1,721,097 research outputs found
Do Regulators Know Better?
No full textBehavioral regulation is on the agenda of politicians and authorities of most countries. Mandatory approaches and coercive legislation have financial, but also political, costs that are becoming more and more difficult to afford; also the effectiveness and the applicability of these kinds of rules in some domains is in question. This puts alternative solutions like the ones that are within the scope of the Befairly initiative at the center of the academic and policy debate. But because they are popular, and
fashionable, and blessed by a huge recent success, these approaches might
be misinterpreted and misapplied. To avoid this possible outcome a serious and critical debate has to
develop; not all measures are equivalent, not all of them are effective and appropriate in any situation. A critical attitude from those who are certainly convinced of the necessity of adopting a behavioral perspective is appropriate and advisable to try to avoid mistakes.
In this chapter issues which are essential for structuring action are debated such as the necessity to develop a common and shared vision of objectives, once an adequate comprehension of the actual economic framework is reached, the suitability of soft compared to hard approaches to regulation, the competence and accountability of regulators
How financial decisions are affected by financial literacy levels, behavioral aspects and individual propensities: an empirical analysis of Italian young adults
No full textOpen Banking: la prospettiva dei clienti
No full textDal 14 settembre 2019 è entrata in vigore la direttiva Psd2 con le disposizioni in tema di autenticazione forte che, fin da subito, hanno avuto effetto sulle modalità di accesso all’Internet Banking e sui pagamenti digitali; ma se questa parte della nuova normativa è immediatamente percepibile, altre disposizioni, quelle che aprono le porte all’Open Banking, pur vigenti, esplicheranno i loro effetti in un tempo e con un’intensità tutta da definire. Se la nuova normativa abilita le banche e le non banche ad offrire servizi innovativi anche, e soprattutto, mediante nuove modalità e regole di accesso ai dati dei clienti/consumatori, questi ultimi sono disponibili a dare questa facoltà? E in caso affermativo, per fare cosa e a quali condizioni?
Per rispondere a queste domande, il volume, che presenta l’ottavo rapporto di ricerca Crif-Sda Bocconi, con la partecipazione di Nomisma, si focalizza sull’analisi della domanda, sulle propensioni e sulle aspettative dei clienti/consumatori, attraverso un questionario sottoposto ad un campione di rispondenti suddiviso in 4 classi demografiche (Baby Boomers, GenX, Old Millennials, Young Millennials) e segmentato in 3 gruppi distinti in base ad una maggiore o minore attitudine digitale. I temi affrontati riguardano:
– preferenze e modalità di acquisto dei consumatori e metodi di pagamento utilizzati;
– modalità di utilizzo della banca e dei servizi offerti;
– percezioni ed aspettative rispetto alla banca;
– disponibilità ed interesse dei consumatori a condividere informazioni personali.
In particolare, con riguardo a quest’ultimo aspetto, vero fattore abilitante della diffusione dell’Open Banking, dalla ricerca è emerso che il 20% ha risposto positivamente e non ha quindi preclusioni nel condividere le proprie informazioni personali pur di ottenere vantaggi in termini di servizi innovativi e personalizzati. Non basta che la normativa crei il quadro all’interno del quale le informazioni possono essere scambiate e che le banche vi si attengano. Perché l’Open Banking decolli è necessario che i consumatori accedano concretamente alle possibilità che la Psd2 offre loro, cogliendone le opportunità.
Vi sono dunque i presupposti perché lo scenario reso possibile dalle disposizioni della Psd2 si realizzi; sta ora alle banche e più in generale all’industry finanziaria raccogliere la sfida ed interpretare in modo creativo ed innovativo il proprio ruolo ed il proprio posizionamento strategico
The Italian Alternative Dispute Resolution (Adr) Mechanism and Customer Behaviour
No full textEncouraging and fostering the creation of Adrs is becoming one of the priorities for national and international regulators. The cost of traditional judiciary systems is indeed generally too high to ensure adequate access to justice for consumers. As a matter of fact, the level of minimum cost sets a threshold which, eventually save for collective actions, prevents most consumer complaints to find access in court. Since this fact is certainly true, in case of financial contracts, the European Union has approved appropriate regulations forcing Member States to create Adrs which are competent for settling banking and investments complaints.
The opportunity for the consumer to access justice represents not only the answer to a request for fairness of treatment and equality, but it is also essential for a proper functioning of the market and for efficiency. If unfair suppliers were shielded by the judiciary sanctions due to the costs to access traditional judgment, they would easily opportunistically gain profit from transactions benefitting from the appropriate behavior of more convenient suppliers and this way, distorting market conditions at the detriment of both consumers and competitors.
There are then strong motivations to reduce the cost of accessing justice and they are significant for all stakeholders. However, whereas an excessive cost of justice encourages opportunistic behaviors from the part of suppliers, setting the cost at an excessively low level also provides incentives for equal opportunistic behaviours and damages consumers as well as suppliers, hampering the market’s efficiency.
In the paper the behaviours of consumers appealing to Abf are examined,trying to understand if a prevailing examination of this body upon specific issues has the effect of “attracting” complaints on those matters; the fact that decisions on certain subjects are mostly favorable to appellants encourages consumers to take actions since the minimum cost of appealing, as a matter of fact, does not represent a disincentive for unmotivated claims and for a reckless approach to appealing.
Should this situation prove to be true, negative impacts would affect not only the financial industry but also consumers and the Abf system’s efficiency; whereas financial institutions would surely re-price their products taking into account the risk of being frequently and significantly condemned to pay indemnities to appellants, the capacity of the Adr system to address issues which actually require attention and decision is weakened by the volume of standard and recurring matters that would be submitted to the decision.
The first evidence of the analysis shows that for a considerable amount of products (namely Atm/Pos and night safe, Loans secured by a pledge of salary, Credit accounts, Consumer credit and Mortgages) there is indeed said “attraction” effect; this fact has an impact on the system’s efficiency, on the overall costs, but also on the behaviours of the consumers, providers and lenders as an ex-post redefinition is most likely to occur. What is also worth pointing out is that what we called “attraction” effect is almost immediate as it occurs in a two-year span; since the Abf decisions are public but not widely popular and well known, it is difficult to understand how such a large number of consumers becomes aware in such a short time of decisions of a certain relevance, but to some extent strictly technical, and accordingly react promptly. The reasonable explanation, which is confirmed by an empirical observation, though not yet proved by specific data, is that “facilitators” play a significant role in seeking potential appellants who are encouraged to submit a complaint to the Abf. This activity would not be, for itself, negative and to some extent could accelerate the effect of market discipline which is one of the aims of the Abf. The problem is that the so-called “facilitators” are acting for profit, gaining interest not only from lenders but also from consumers and that their misdeeds contaminate and distort the Abf’s activity forcing it to work on serial complaints and undermining its original role of a free access judicial service.
The fact that the Abf’s activity can be easily and significantly driven to focus on certain issues shows that it is vulnerable and subject to abuse; this is clearly harmful not only for the financial industry, but mainly for the market and for consumers which are deprived of the easy and convenient access to Adr
Qualche riferimento concettuale
No full textIl saggio introduce il modello teorico di riferimento (Lawrence e Nohria) utilizzato per interpretare il quadro delle motivazioni delle persone impiegarte nelle banche e delinea le ragioni del deterioramento del clima intern
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