2 research outputs found

    Self-control depletion in capuchin monkeys: does delay of gratification rely on a limited resource?

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    Self-control failure has enormous personal and societal consequences. One of the most debated models explaining why self-control breaks down is the Strength Model, according to which self-control depends on a limited resource. Either previous acts of self-control or taking part in highly demanding cognitive tasks have been shown to reduce self-control, possibly due to a reduction in blood glucose levels. However, several studies yielded negative ?ndings, and recent meta-analyses questioned the robustness of the depletion effect in humans. We investigated, for the ?rst time, whether the Strength Model applies to a non-human primate species, the tufted capuchin monkey. We tested ?ve capuchins in a self-control task (the Accumulation task) in which food items were accumulated within individual\u27s reach for as long as the subject refrained from taking them. We evaluated whether capuchins\u27 performance decreases: (i) when tested before receiving their daily meal rather than after consuming it (Energy Depletion Experiment), and (ii) after being tested in two tasks with different levels of cognitive complexity (Cognitive Depletion Experiment). We also tested, in both experiments, how implementing self-control in each trial of the Accumulation task affected this capacity within each session and/or across consecutive sessions. Repeated acts of self- control in each trial of the Accumulation task progressively reduced this capacity within each session, as predicted by the Strength Model. However, neither experiencing a reduction in energy level nor taking part in a highly demanding cognitive task decreased performance in the subsequent Accumulation task. Thus, whereas capuchins seem to be vulnerable to within-session depletion effects, to other extents our ?ndings are in line with the growing body of studies that failed to ?nd a depletion effect in humans. Methodological issues potentially affecting the lack of depletion effects in capuchins are discussed

    False belief understanding and "cool" inhibitory control in 3-and 4-year-old Italian children.

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    During preschool years, major developments occur in both executive function and theory of mind (ToM), and several studies have demonstrated a correlation between these processes. Research on the development of inhibitory control (IC) has distinguished between more cognitive, "cool" aspects of self-control, measured by con?ict tasks, that require inhibiting an habitual response to generate an arbitrary one, and "hot," affective aspects, such as affective decision making, measured by delay tasks, that require inhibition of a prepotent response. The aim of this study was to investigate the relations between 3- and 4-year-olds\u27 performance on a task measuring false belief understanding, the most widely used index of ToM in preschoolers, and three tasks measuring cognitive versus affective aspects of IC. To this end, we tested 101 Italian preschool children in four tasks: (a) the Unexpected Content False Belief task, (b) the Con?ict task (a simpli?ed version of the Day-Night Stroop task), (c) the Delay task, and (d) the Delay Choice task. Children\u27s receptive vocabulary was assessed by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary test. Children\u27s performance in the False Belief task was signi?cantly related only to performance in the Con?ict task, controlling for vocabulary and age. Importantly, children\u27s performance in the Con?ict task did not signi?cantly correlate with their performance in the Delay task or in the Delay Choice task, suggesting that these tasks measure different components of IC. The dissociation between the Con?ict and the Delay tasks may indicate that monitoring and regulating a cool process (as ?exible categorization) may involve different abilities than monitoring and regulating a hot process (not touching an available and highly attractive stimulus or choosing between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed one). Moreover, our ?ndings support the view that "cool" aspects of IC and ToM are interrelated, extending to an Italian sample of children previous ?ndings on an association between self-control and ToM
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