1,720,973 research outputs found
Language, Experience and Reality. A one day workshop to celebrate Hector-Neri Castañeda and his contributions to philosophy on the 20th anniversary of his death
No full textConvegno internazionale con relatori: Francesco Orilia, Tomis Kapitan, William J. Rapaport, Erwin Tegtmeier, Alberto Voltolini, Javier Cumpa, Venanzio Raspa, Gregory Landini, Adriano Palma, Giuseppe Varnier, David McCarthy und Dale Jacquett
The Compatibility of Downward Causation and Emergence
No full textIn this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly interconnected, presuppose the presence of levels of reality. However, emergence and downward causation pull in opposite directions with respect to my best reconstruction of what levels are. The upshot is that emergence stresses the autonomy among levels while downward causation puts the distinction between levels at risk of a reductio ad absurdum, with the further consequence of blurring the very notion of downward. Therefore, emergence and downward causation are not fit to each other vis-a-vis the concept of level
A STRUCTURAL AND FOUNDATIONAL ANALYSIS OF EUCLID’S PLANE GEOMETRY: THE CASE STUDY OF CONTINUITY
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Basic Ontology, Multiple Realizability and Mental Causation
No full textIn basic ontology philosophers dispute inter alia about the nature of properties and events. Two main rival views can be identified in the current debate. According to universalism, properties are universals and events are structured entities involving as constituents (in a typical case) a particular, a property qua universal and a time. In contrast, according to tropism, properties are tropes, abstract particulars that can also be viewed as events. This paper analyzes the resources that these two doctrines can offer in an attempt to construct a nonreductive physicalist account of the mental that accommodates multiple realizability without falling prey to epiphenomenalism (in short, NENRP). The tropist resources allow for success by means of a strategy leading to a non-unitarian doctrine. This rules out the unitarian idea, according to which creatures with important physical differences can still have the very same experiences. This tropist strategy can be “simulated” in a version of universalism, with the same non-unitarian consequences. However, from the perspective of another, possibly more natural, version of universalism, one can perhaps find another avenue for NENRP, which brings with it a unitarian point of view. The resulting approach strongly suggests, in contrast to one based on tropism, the possibility of something like self-acquaintance as understood by philosophers such as Russell or Chisholm. In sum, the paper shows ways in which basic ontology matters in philosophy of mind
Three Grades of Downward Causation
No full textthis paper presents three different models of causation that make room in different ways for the idea that there can be downward causation going from the psychological to the physical level
Downward Causation: An Opinionated Introduction
No full textIntroduction to the contemporary debate on downward causation in science and philosoph
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