interaction with ownership structure, board remuneration, shareholder activism and corporate governance disclosure based on the “comply-or-explain” approach. For each of them, this volume provides new evidence and derives specific implications, relevant for the policy debate. Basically, proposals aimed at increasing disclosure and accountability at the European level look generally well-grounded: this is true, in particular, for disclosure about managerial compensation and compliance with national governance codes based on the “comply- or-explain” principle. On the opposite, we suggest caution when evaluating proposals targeting specific governance arrangements, which may actually lead to unintended consequences. Even though the Commission has – so far – refrained from adopting an excessively intrusive stance, further analysis may be needed before intervening in the fields of board composition and shareholder activism
S. Ferrarini, Le assicurazioni marittime
No full textS. Ferrarini, Le assicurazioni marittime. In: Revue internationale de droit comparé. Vol. 23 N°3, Juillet-septembre 1971. pp. 684-685
Nationally Fragmented Supervision Over Multinational Banks as a Source of Global Systemic Risk: A Critical Analysis of Recent EU Reforms
No full textThe European single market supported the creation of multinational banking groups. However, the European banking directives and the single license system were built along the model of the stand-alone bank and cannot keep pace with recent market developments. The national character of prudential supervision determines at least three sets of negative consequences for cross-border banking groups: higher compliance and enforcement costs; national solutions rather than cross-border cooperation between supervisors; greater systemic risks as a consequence of coordination failures. In this paper we argue that there is a strong case for further centralization of supervision and crisis management. Recent reforms in Europe, including the creation of a European Banking Authority, move in the right direction, but they still rely too heavily on cooperation between national authorities. While (enhanced) coordination may be effective in normal times, in emergency situations national authorities tend to behave strategically and exploit information asymmetries. As shown by the recent crisis, misalignment of incentives can lead them to national bias and non-cooperative dominant strategies. We argue that early intervention measures and crisis resolution tools should be reserved to a pan-European authority. Also ongoing supervision should be centralized, so as to avoid an inefficient transfer of powers to a single resolution authority at the outset of a crisis
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