1,720,991 research outputs found

    Children engage in competitive altruism

    No full text
    Humans cultivate their reputations as good cooperators, sometimes even competing with group mates, to appear most cooperative to individuals during the process of selecting partners. To investigate the ontogenetic origins of such “competitive altruism,” we presented 5- and 8-year-old children with a dyadic sharing game in which both children simultaneously decided how many rewards to share with each other. The children were either observed by a third-person peer or not. In addition, the children either knew that one of them would be picked for a subsequent collaborative game or had no such knowledge. We found that by 8 years of age, children were more generous in the sharing game not only when their behavior was observed by a third party but also when it could affect their chances of being chosen for a subsequent game. This is the first demonstration of competitive altruism in young children, and as such it underscores the important role of partner choice (and individual awareness of the process) in encouraging human cooperation from an early age

    Human children but not chimpanzees make irrational decisions driven by social comparison

    Full text link
    Human evolutionary success is often argued to be rooted in specialized social skills and motivations that result in more prosocial, rational and cooperative decisions. One manifestation of human ultra-sociality is the tendency to engage in social comparison. While social comparison studies typically focus on cooperative behaviour and emphasize concern for fairness and equality, here we investigate the competitive dimension of social comparison: a preference for getting more than others, expressed in a willingness to maximize relative payoff at the cost of absolute payoff. Chimpanzees and human children (5–6- and 9–10-year-olds) could decide between an option that maximized their absolute payoff (but put their partner at an advantage) and an option that maximized their relative payoff (but decreased their own and their partner's payoff). Results show that, in contrast to chimpanzees and young children, who consistently selected the rational and payoff-maximizing option, older children paid a cost to reduce their partner's payoff to a level below their own. This finding demonstrates that uniquely human social skills and motivations do not necessarily lead to more prosocial, rational and cooperative decision-making

    Group membership biases children's evaluation of evidence

    No full text
    People form beliefs not only as individual agents, but as members of social groups. Here, we investigate how group membership influences belief formation and revision in childhood. Across three studies (N = 262), 4-6-year-old children either joined one of two groups or neither group, then evaluated evidence to arrive at a conclusion. Children who belonged to a group were more convinced by evidence that supported their ingroup's belief (Study 1 & 2) and were less convinced by evidence that opposed their ingroup's belief (Study 3), leading them to hold inaccurate group beliefs. Children who did not belong to a group rationally evaluated the available evidence and arrived at accurate conclusions. These results suggest that group membership modulates children's evidentiary standards

    Helping in young children and chimpanzees shows partiality towards friends

    No full text
    Friendship naturally leads to treating some people differently from the way we treat everyone else. One manifestation of such preferential treatment is in the domain of prosociality: we are more likely to extend favors towards our friends. Little is known about the developmental and evolutionary roots of such preferential prosociality. Here, we investigate whether young children and chimpanzees show partiality towards friends in helping contexts. Results show that young children at the age of three – when they first form preferential peer relationships – already bias their helping decisions in favor of their friends, both when they have to make a choice whether to help a friend or a neutral peer (Study 1) and when measuring their overall motivation to help (Study 2). In Study 3, by combining observational and experimental methods, we demonstrate similar though less robust motivations to provide help preferentially to friends in our closest living relatives, chimpanzees. Taken together, these studies suggest that partiality towards friends is grounded early in ontogeny and human evolution
    corecore