94,460 research outputs found

    An analysis of feasible solutions for multi-issue negotiation involving non-linear utility functions

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    This paper analyzes bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self- interested agents. Specifically, we consider the case where issues are divisible, there are time constraints in the form of deadlines and discount factors, and the agents have different preferences over the issues. Given these differing preferences, it is possible to reach Pareto-optimal agreements by negotiating all the issues together using a package deal procedure (PDP). However, finding equilibrium strategies for this procedure is not always computationally easy. In particular, if the agents utility functions are nonlinear, then equi-librium strategies may be hard to compute. In order to overcome this complexity, we explore two different solutions. The first is to use the PDP for linear approximations of the given nonlinear utilities. The second solution is to use a simultaneous procedure (SP) where the issues are discussed in parallel but independently of each other. We then compare these two solutions both in terms of their computational properties (i.e., time complexity of computing an approximate equilibrium and the associated error of approximation) and their economic properties (i.e., the agents utilities and social welfare of the resulting outcome). By doing so, we show that an approximate equilibrium for the PDP and the SP can be found in polynomial time. In terms of the economic properties, although the PDP is known to generate Pareto optimal outcomes, we show that, in some cases, which we identify, the SP is better for one of the two agents and also increases the social welfare. Copyright © 2009, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

    FIGURE 2. A–F in Agaricus radiatosquamulosus sp. nov. of A. subg. Spissicaules from Pakistan

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    FIGURE 2. A–F. Basidiomata of Agaricus radiatosquamulosus. A, B and D = BG01 (Holotype); C, E and F = N-224, Photos by Aiman Izhar and Nadia Fatima. Scale Bars = 1 cm.Published as part of Bashir, Hira, Fatima, Nadia, Izhar, Aiman, Niazi, Abdul Rehman, Khalid, Abdul Nasir & Callac, Philippe, 2023, Agaricus radiatosquamulosus sp. nov. of A. subg. Spissicaules from Pakistan, pp. 231-242 in Phytotaxa 579 (4) on page 237, DOI: 10.11646/phytotaxa.579.4.1, http://zenodo.org/record/756393

    A heuristic approximation method for the Banzhaf index for voting games

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    The Banzhaf index is a well known and widely used index for measuring the power a player has in a voting game. However, the problem of computing this index is computationally hard. To overcome this problem, a number of approximation methods were developed for one majority voting games. While it may be possible to extend some of these to k-majority games (which are generalized versions of one majority games), to date, there has been no performance analysis of these methods in the context of the Banzhaf index for k-majority games. In this paper, we fill this gap, by first presenting an approximation method for the Banzhaf index for k-majority games. This is a heuristic method that uses randomization to estimate an approximate. We then show that this method is computationally feasible. Finally, we evaluate its performance by analyzing its error of approximation, and show how the error varies with k. Specifically, we show that the average percentage error increases from 15% for games with k = 1 to 30% for games with k = 5

    FIGURE 1 in A new species of Askola Peters, 1969 (Ephemeroptera: Leptophlebiidae) from Southeastern Brazil

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    FIGURE 1. Map of South America and known distribution of Askola fortuita sp. nov. in Caparaó mountain range.Published as part of Salles, Frederico F. & Jabeen, Fatima, 2023, A new species of Askola Peters, 1969 (Ephemeroptera: Leptophlebiidae) from Southeastern Brazil, pp. 195-200 in Zootaxa 5315 (2) on page 196, DOI: 10.11646/zootaxa.5315.2.8, http://zenodo.org/record/813044

    Automated analysis of weighted voting games

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    Weighted voting games (WVGs) are an important mechanism for modeling scenarios where a group of agents must reach agreement on some issue over which they have different preferences. However, for such games to be effective, they must be well designed. Thus, a key concern for a mechanism designer is to structure games so that they have certain desirable properties. In this context, two such properties are PROPER and STRONG. A game is PROPER if for every coalition that is winning, its complement is not. A game is STRONG if for every coalition that is losing, its complement is not. In most cases, a mechanism designer wants games that are both PROPER and STRONG. To this end, we first show that the problem of determining whether a game is PROPER or STRONG is, in general, NP-hard. Then we determine those conditions (that can be evaluated in polynomial time) under which a given WVG is PROPER and those under which it is STRONG. Finally, for the general NP-hard case, we discuss two different approaches for overcoming the complexity: a deterministic approximation scheme and a randomized approximation method

    Voluntary and collective employer engagement and agency around the high-skill supply-demand relationship of education & training and VET in England.

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    The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.This article explores the underexamined idea of employer engagement as the institutional agency around the supply-demand relationship surrounding education and training (E&T) and VET in England (2012), arguing why VET needs are still likely to be unmet. A single case-study methodology and forty convergent interviews with high-skill employers and policy stakeholders revealed three types of highly constrained employer agencies, in England’s Northwest Bioregion, during a period when policy institutions faced restructuring and closure. The research is set against the backdrop of a previously failed and historically repeatedly revised VET institutional environment. In further addressing the lack of empirical evidence on the employer engagement problems faced by policy stakeholders during 2012, it reveals an individualised, voluntary, yet expected weak employer agency around supply-side initiatives. Also, a voluntary yet collective employer agency underpins the wider challenged efforts of policy stakeholders in engaging employers around E&T/VET, while also evident is a collective progressive employer agency around high-skill VET linked to R&D production. Discussions highlight the influence of supply-/demand-side constraints for current VET, questioning what has really changed

    A comparative study of game theoretic and evolutionary models for software agents

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    Most of the existing work in the study of bargaining behaviour uses techniques from game theory. Game theoretic models for bargaining assume that players are perfectly rational and that this rationality in common knowledge. However, the perfect rationality assumption does not hold for real-life bargaining scenarios with humans as players, since results from experimental economics show that humans find their way to the best strategy through trial and error, and not typically by means of rational deliberation. Such players are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against an opponent with bounded rationality, the most effective strategy of a player is not the equilibrium strategy but the one that is the best reply to the opponent's strategy. The evolutionary model provides a means for studying the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational players. This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the game theoretic and evolutionary approaches to bargaining by examining their assumptions, goals, and limitations. We then study the implications of these differences from the perspective of the software agent developer

    Variations on the Author

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    “Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
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