1,721,061 research outputs found

    Il problema delle emozioni

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    Si presenta il problema delle emozioni nella attuale ricerca filosofica internazionale, con particolare riferimento alla distinzione fra emozioni e altri fenomeni dell'affettività, quali gli uomini e le disposizioni affettive. Ci si concentra poi sul rapporto fra attività e passività nelle emozioni conflittuali, con particolare riferimento ad Aristotele. Si mostra infine la differenza fra ira e odio dal punto di vista comunicativo (sostenendo che nell'ira c'è una forte intenzione comunicativa che è assente nell'odio)

    The Myth of the Last Judgment in the Gorgias

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    In contrast with the standard interpretations of the final myth of judgments in the Gorgias, this article interprets it as a metaphorical way to address the contrast between rhetoric and philosophy. More specifically, the age of Chronos and the age of Zeus are not, according to the author, meant to convey Plato's own views on the afterlife. Rather, they are meant to represent two different attitudes towards life: the rhetorical attitude is exemplified by the age of Chronos, while the philosophical attitude is exemplified by the age of Zeus

    Che cos'è la filosofia politica? Il dibattito fra Strauss e Kojève sulla tirannide

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    What Is Political Philosophy? The Strauss-Kojève Debate On Tyranny. On Tyranny, by Leo Strauss and Alexander Kojève, is now available in Italian. The article examines the debate between the two philosophers, focussing primarily on their respective views of political philosophy and the opposition between ancients and moderns concerning such issues as the role of luck, the gap between theory and practice, and whether or not history is meaningful, teleologically oriented, able to prove (or disprove) political theory or, on the contrary, itself subject to theoretical judgment. The author explains how the debate centers around two fundamentally different views of the relationship between philosophy and love of recognition. While for Kojève subjective certainty becomes knowledge only when widely recognized (and hence proved correct by history), Strauss, whose starting points are Xenophon’s and Plato’s views on the relationship between love of honour and philosophy, maintains that recognition is no guarantee of truth and philosophy, in its most authentic form, is skeptical or zetetic

    Aristotle on Shame

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    The article concentrates both on the distinction between aidos and aischyne in Aristotle’s work and on the relevance of shame in Aristotle’s ethical theory. With respect to the Nicomachean Ethics, the question addressed is why Aristotle maintains that aidos can be helpful in the education to virtue but cannot itself be considered a virtue. With respect to the Rhetoric, the focus is first on the terminological distinction between aidos and aischyne, and subsequently on the relevance of temporality, and the role that witnesses are supposed to play with respect to aischyne. Having shown that Aristotle attributes to shame certain functions that today are commonly attributed to guilt, the author claims that for Aristotle shame covers a wider range of phenomena than one might expect: not only actions for which an agent can be responsible, but also situations in which the agent plays no active role, or even events in which the subject suffers passively evil done by others. The person who feels shame is faced with a gap between her beliefs and expectations about herself and a perspective from which she is seen as defective or degraded. When the feeling of degradation is a response to the apparent culpable behavior of others, shame paves the way to anger. The last part of the paper is devoted to exploring the relationship between shame and anger. The questions addressed are why shame can induce someone to anger and why, by contrast, someone feeling angry may remain insensitive to shame

    “The Desire for Recognition in Plato’s Symposium”

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    The paper argues that thumos, which is never explicitly mentioned as a part of the soul in the Symposium, plays a major role in the dialogue. In light of the Republic’s characterization of thumos as the source of emotions such as of love of honor, love of victory, admiration for courage, shame, anger, and the propensity to become indignant at real or imaginary wrongs, the paper argues that both Phaedrus’ speech and the speech of Alcibiades are shaped by thumoeidetic motivations. While Phaedrus’ stress on shame, honor, glory and courage aims at proving that Eros inspires virtue, the speech of Alcibiades shows that thumoeidetic motivations are not sufficient to shape a noble character. The dependence on recognition, the ambiguous role played by shame, and the tension between what is admirable and what just happens to be admired are implicit shortcomings in Phaedrus’ speech. When the same themes come back in Alcibiades’ speech they work as negative counterpoints to Phaedrus’ main arguments. Alcibiades’ obsession with power and victory dominates his ambivalent encomium of Socrates. The speech does not reveal who Socrates really is. Rather, it shows how the philosophical life can be misunderstood when reason’s best ally takes over in the souls of men

    Leo Strauss on Collingwood

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    Strauss’s invitation to understand Greek authors as they understood themselves was attacked by influential scholars as anti-historical. In the first part of the paper, I argue that the charge is due to a misunderstanding of Strauss’s position on the respective role of interpretation and criticism in historicism. In the second part, I highlight Strauss’s view of the tension between scientific history as the manifestation of a certain age, and scientific history as the culmination of historical progress. In the third part, I discuss Strauss’s thesis that the belief in progress prevented Collingwood from taking past thinkers seriously. Collingwood claimed that the Greeks failed to appreciate that age-long traditions shaped their thought. Strauss held the opposite: the beginning of Greek philosophy coincides with questioning the identity between the ancestral and the good, and philosophy in Plato’s Republic is shown to be a form of critical reflection on the reasons why certain traditions and myths can exercise political, religious, and psychological power

    Williams's Defense of Shame as a Moral Emotion

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    Section 1 examines four reasons most commonly adduced to support the claim that guilt is superior to shame, both psychologically and morally: a) While guilt expresses a concern for others shame is a self-centered and selfish emotion. b) While guilt appeals to autonomy shame is linked to heteronomy. c) Shame is not a reactive attitude, like guilt, indignation, blame, resentment, but an objective attitude, like disdain or disgust. d) While guilt invites us to second-person responses, shame inhibits them. The second part of the paper (sections 2 and 3) addresses Williams’s analysis of the role of shame in ancient Greek literature and philosophy. Section 2 is dedicated to Williams’s response to the objections concerning selfishness and shallowness and to discussing his reply to the charge that since shame belongs to the objective attitudes it tends to inhibit second-person responses. Section 3 concentrates on Williams’s reflections on heteronomy by focusing on the attitude of others in shame and on the role played by the internalized other
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