1,720,973 research outputs found

    Being Trans, Being Loved: Clashing Identities and the Limits of Love

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    There is no specific trans perspective on romantic love. Trans people love and do not love, fall in love and fall out of love, just like everyone else. Trans people inhabit different sexual identities, different relationship types, and different kinds of loving. When it comes to falling in love as or with a trans person, however, things can get more complicated, as questions of gender and sexual identity emerge. In a study by Blair & Hoskin from 2018, 87.5% of the interviewed participants said they would not consider dating a trans person (Blair & Hoskin, 2018). Among those who were open to dating trans people, a pattern emerged: the subjects were disproportionately willing to date trans men but not trans women, even if this preference did not match their own sexual identity; for example, a woman who identifies as a lesbian may be open to dating a trans man but not a trans woman. This seems like a clash of sexual and gender identities: why are women who identify as lesbians willing to date men? This chapter aims to analyze this phenomenon: love between clashing sexual and gender identities – e.g., the love between a man, who identifies as being romantically interested in men, and a trans woman, – and thereby evaluates the limits of romantic love for trans people. Limits of love, in this chapter, are conceived of as normative restrictions on whom and how we love. By exploring cases of clashing sexual and gender identities in romantic love, this chapter analyzes how trans people’s opportunities for love are often limited

    COVID-19 and Trans Healthcare: Yes, Global Pandemics are (also) a Trans Rights Issue

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    Trans healthcare and thus trans people have been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Trans people’s healthcare situations have turned out to be so vulnerable in this crisis because they have been precarious to begin with. There are multiple ways in which trans healthcare has been affected: Surgeries and other procedures have been cancelled or postponed, and mental health services have been paused or moved online. This raises ethical questions around discrimination against trans people in the healthcare system. This article argues that cancelling trans surgeries and procedures in the COVID-19 crisis is made possible through an understanding of trans healthcare as non-essential. The article explores how trans healthcare in particular has been affected by the pandemic

    Trans Perspectives in Philosophy of Mind

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    This paper explores the intersection between trans philosophy and philosophy of mind—two areas that have traditionally been treated as addressing fundamentally different questions. While philosophy of mind typically investigates the nature and workings of the mind, trans philosophy interrogates the nature of trans realities. As these realities include investigations into embodiment, mind-body relationships, and emotion, I suggest taking trans perspectives seriously in philosophy of mind. Drawing on recent developments in feminist philosophy of mind and critical approaches to philosophy of mind, this paper argues that incorporating trans perspectives into philosophy of mind not only challenges the field’s lingering individualistic assumptions but also enriches its methodological scope. Trans perspectives foreground lived, socially-situated experiences that expose the limits of abstract, decontextualized theorizing in mainstream philosophy of mind. Building on the work of Bettcher, Marvin, Dembroff, Hale, and others, I suggest that trans philosophy of mind is not about reducing trans people to psychological case studies, but about rethinking core philosophical questions in the philosophy of mind—such as self-knowledge, embodiment, and perception—from within trans realities. These perspectives highlight the constitutive role of social structures, bias, and intelligibility in shaping mental life, resonating with arguments in feminist philosophy and critical phenomenology that mental states are socially embedded and normatively structured. Through examples, I illustrate how trans perspectives disrupt and expand conventional understandings of the mind. Ultimately, the paper argues that trans philosophy of mind contributes not only to a more inclusive and accurate philosophy of mind but also to the ongoing development and future possibilities of trans philosophy itself

    Are all emotions social? Embracing a pluralistic understanding of social emotions

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    While the importance of social emotions is widely recognized, the question whether all emotions are social and what this would mean for the category ‘social emotions’ is yet to be addressed systematically. Emotion theorists and researchers so far have proposed different candidates for social emotions. These include non-basic emotions, self-conscious emotions, higher-cognitive emotions, and defining social emotions via their social functions. This paper looks at these different candidates for social emotions and briefly discusses their issues. Discussing the candidates and their issues motivates embracing a pluralistic approach to social emotions. In a further step, the paper will look at approaches exploring how social factors impact emotions in general. This serves as a basis for explaining what it would mean to propose that all emotions are social. After reviewing different candidates for social emotions and looking at the impact of social factors on emotions in general, the paper will propose that a pluralistic understanding of social emotions is needed to embrace the different ways in which social emotions may function. Embracing a pluralistic understanding of social emotions does not mean, however, that all emotions are social emotions

    Scripts and Social Cognition: How We Interact with Others

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    This book argues that our success in navigating the social world depends heavily on scripts. Scripts play a central role in our ability to understand social interactions shaped by different contextual factors. In philosophy of social cognition, scholars have asked what mechanisms we employ when interacting with other people or when cognizing about other people. Recent approaches acknowledge that social cognition and interaction depends heavily on contextual, cultural, and social factors that contribute to the way individuals make sense of the social interactions they take part in. This book offers the first integrative account of scripts in social cognition and interaction. It argues that we need to make contextual factors and social identity central when trying to explain how social interaction works, and that this is possible via scripts. Additionally, scripts can help us understand bias and injustice in social interaction. The author’s approach combines several different areas of philosophy—– philosophy of mind, social epistemology, feminist philosophy—as well as sociology and psychology to show why paying attention to injustice in interaction is much needed in social cognition research, and in philosophy of mind more generally. Scripts and Social Cognition: How we Interact with Others will appeal to scholars and graduate students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, social epistemology, social ontology, sociology, and social psychology

    Social Media Experiences of LGBTQ+ People: Enabling Feelings of Belonging

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    This paper explores how the social and affective lives of people with marginalized social identities are particularly affected by digital influences. Specifically, the paper examines whether and how social media enables LGBTQ+ people to experience feelings of belonging. It does so by drawing on literature from digital epistemology and phenomenology of the digital, and by presenting and analyzing the results of a qualitative study consisting of 25 interviews with LGBTQ+ people. The interviews were conducted to explore the social media experiences of LGBTQ+ people through an empirical framework informed by both phenomenology and social epistemology, particularly feminist standpoint theory. The paper emphasizes the importance of positionality and the epistemic value of research that centers marginalized perspectives and employs an anti-oppressive research approach, and focuses on understanding the digital experiences of LGBTQ+ people from within their marginalized perspective

    Perceiving Emotion: Scripts versus Emotion Concepts

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    This paper proposes that the role of emotion scripts, and their entanglement with emotion concepts, has not been adequately treated in recent concept-focused and situated approaches to emotion perception. These approaches aim to emphasize the context-sensitive and interactive nature of emotion perception, and I argue that scripts have distinctive explanatory power when it comes to both of these features of emotion perception, and accordingly deserve to be taken more seriously by concept-focused and situated approaches. Situated perspectives on emotion perception have long pointed out that, while the move toward understanding emotion perception as context-sensitive is needed, an individualistic and overly cognitive focus remains in context-sensitive accounts to emotion perception, particularly in accounts that emphasize emotion concepts (see Glazer 2022, Krueger 2014a, b). And while recent and influential context-sensitive approaches to emotion perception have emphasized emotion concepts (see Gendron and Barrett 2018), earlier work on emotion concepts that ties them to emotion scripts has been ignored in these recent views (e.g., Russell, 1991, 2003; Wierzbicka 1992; Fehr & Russell, 1984). Situated approaches that criticize recent context-sensitive views for their individualistic focus have also overlooked scripts, despite their potential to contribute to situated views. Overlooking scripts is a problem when arguing for a context-sensitive and situated understanding of emotion perception. Scripts describe contextually variable, normatively constrained moves between social agents; that is, they account for how social norms influence social interaction (including emotion perception) in context-sensitive ways. Thus, scripts are exceptionally well positioned to account for context-sensitive, interactive emotion perception. This paper aims to (1) explain what it means to understand emotion perception as both interactive and context-sensitive, making reference to situated approaches to emotion perception, and (2) bring scripts back into the debate on emotion perception

    Pathologizing Disabled and Trans Identities: How Emotions Become Marginalized

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    In recent years, an array of critical emotion theorists have emerged who call for change with respect to how emotion theory is done, how emotions are understood, and how we do emotion. In this chapter, I draw on the work that some of these authors have produced to analyze how emotional marginalization of trans and disabled identities is experienced, considering in particular how this emotional marginalization results from the long history of pathologization of trans and disabled people. The past and current pathologization of trans and disabled people is produced through normative assumptions, values, and beliefs that uphold systems of normalcy, including assumptions, values, and beliefs about how we feel and express emotions. In order to examine these issues, I identify three different stages at which emotional marginalization may take place: emotion experience, emotional display, and emotion recognition. In other words, emotional marginalization of trans and disabled people can occur at any of these stages. The central concern of my chapter is thus to show how emotional marginalization, at each of these stages, affects trans and disabled people

    Perceiving Emotion: Scripts versus Emotion Concepts

    Get PDF
    This paper proposes that the role of emotion scripts, and their entanglement with emotion concepts, has not been adequately treated in recent concept-focused and situated approaches to emotion perception. These approaches aim to emphasize the context-sensitive and interactive nature of emotion perception, and I argue that scripts have distinctive explanatory power when it comes to both of these features of emotion perception, and accordingly deserve to be taken more seriously by concept-focused and situated approaches. Situated perspectives on emotion perception have long pointed out that, while the move toward understanding emotion perception as context-sensitive is needed, an individualistic and overly cognitive focus remains in context-sensitive accounts to emotion perception, particularly in accounts that emphasize emotion concepts (see Glazer 2022, Krueger 2014a, b). And while recent and influential context-sensitive approaches to emotion perception have emphasized emotion concepts (see Gendron and Barrett 2018), earlier work on emotion concepts that ties them to emotion scripts has been ignored in these recent views (e.g., Russell, 1991, 2003; Wierzbicka 1992; Fehr & Russell, 1984). Situated approaches that criticize recent context-sensitive views for their individualistic focus have also overlooked scripts, despite their potential to contribute to situated views. Overlooking scripts is a problem when arguing for a context-sensitive and situated understanding of emotion perception. Scripts describe contextually variable, normatively constrained moves between social agents; that is, they account for how social norms influence social interaction (including emotion perception) in context-sensitive ways. Thus, scripts are exceptionally well positioned to account for context-sensitive, interactive emotion perception. This paper aims to (1) explain what it means to understand emotion perception as both interactive and context-sensitive, making reference to situated approaches to emotion perception, and (2) bring scripts back into the debate on emotion perception

    Are all emotions social? Embracing a pluralistic understanding of social emotions

    No full text
    While the importance of social emotions is widely recognized, the question whether all emotions are social and what this would mean for the category ‘social emotions’ is yet to be addressed systematically. Emotion theorists and researchers so far have proposed different candidates for social emotions. These include non-basic emotions, self-conscious emotions, higher-cognitive emotions, and defining social emotions via their social functions. This paper looks at these different candidates for social emotions and briefly discusses their issues. Discussing the candidates and their issues motivates embracing a pluralistic approach to social emotions. In a further step, the paper will look at approaches exploring how social factors impact emotions in general. This serves as a basis for explaining what it would mean to propose that all emotions are social. After reviewing different candidates for social emotions and looking at the impact of social factors on emotions in general, the paper will propose that a pluralistic understanding of social emotions is needed to embrace the different ways in which social emotions may function. Embracing a pluralistic understanding of social emotions does not mean, however, that all emotions are social emotions
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