1,720,992 research outputs found
Frege pipes up
No full textMartone has recently built a case aimed at showing that any attempt to exploit the ingredients of the semantic machinery of demonstratives to solve Frege’s Puzzle seems hopeless. In this reply, I show that Martone’s case seems unable to shatter our hopes
The face-value theory, know-<i>that</i>, know-<i>wh</i> and know-<i>how</i>
No full textFor sentences such as (1) Columbus knows that the sea is unpredictable there is a face‐value theory, according to which ‘that’‐clauses are singular terms denoting propositions. Famously, Prior raised an objection to the theory, but defenders of the face‐value theory such as Forbes, King, Künne, Pietroski and Stanley urged that the objection could be met by maintaining that in (1) ‘to know’ designates a complex relation along the lines of being in a state of knowledge having as content. Is the theory safe, then? The aim of this paper is to show that a new problem for the theory arises if we consider some clauses other than ‘that’‐clauses
Propositional attitude predicates and ‘That’-Clauses
No full textThe so-called face-value theory of propositional attitude sentences, i.e. (The Face-Value Theory) (RP) Propositional attitude predicates occurring in propositional attitude sentences designate relations;(ST) ‘That’-clauses are singular terms;(P) ‘That’-clauses denote propositions,is often endorsed without even discussing the plausibility of its tenets. As Schiffer (2003: 11) holds, it is “the default theory that must be defeated if it’s not to be accepted” and in fact he himself spends but a handful of lines discussing it. Surely, it is the default theory, considering that it originated more or less two thousand years ago, and since then in philosophy it has mostly been taken for granted. But this does not make it necessarily true, and all alternative theories must be defeated if they are not to be accepted. The aim of this paper is to defeat the alternatives for what at stake with theses (RP) and (ST). As we will see, although we cannot prove that these theses are true, all the different data that need to be accounted for can be more elegantly and more easily explained if the two theses are endorsed. Thus we will conclude that there really is something face-value in the theses, and that an account that endorses them is to be preferred to the alternatives. <br/
On Wrinch's extension of the multiple relation theory of judgment
No full textIn 1919, Dorothy Wrinch suggested how to extend Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment in order for the theory to be able to account also for molecular and quantified judgments. In this paper, some worries for her extension, which all stem from metaphysical considerations, will be presented and what Wrinch said and could have said about them will be discussed
Wittgensteinian facts as ultimate items of Tractarian ontology?
No full textAccording to José Zalabardo’s reading, Wittgenstein in TLP solves the metaphysical problem of the unity of facts, i.e. the problem of how their unity arises from the manifold of their constituents, by holding that(1) Facts ‘should not to be construed as compounds. They don’t arise from the combination of constituents. They are ultimate, indivisible units.’ (p. 14) The fact that Pavarotti sings, for example, is not a compound. Consequently, Zalabardo holds, Pavarotti and the property of singing are not components:(2) Objects (properties and relations) are ‘features of facts’ (p. 19),they are common characteristic marks of classes of facts. Zalabardo moreover holds that, as a consequence(3) ‘Facts are the only ultimate items of Tractarian ontology.’ (p. 17) With his intriguing proposal, Zalabardo has both interpretative and theoretical aims and I will similarly discuss both aspects of Zalabardo’s Wittgenstein. Concerning the interpretation, while there is room for challenging that Wittgenstein endorsed theses (1) and (2) (see Horwich’s commentary), for the sake of argument I will grant that Zalabardo is right on this. I will instead argue that maybe (3) does not need to follow in Wittgenstein’s reasoning (§1). Regarding the theoretical import, Zalabardo holds that Wittgenstein’s proposals might not work in the end, but still ‘advance our understanding of the problems in important ways’ (p. 2). I will show that there is room to think that this is not really the case (§2). <br/
“Please let me know whether it seems to you absurd or ridiculous to bring in necessity and contingency”. Dorothy Wrinch and Bertrand Russell on the role of logic in our knowledge of the external world
No full textIn this paper, we will discuss Wrinch’s reflections on logic at the intersection among logic, epistemology and metaphysics. We will see, first, how Wrinch was a Russellian philosopher and scientist, as she explicitly believed in Russell’s logical-analytic method and in the “all-important” role Russell saw for logic in our knowledge of the external world. Second, we will see how Wrinch’s reflections also show us that, in 1918, one could endorse the Russellian overarching project as presented in Our Knowledge of the External World while holding that logic can provide us with kinds of pieces of knowledge of the external world that go beyond those Russell was happy to admit
Saving logic from a metaphysical limbo. Susanne Langer on logical assertion
No full textCan a logic free from psychological considerations be free from metaphysical ones? The topic of this paper is Susanne Langer’s discussions of the notion of logical assertion, which aim at addressing this question. We will see both that Langer’s remarks are of historical interest and that they can help us understand better what logic should be taken to be concerned with, and what logical assertion should be taken to be
Empty names, presupposition failure, and metalinguistic negation
No full textWhen it comes to empty names, we seem to have reached very little consensus. Still, we all seem to agree, first, that our semantics should assign truth to (one reading of) negative singular existence statements in which an empty name occurs and, second, that names are used in such statements. The purpose of this paper is to show that ruling out that the names are mentioned is harder than it has been thought. I will present a new metalinguistic account for negative singular existence statements in which an empty name occurs and I will show that the account can deal both with the objections to the traditional metalinguistic account and with other objections that seem to target my new proposal
Properly answering the question what is knowledge of what things are? On André Abath’s erotetic view
No full textWhile philosophers are and have always been interested in, if not obsessed by, questions of the kind What is x?, somehow ironically, the question What is knowledge of what x is? did not receive much attention. Thankfully, to properly answer this question, André Abath suggested his erotetic view. As he convincingly argues, there might be many contexts in which, in order to know what x is, it is not necessary to know an answer to the question What is x? that provides us with necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be x (p. 65), as that is excessively demanding in many if not most contexts (p. 66). But the context that is relevant to our discussion of whether André’s erotetic view properly answers the question What is knowledge of what x is? is the context of a classic philosophical discussion. In a context of that kind, we are exactly after necessary and sufficient conditions, and this is the relevant necessary and sufficient condition according to André: S knows what x is in context c if and only if S knows a proposition (or propositions) that properly answer (that is, provide a proper answer to) the question of what x is in c (p. 42), where for a proposition to properly answer a question in a context it should be such that, in that context, it settles the question, it brings the inquiry to a close (pp. 27–30; 42). In our classic philosophical context, when a philosopher is confronted with a stimulating definition providing a necessary and sufficient condition, it is natural to investigate whether the condition is indeed necessary and whether it is indeed sufficient. Finding myself in that context, in this commentary I will investigate exactly into that. First, I will discuss André’s notion of partial knowledge, to understand whether the erotetic view gives us too many or too few knowers and to raise the question as to whether the view could be even more contextualist than it currently is. Second, I will discuss whether the erotetic view leaves some knowers out, to also understand whether André’s sophisticated rejection of the claim that his view is excessively intellectualist is completely convincing. <br/
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