1,721,006 research outputs found
Ruolo degli spostamenti attenzionali dello sguardo in un robot umanoide iCub durante un compito di manipolazione: un esperimento pilota.
No full textSocial Networks and Deviant Leisure Choices. An Agent-based Simulation Model
No full textDeviant leisure has been largely ignored in leisure research [Rojeck 1999]. Stebbins [1997] observed that most of deviant leisure often takes the form of casual leisure since it involves activities undertaken in the pursuit of immediately, intrinsically rewarding, relatively short-lived pleasures. Accordingly, from the tolerable deviance perspective [Stebbins 1996] some deviant activities, such as heavy drinking and gambling are currently considered as forms of deviant casual leisure as they produce a significant level of pleasure for those who participate in them. Recently deviant activities, such as auto-theft, have been contextualized as thrill and risk within a hedonic leisure lifestyle [Drodza 2006]. Following this approach it’s possible to identify models of deviant lifestyles associated with specific sub-cultures that influence the emergence of the motivation for deviance. This perspective reveals the importance of differential associations and the process of social influence (such as social learning and communication) within different type of social networks.
Building on these approaches, the present study provides an agent-based simulation model in which different types of agents (with different risk propensity), are faced on different leisure opportunities, some of which are deviant pleasurable leisure activities (with high potential benefit). Moreover individuals interact within social networks influencing each other by direct communication and learning. The aim of the study is to analyze the role of different type of social networks (characterized by different patterns of interconnections between members) on individual deviant leisure choices. The simulation model explores the impact of network topologies on the spread of some forms of deviant casual leisure
Does Initial Mispricing imply Equilibrium Price Overreaction and Wealth Divide?
No full textWe discover that letting agents pairwise sequentially exchange at "wrong" prices has a robust effect on prices at convergence. If the initial relative price for a good is cheaper than the equilibrium walrasian price due to initial endowments, the initial excess demand effect pushes resource allocation. This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with two goods and N agents with uniformly distributed preferences and identical endowments. Relaxing the auctioneer assumption, but maintaining a global price rule, sequentially random pairwise trading at out-of-equilibrium prices is allowed. Initial mispricing implies rationing, determining excess demand (supply) fading away only at convergence, when the price of the initially cheaper (more expensive) good becomes more expensive (cheaper) than the walrasian one. The system converges when the sequential price reaches the walrasian price evaluated at current updated endowments. A perfectly symmetric setting, by initial mispricing and consequent rationed trading, creates asymmetric resource allocations even at convergence, where welfare is less than a standardized 1% lower than the auctioneer Pareto one. This model sketches a possible basis for price over-reaction microfoundation and captures endogenous "wealth divide" among the population, induced by whether agent trading is dominated by good preferences or just by speculation around their prices.We discover that letting agents pairwise sequentially exchange at "wrong" prices has a robust effect on prices at convergence. If the initial relative price for a good is cheaper than the equilibrium walrasian price due to initial endowments, the initial excess demand effect pushes resource allocation.
This paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with two goods and N agents with uniformly distributed preferences and identical endowments. Relaxing the auctioneer assumption, but maintaining a global price rule, sequentially random pairwise trading at out-of-equilibrium prices is allowed. Initial mispricing implies rationing, determining excess demand (supply) fading away only at convergence, when the price of the initially cheaper (more expensive) good becomes more expensive (cheaper) than the walrasian one. The system converges when the sequential price reaches the walrasian price evaluated at current updated endowments. A perfectly sy
An Agent Based Approach to the Dynamics of Illegality. A position Paper
No full textThe aim of this paper is twofold. On one hand, it is aimed to propose Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) as a general approach to study the dynamics of different forms of illegality and check the efficacy of different answers and potential solutions. On the other, it presents an ABM model to reproduce the demographics, economic and employments variable of a Southern Italian region (Campania) where one specific variant of Extortion Racketeering Systems (ERSs), Camorra, is highly active and prosperous. Peliminary results of a set of simulations will show the effects of varying levels of extortion and punishment on the rates of inactivity, employment, etc. of a population of agents endowed with social learning mechanisms
Walrasian Tatônnement by Pairwise Trading: Convergence and Welfare Implications
No full textThis paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with two goods and N agents with uniformly distributed preferences and identical endowments. Relaxing the auctioneer assumption, but maintaining a global price rule, sequentially random pairwise trading at out-of-equilibrium prices is allowed. Initial mispricing implies rationing, determining excess demand (supply) fading away only at convergence, when the price of the initially cheaper (more expensive) good becomes more expensive (cheaper) than the walrasian one. The system converges when the sequential price reaches the walrasian price evaluated at current updated endowments. A perfectly symmetric setting, by initial mispricing and consequent rationed trading, creates asymmetric resource allocations even at convergence, where welfare is less than a standardized 1% lower than the auctioneer Pareto one.This model sketches a possible basis for price over-reaction microfoundation and captures endogenous "wealth divide" among the population, induced by whether agent trading is dominated by good preferences or just by speculation around their prices
Walrasian Tatonnement with Rationed Pairwise Trading
No full textThis paper characterizes the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a symmetric, pure exchange economy with two goods and N agents with uniformly distributed preferences and identical endowments. Relaxing the auctioneer assumption, but maintaining a global price rule, sequentially random pairwise trading at out-of-equilibrium prices is allowed. Initial mispricing implies rationing, determining excess demand (supply) fading away only at convergence, when the price of the initially cheaper (more expensive) good becomes more expensive (cheaper) than the walrasian one. The system converges when the sequential price reaches the walrasian price evaluated at current updated endowments. A perfectly symmetric setting, by initial mispricing and consequent rationed trading, creates asymmetric resource allocations even at convergence, where welfare is less than a standardized 1% lower than the auctioneer Pareto one.
This model sketches a possible basis for price over-reaction microfoundation and captures endogenous "wealth divide" among the population, induced by whether agent trading is dominated by good preferences or just by speculation around their prices
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