1,720,988 research outputs found
The ‘How' and ‘What' of Aesthetic Experience. Some Reflections Based on Noë's Strange Tools. Art and Human Nature
No full textBeing a book on art and its nature, Strange Tools deals with aesthetic experience as a crucial object of inquiry. Indeed, it offers several interesting insights into what aesthetic experience is and how we should (or should not) account for it. However, some aspects of Noë’s analysis raise questions, both about the act and about the object of aesthetic experience itself. In this paper, I will discuss these issues highlighting a potential conflict in the author’s analysis of aesthetic experience and providing some hints about the objective correlate of such an experience
The sense of we-agency and vitality attunement: between rhythmic alignment and emotional attunement
No full textIn this paper I focus on possible boosting factors for the sense of we-agency in joint actions. My aim is to shed light on a factor that, until now, has received little or no consideration at all, and that I call vitality attunement. I argue that vitality attunement stands between two other boosting factors for the sense of we-agency-i.e., rhythmic alignment and emotional attunement. Investigating two examples of joint action, i.e., dancing and joint musical performances, I show that vitality attunement is not reducible to either of the other two boosting factors and that it deserves to be studied on its own as a distinctive boosting factor for the sense of we-agency. In order to argue for my thesis, I first introduce some of the most crucial aspects of the sense of we-agency in joint actions, then I analyze how rhythmic alignment and emotional attunement have been argued to foster such an experience, and finally I introduce vitality attunement, describing how it too can be a boosting factor for the sense of we and of we-agency
Where Straus Meets Enactivism. Reflections on an Enactive Theory of Music Perception
No full textIn this paper, I will try to integrate Joel Krueger’s enactive theory of music perception with some of Erwin Straus’ reflections on different forms of experiencing spatiality and movement. Krueger (2009, 2011b) maintains that music perception is a form of active perception, in which our body and our ability to move with music act as vehicles to draw out certain features of the piece and to respond to the affordances it presents. However, the author does not specify what kind of movements are involved in the enactment of music perception. I will propose such a specification, using Straus’ distinction between goal-directed and expressive movements (Straus 1930)
Recognizing myself in my expressive body: a phenomenological account
No full textIn this paper I would like to investigate the possibility of one’s recognition of oneself in his/her lived body. Specifically, I will maintain the thesis that one can recognize him/herself as a person in his/her bodily expressive behaviour. In order to do so, I will give an account of the latter that, even recognizing the pre-reflective nature of bodily expressions, tries to highlight their belonging to the personal sphere of our life as embodied beings. At the basis of such an account, the idea of an individual bodily expressive style as a counterpart of one’s whole personal style will be developed
On the boundaries of cognition
No full textWhen it comes to the debate about the constitutive, supervenience basis for cognition and cognitive processes, two theoretical positions are often opposed to each other. The first is the intracranialist one, exemplified by Adams and Aizawa’s idea that cognition has its supervenience basis just within the boundaries of the brain. The second is the transcranialist one, exemplified by Noë’s and Clark and Chalmers’s theses that the constitutive basis of cognition and the mind can span the brain, the body and the environment. In this paper, I want to maintain that Adams and Aizawa’s main intracranialist argument against transcranialism does not hold. In this sense, the authors do not go any step further towards intracranialism and against transcranialism
From the Embodied Self to the Embodied Person. On the Constitution of One's Own Personal Expressive Style
No full textIn this paper, I will focus on the process of constitution of oneself as an embodied being and, more precisely, on the specific way in which one can experience oneself not just as an embodied self, but rather as the actual embodied person he/she is. I will start by describing the most basic way in which our embodied self is constituted, that is as a felt-feeling body and as the zero-point of orientation of all our sensations and perceptions. Then, I will show how our body can be constituted for us also as an instrument for action, leading to the experience of what Husserl called “I-can” (Husserl 1952, 159-160). I will argue that, even though in this latter form of body awareness we can experience some traits of our own personality, a further dimension of our embodied life – that is, the expressive one – allows us to have a more defined experience of the specific embodied persons we are. I will describe what “person” specifically means in my framework and, on this basis, I will show how the expressive dimension of our body can account for my experience of myself not just as an embodied self, but as the embodied person I am
What we see depends on how we move. The embodied roots of visual perception
No full textThe aim of this paper is to highlight the role that our lived body has in shaping our perceptual life. Through Husserl’s description of the way in which we perceive the world around us, we will underline the fact that our body is not just an object among others for us, but a fundamental constitutive principle of our own experience. In this way, we will try to maintain that to perceive is, in some sense, to have an implicit and pre-reflective knowledge of our embodied relation to the world
Emotions and challenges to justice
No full textIn this special issue, our aim is to analyse the role of emotions with particular attention to shaping political actions in the face of present challenges to justice. The relationship between the widespread rise of collective emotions and the experience of injustice in our societies is a pressing issue, both in our everyday practice of ethical and political discourse and in philosophical reflection and discussion. Some negative emotions-such as fear, resentment, greed, distrust towards institutions, and disrespect for basic human rights-are often manipulated and amplified. Other, more positive, emotions, such as respect, hope, solidarity, and affinity, often seem to be not enough to give rise to alternative policies. This worldwide problem reflects a deep economic, social, and existential crisis. In this framework, philosophical reflection on emotions can be put fruitfully in dialogue with the contemporary philosophical analysis of collective intentionality and collective agency, which aims at investigating the nature of different types of groups and their main features as well as phenomena such as sense of group membership and group agency. Indeed, it is often argued that collective emotions boost the sense of group belonging in individual members and act to reduce uncertainty in joint actions. In normative terms, feelings such as the rejection of cruelty have been proposed as the foundation of moral equality, and even rationalistic approaches tend to focus on respect first of all as a feeling, as Kant maintained
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