333,866 research outputs found
An analysis of feasible solutions for multi-issue negotiation involving non-linear utility functions
No full textThis paper analyzes bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self- interested agents. Specifically, we consider the case where issues are divisible, there are time constraints in the form of deadlines and discount factors, and the agents have different preferences over the issues. Given these differing preferences, it is possible to reach Pareto-optimal agreements by negotiating all the issues together using a package deal procedure (PDP). However, finding equilibrium strategies for this procedure is not always computationally easy. In particular, if the agents utility functions are nonlinear, then equi-librium strategies may be hard to compute. In order to overcome this complexity, we explore two different solutions. The first is to use the PDP for linear approximations of the given nonlinear utilities. The second solution is to use a simultaneous procedure (SP) where the issues are discussed in parallel but independently of each other. We then compare these two solutions both in terms of their computational properties (i.e., time complexity of computing an approximate equilibrium and the associated error of approximation) and their economic properties (i.e., the agents utilities and social welfare of the resulting outcome). By doing so, we show that an approximate equilibrium for the PDP and the SP can be found in polynomial time. In terms of the economic properties, although the PDP is known to generate Pareto optimal outcomes, we show that, in some cases, which we identify, the SP is better for one of the two agents and also increases the social welfare. Copyright © 2009, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
An agenda based framework for multi-issues negotiation
No full textThis paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this context we determine the conditions under which agents have similar preferences over the implementation scheme and the conditions under which they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium even when both players have uncertain information about each other, and each agent’s information is its private knowledge. We also study the properties of the equilibrium solution and determine conditions under which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto-optimal
CSC: Circular Strings Comparison
No full textDescription: Given two sequences x and y, CSC finds the cyclic rotation of x (or an approximation of it) that minimises the blockwise q-gram distance from y.
Installation: To compile CSC, please follow the instructions given in file INSTALL.
Citation:
Roberto Grossi, Costas S. Iliopoulos, Robert Mercas, Nadia Pisanti, Solon P. Pissis, Ahmad Retha, Fatima Vayani:
Circular Sequence Comparison with q-grams.
WABI 2015: 203-216.
License: GNU GPLv3 License; Copyright (C) 2015 Solon P. Pissis, Ahmad Retha and Fatima Vayani
Optimal negotiation of multiple issues in incomplete information settings
No full textThis paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents. The outcome of such encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda (i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed together or separately). Against this background, this paper analyses such negotiations by varying the agenda and negotiation procedure. This analysis is carried out in an incomplete information setting in which an agent knows its own negotiation parameters, but has incomplete information about its opponent’s. We first determine the equilibrium strategies for two negotiation procedures: issue-by-issue and package deal. On the basis of these strategies we determine the negotiation outcome for all possible agenda–procedure combinations and the optimal agenda–procedure combination for each agent. We determine those conditions for which agents have identical preferences over the optimal agenda and procedure and those for which they do not, and for both conditions we show the optimal agenda and procedure
Comparing equilibria for game theoretic and evolutionary bargaining models
No full textGame-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect rationality and that they always play an equilibrium strategy. In contrast research research in experimental economics shows that in bargaining between human subjects, participants do not always play the equilibrium strategy. Such agents are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against a boundedly rational opponent, a player's most effective strategy is not the equilibrium strategy, but the one that is the best reply to the opponent's actual strategy. Against this background, this paper studies the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational agents byusing genetic algorithms. Since bargaining involves players with different utility functions, we have two subpopulations - one represents the buyer, and the other represents the seller (i.e., the population is asymmetric). We study the competitive co-evolution of strategies in the two subpopulations for an incomplete information setting, and compare the results with those prescribed by game theory. Our analysis leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, our study shows that although each agent in the game-theoretic model has a strategy that is dominant at every period at which it makes a move, the stable state of the evolutionary model does not always match the game-theoretic equilibrium outcome. secondly, as the players mutually adapt to each other's strategy, the stable outcome depends on the initial population
An approximation method for power indices for voting games
No full textThe Shapley value and Banzhaf index are two well known indices for measuring the power a player has in a voting game. However, the problem of computing these indices is computationally hard. To overcome this problem, we analyze approximation methods for computing these indices. Although these methods have polynomial time complexity, finding an approximate Shapley value using them is easier than finding an approximate Banzhaf index. We also find the absolute error for the methods and show that this error for the Shapley value is lower than that for the Banzhaf index
A comparative study of game theoretic and evolutionary models for software agents
No full textMost of the existing work in the study of bargaining behaviour uses techniques from game theory. Game theoretic models for bargaining assume that players are perfectly rational and that this rationality in common knowledge. However, the perfect rationality assumption does not hold for real-life bargaining scenarios with humans as players, since results from experimental economics show that humans find their way to the best strategy through trial and error, and not typically by means of rational deliberation. Such players are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against an opponent with bounded rationality, the most effective strategy of a player is not the equilibrium strategy but the one that is the best reply to the opponent's strategy. The evolutionary model provides a means for studying the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational players. This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the game theoretic and evolutionary approaches to bargaining by examining their assumptions, goals, and limitations. We then study the implications of these differences from the perspective of the software agent developer
Fatima Jinnah
No full textAlthough fifty years have passed since the death of Fatima Jinnah - author, activist and stateswoman known in Pakistan as the &apos;mother of the nation&apos; - this is the first scholarly biography to tackle her life in full. Her background and contribution to Muslim nationalism under the British Raj, as well as her various efforts to consolidate the state, including a run for president in 1964, are told through previously untapped archival sources. Examining her life in the context of scholarship on South Asia and on women in Islam, Pirbhai assesses Fatima Jinnah&apos;s role through the theoretical lens of the colonial &apos;new woman&apos;. This is essential reading for all those interested in modern South Asian and Islamic history, particularly the themes of gender and colonialism, the roots of Muslim nationalism and the early challenges facing the Pakistani state, as shown through the extraordinary lived experience of its most influential female activist.</jats:p
Multi-issue negotiation under time constraints
No full textThis paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. In this model the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously as part of the bargaining equilibrium. We show that the sequential implementation of the equilibrium agreement gives a better outcome than a simultaneous implementation when agents have like, as well as conflicting, time preferences. We also show that the equilibrium solution possesses the properties of uniqueness and symmetry, although it is not always Pareto-optimal
Henri Lammens, S. J., Fatima et les filles de Mahomet
No full textXanthopoulos Th. Henri Lammens, S. J., Fatima et les filles de Mahomet. In: Échos d'Orient, tome 17, n°108, 1915. pp. 486-487
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