4 research outputs found
The Political Ecology of Forest Management in Ghana: Actors, Interests and Practices in the Assin North Municipality.
Get PDFThe Assin North Municipality is endowed with forest resources that are used for economic purposes. This study focused on the interests of the actors involved in the management of off-reserve forests in the municipality and how their interactions influence forest management outcomes. The study collected primary data through interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), observations and photography using 8 weeks in the field between May to July 2012. The study conducted 35 structured interviews using questionnaires; 14 unstructured interviews; two (2) semi-structured interviews; and five (5) FDGs to gather data on forest actors, interests and practices from the study area. Participants in the study included farmers, staff of the Forest Service Division of the Forestry Commission, Bush managers of logging companies, staff of the Municipal Assembly and chiefs. Through the lens of political ecology, the study revealed that actors in the municipality are enmeshed in a competitive battle for the economic benefits accruing from the commercial exploitation of forest resources (timber). Again, actors do not have equal powers in such a competitive battle. Legal and regulatory instruments in forestry have conferred much power on state institutions (such as the Forestry Commission) and logging companies by creating a conducive normative haven from which they dominate and marginalise farmers and community members in actor-interactions such as benefit sharing, permit allocation and consent, timber tree usage and compensation payments. To have their way in such interactions therefore, these weaker actors dwell on hidden discourses to craft and use weapons of resistance such as illegal logging, deliberate tree destruction and arson – practices that impede sustainable forest management in the municipality. With this, the study concluded that failures in forest management in the municipality are inevitable outcomes of the politics of resource use and control (domination/marginalisation and resistance). Keywords: Forest management, Political ecology, actors, interests, marginalisation, politicised environmen
Sustaining off-reserve forests in Ghana: a game-theoretic approach
Get PDFThis thesis explores options for resolving the ongoing tenure and compensation conflicts in the off-reserve forests (non-plantation forests outside permanent forest reserves) in Ghana. The ongoing degradation of the forests has been attributed to the prevalent tenure and compensation conflicts among cocoa farmers, the government, and logging concessionaires. Cocoa farmers nurture and preserve naturally growing trees in the off-reserve forests. They even plant indigenous tree species on their farms for the purpose of providing additional shades for their cocoa crops. Yet since 1998, the government has denied farmers any legal rights to the shade trees they retain on their farms. In addition, crops are extensively damaged by logging and transporting activities occurring on cocoa farms. However, most concessionaires fail to adequately compensate affected farmers.
Farmers tend to resort to unsustainable forest practices as a result of these tenure and compensation conflicts. They markedly reduce shade tree density when cocoa crops start bearing pods by cutting down or killing many young trees and engaging in illegal (chainsaw) logging. Thus, the key research question investigated by this thesis is: what is the most optimal policy option for minimising unsustainable forest practices among farmers? To respond to this question, this thesis developed game-theoretic models to predict the future behaviour of some key stakeholders under hypothetical policy scenarios. The predictions of the game-theoretic models were then tested with empirical data collected from farmers and concessionaires in Ghana in 2016.
The current behaviours of the concessionaires and farmers in the off-reserve forests were found to be consistent with the rational-choice model. These stakeholders are behaving in ways that will maximise their expected values in the off-reserve forests. Both the theoretical and empirical results revealed that farmers are less likely to be fully compensated should they pursue compensation on their own. It was found that a credible threat of litigation by a third-party advocate is likely to be the most optimal option to ensure that concessionaires fully and promptly compensate farmers for crop damage. More importantly, the most optimal policy option to motivate farmers to increase tree density and diversity and minimise farmer-driven illegal logging is a policy mix that concurrently provides 40% of stumpage revenue to farmers; ensures full compensation for crop damage through third-party litigation; and strictly enforces the tree harvesting rule using FC-farmer partnerships.Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Social Sciences, 201
The Contribution of Periodic Markets to Internally Generated Fund (IGF) of Ejisu-Juaben Municipal Assembly
Get PDFAs part of Ghana's fiscal decentralisation programme, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies are mandated to mobilise resources internally to reduce dependence on the external sources of funds. Internally Generated Funds (IGF) of MMDAs in Ghana has been relatively low since 1993. The focus of this paper is to assess the contribution of revenue mobilisation from periodic markets to Internally Generated Fund (IGF). Simple random sampling techniques were used to select 94 market sellers in the municipality and officers of the Assembly using purposive sampling. The four main periodic markets were located in Ejisu, Juaben, Kwaso and Boamadumase. Interview guides and structured questionnaires were used to collect data. The study found that the Municipality practice Public-Private Partnership (PPP) with REVSOL Company in local revenue collection. The proceeds from periodic markets contributed 7.5 percent and 7.8 percent in 2010 and 2011 respectively. A number of factors affect revenue collection from periodic markets in the Municipality. These include; lack of accountability and transparency, lack of adequate logistics, weak institutional collaboration, inadequate motivation to revenue collectors, inadequate revenue collectors, lack of skilled personnel, poor development of the market and weak legal and regulatory framework
Reversing Ecological Degradation: A Way Forward for Global Environmental Governance
Get PDFEnvironmental governance aims at sustaining earth's ecosystem to be able to cater for the needs of generation unborn as well as protect nature from extinction. However, five decades of environmental governance have yielded abysmal results due to lack of strong institutions to carry out the environmental mandate. Moreover, there is lack of commitment towards environmental negotiations and compliance. There is also little efforts to enforce agreements and regulations while little incentive exists for adherence to these agreements. This paper therefore presents a brief exposition on environmental governance by elucidating its main dimensions and challenges; and proceeds to offer a way forward for environmental governance with insights from multi-level governance, taking into consideration the challenges and (political ecology and ecological economics) critiques of the mainstream
