1,720,992 research outputs found
The Experts, the Virtuous and the Wounded. Who Should Take Part in an «Ideal Conversation»? A Note on Philip Kitcher’s «Moral Progress»
No full textElisabetta Lalumera and Sarah Songhorian discuss Philip Kitcher’s Moral Progress. Lalumera focuses on the notion of «ideal conversation» as central to Kitcher’s democratic contractualism, raising concerns about the criteria for inclusion, the role of expertise, and the tension between inclusivity and the requirement for virtuous participants. Songhorian explores the interplay between individual and social dimensions of moral progress, highlighting Kitcher’s rejection of teleological or discovery-based conceptions in favor of a pragmatic, problem-solving approach
MEFISTO- Rivista di Medicina, Filosofia e Storia
No full textRivista di filosofia e storia della medicin
Etica della comunicazione sanitaria
No full textUna sintetica introduzione alle principali questioni etiche e filosofiche riguardanti la comunicazione sanitaria: la comunicazione fra medico e paziente e quella fra istituzioni, sanitari e cittadini. In uno scenario in cui autonomia e consenso della persona sono sempre più rilevanti nelle scelte di cura e di tutela della salute, si delinea un quadro concettuale aggiornato per affrontare temi problematici come la comunicazione della diagnosi, l’impostazione delle campagne di prevenzione e salute pubblica, il ruolo dei medici come esperti nei media
Resistenza alla vaccinazione: il ruolo della fiducia e dei valori
No full textTrust in healthcare system is a key element for understanding vaccine hesitancy, and for dealing with it. In this paper I outline a conceptual model of the relation of trust between the public and the health care system, drawing from health care studies and the philosophical literature. Key components of the model are values, epistemic authority, vulnerability and credibility. I also briefly suggest how the features of such a model may help implementing communication strategies addressed to hesitant parents
Perché la salute non è completo benessere | Why health is not complete well-being
Full text linkI concetti di salute e benessere adottati dalle istituzioni sanitarie e dalla comunità scientifica influenzano le policy di salute, la ricerca e la cura. Questo articolo analizza analizza la definizione dell'Oms di salute come completo benessere, che raggiunge l'obiettivo di legittimare un ampio mandato per la salute pubblica, ma ha problemi di chiarezza e di applicabilità e, soprattutto, ha l'effetto di medicalizzare tutta la vita umana. I costi dell'identificare la salute con il benessere sembrano maggiori dei vantaggi, anche se la definizione dell'Oms è altamente motivante.Diverse notions of health and well-being play a pivotal role in shaping both research directions and healthcare policies. This article critically examines the World Health Organization's (WHO) comprehensive conception of health as holistic well-being, delving into the discourse within medical and philosophical literature. While this definition effectively fosters an expansive foundation for public health initiatives, it is not without its challenges
in terms of lucidity and practicability. Chiefly, it tends to pathologize the entirety of human existence. The drawbacks associated with equating health solely with well-being appear to surpass the advantages, despite the undeniable motivational force encapsulated within the WHO's defnitio
Psichiatria e neuroscienza cognitiva: la proposta di Dominic Murphy
No full textA quite radical way to look at psychiatry has been recently proposed by Dominic Murphy, who boldly defends a «strong medical model», seeing psychiatry as a branch of cognitive neuroscience. In the present paper, we overview and discuss Murphy's proposal focusing on three different but related theses. First, the claim that a mental disorder must be identified with a pathological process that takes place in the brain and can be eventually individuated with the methodology of cognitive neuroscience. Second, the assertion that psychiatric explanation must be regarded as causal and multilevel: it should eventually aim at discovering what are the underlying mechanisms of mental disorders, but also acknowledge that these mechanisms can be located at different levels, none of which is privileged. Third, the critique to the most relevant nosology of mental disorders, that of DSM-5, which is merely descriptive and classifies mental disorders according to their signs and symptoms
Il criterio del “danno” nella definizione di disturbo mentale del DSM. Alcune riflessioni epistemologiche
Full text linkIn this paper, we analyse the harm requirement in the general definition of mental disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM). This issue has both philosophical and clinical relevance: on the one hand the harm requirement is a normative, value-laden, non-objective component in the definition of mental disorder; on the other hand, the harm requirement has often been defended on the grounds that it prevents an increase in false positives. The issue is also important in assessing the relationship between psychiatry and somatic medicine, more precisely, between the DSM and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). We argue that there are good reasons not to maintain the harm requirement in the general definition of mental disorder. After a brief introduction, we overview the history of the harm requirement across the various editions of the DSM. Then, we examine the main objection to the inclusion of the harm requirement in the general definition of mental disorder, that is, the problem of false negatives, and also present several other points – both practical and conceptual – that help demonstrate why the harm requirement is inadequate as a definiens of mental disorder. To conclude, we stress that the decision of the DSM-5 task force not to regard the harm requirement as a necessary component of mental disorder should be endorsed
The Experts, the Virtuous and the Wounded. Who Should Take Part in an «Ideal Conversation»?
No full textElisabetta Lalumera and Sarah Songhorian discuss Philip Kitcher’s Moral Progress. Lalumera focuses on the notion of «ideal conversation» as central to Kitcher’s democratic contractualism, raising concerns about the criteria for inclusion, the role of expertise, and the tension between inclusivity and the requirement for virtuous participants. Songhorian explores the interplay between individual and social dimensions of moral progress, highlighting Kitcher’s rejection of teleological or discovery-based conceptions in favor of a pragmatic, problem-solving approach
Overcoming Expert Disagreement In A Delphi Process. An Exercise In Reverse Epistemology
Full text linkDisagreement among experts is a central topic in social epistemology. What should an expert do when confronted with the different opinion of an epistemic peer? Possible answers include the steadfast view (holding to one’s belief), the abstemious view (suspending one’s judgment), and moderate conciliatory views, which specify criteria for belief change when a peer’s different opinion is encountered. The practice of Delphi techniques in healthcare, medicine, and social sciences provides a real-life case study of expert disagreement, where disagreement is gradually transformed into consensus. An analysis of Delphi shows that moderate conciliatory views are descriptively more adequate than rival views. However, it also casts doubt on whether the debate in social epistemology is explanatory relevant vis-à-vis real life cases of expert disagreement, where consensus replaces truth, and acceptance is more explanatorily relevant than belief
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