1,721,612 research outputs found
Brief von Kurt Rothschild an Ernst Fehr
No full textBRIEF VON KURT ROTHSCHILD AN ERNST FEHR
Brief von Kurt Rothschild an Ernst Fehr ([1]
Brief von Helga Duda und Ernst Fehr an Kurt Rothschild
No full textBRIEF VON HELGA DUDA UND ERNST FEHR AN KURT ROTHSCHILD
Brief von Helga Duda und Ernst Fehr an Kurt Rothschild ([1]
Wir wollen mittelfristig in der Weltklasse mitspielen
Full text linkErnst Fehr baut die Wirtschaftsfakultät der Universität Zürich kräftig aus – auf rund 30 Professore
"Ökonomen müssen nicht populär sein"
No full textDer Zürcher Starökonom Ernst Fehr über die Kritik an den Wirtschaftswissenschaften und die Lehren aus der jüngsten Finanzkrise
"Ich hoffe, dass Frau Gössi bei den Freisinnigen Erfolg hat"
Full text linkDer einflussreiche Ökonom Ernst Fehr spricht sich für eine umfassende CO2-Steuer aus und fordert ein
umweltpolitisches Umdenken bei der FDP
Bonus-Kriterien sind oft leicht manipulierbar
No full textFür das, was sie leisten, sind die Boni vieler Manager zu hoch, meint Ernst Fehr. Der Ökonom erklärt, wie ein gut gemachtes Vergütungssystem aussehen sollte und warum eine gesetzliche Obergrenze sinnlos ist
Sustainability: Game human nature
No full textFinding ways to adapt natural tendencies and nudge collective action is central to the well-being of future generations, say Helga Fehr-Duda and Ernst Fehr
Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player
Full text linkWe analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.Experiments, Leadership, Reciprocity, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
An Uninterpreted Spatial Version of the Trust Game: Evidence of Reciprocity without Suggestive Words, Evidence of Iterated Dominance Self-Taught
Full text linkIn this working paper we report on two trust games: a BDM-like game which is interpreted through its use of the possibly suggestive words “show up fee,” “sends,” “tripled,” “send back”; and an uninterpreted spatial game that does not use these words suggestive or not. In the spatial game we found a considerable amount of reciprocity, which implies the words are not necessary for reciprocity. For further comparison we designed the two games to have a correspondence relation (the relation extends to the original BDM trust game). We focused on two “variables” – interpreted or uninterpreted and spatial or word-based. We also designed “constants” which were identical or near identical in the two games. We did this to reduce confounding in statistical comparisons. We found the frequency of reciprocity in the spatial game, without the suggestive words, was about the same as the frequency of reciprocity in the BDM-like game, with the suggestive words. We found iterated dominance in the spatial game was 5.5 times higher than in the BDM-like game. And we found sending the full endowment was significantly more frequent in the BDM-like game than in the spatial game.#
Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement
Full text linkWe discuss survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction norm violations – such as evading taxes, drunk driving, fare dodging, or skiving off work – by expressing disapproval or social exclusion. Our data suggest that people condition their sanctioning behavior on their belief about the frequency of norm violations. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower the individuals' inclination to punish it. Based on an instrumental variable approach, we demonstrate that this pattern reflects a causal relationship.Norm Enforcement, Sanctioning, Social Norms, Survey Evidence
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