6 research outputs found
An Appraisal of the Concept of Sovereignty in the Social Contractarian Thoughts of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Full text linkThe concept of sovereignty is one of the major concepts that have elicited response from political thinkers in one form or the other throughout the ages. Discourses and contributions by thinkers as it were are divided into two strands, the classical theory of sovereignty and the constitutional theory of sovereignty. The difference that exists between these schools of thought ramifies the question of how the concept of sovereignty relates to state authority. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) also contributed to discourse on the concept of sovereignty. This he did while putting forward his thoughts on the social contract. In Rousseau’s contractarian thought, sovereignty is popular, unlimited, inalienable, and resides within the people and as such, the people in Rousseau’s thinking “calls the shots” in any democratic political configuration. This paper engages the expository and analytic method of data analysis in its bid to appraise the Rousseauan conception of sovereignty with the intent of bringing to the fore, its inherent merits and demerits and to accordingly extrapolates its implications for democratic legitimacy in an age where democracy has been accepted in the world over as the world-best practice in governance. In the final third, the paper holds that the inherent demerits of the Rousseauan conception of sovereignty notwithstanding, Rousseau seems to have laid down the prototype of all legitimate government through his exclusive conferment of sovereignty on the people. It concludes that legitimate democratic regimes can be realized in Africa through the adoption of the Rousseauan model of contractual governance. Keywords: Sovereignty, Social Contract, Consent, People, Legitimacy
Justification for Relativity in Traditional Logic
Full text linkStandard responses to the question of the nature of logic can be broadly classified into two, namely: logical monists that privilege traditional logic above non-traditional logic and logical pluralists who recognize the legitimacy of many-valued logic and use same to argue for some form of logical relativity. The line of distinction appears to be fairly clear as traditional, Aristotelian, two-valued and standard logic maintains fidelity with the principle of bivalence and the traditional laws of thought while non-traditional, non-Aristotelian, many-valued, non-standard or alternative logics somehow break their fidelity to the principle of bivalence and the traditional laws of thought. It appears to be settled that relativity typically belongs only to non-traditional logics. Contrary to this understanding, this paper argued that some level of relativity Is presupposed in traditional logic by the legitimacy enjoyed by syllogistic, propositional and predicate logics as a body of systems that make up traditional logic. This paper called for the revision of monistic approaches to traditional logic. Since there is some measure of relativity among traditional systems of logic, de-emphasizing the differences among syllogistic, propositional and predicate logics while stressing their unity as 'traditional logic' leads to the fallacy of accent. This fallacy occurs when theorists place vocal emphasis on the unity among traditional logical systems while ignoring their differences
Justification for Relativity in Traditional Logic
No full textStandard responses to the question of the nature of logic can be broadly classified into two, namely: logical monists that privilege traditional logic above non-traditional logic and logical pluralists who recognize the legitimacy of many-valued logic and use same to argue for some form of logical relativity. The line of distinction appears to be fairly clear as traditional, Aristotelian, two-valued and standard logic maintains fidelity with the principle of bivalence and the traditional laws of thought while non-traditional, non-Aristotelian, many-valued, non-standard or alternative logics somehow break their fidelity to the principle of bivalence and the traditional laws of thought. It appears to be settled that relativity typically belongs only to non-traditional logics. Contrary to this understanding, this paper argued that some level of relativity Is presupposed in traditional logic by the legitimacy enjoyed by syllogistic, propositional and predicate logics as a body of systems that make up traditional logic. This paper called for the revision of monistic approaches to traditional logic. Since there is some measure of relativity among traditional systems of logic, de-emphasizing the differences among syllogistic, propositional and predicate logics while stressing their unity as 'traditional logic' leads to the fallacy of accent. This fallacy occurs when theorists place vocal emphasis on the unity among traditional logical systems while ignoring their differences
Critique of Bochenski’s Conception of Methodology in Philosophy
Full text linkThis paper is an examination of Bochenski’s conception of an acceptable methodology for research in philosophy. Generally methodology refers to the building of scientific knowledge, methods are the how for building knowledge. it is the how, why method we have elected to reflect on the method of doing philosophy. This reflection proceeds from a preliminary discourse on the various methods that have been deployed in doing philosophy in the past to a discourse on the lessons from Josef Maria Bochenski’s thought. The paper, found out that such methods as the phenomenological method, the analytical method, the dialectical method, the hermeneutical method amongst others have been used in doing philosophy, past and present. We have argued in this paper that while it is true that real progress in philosophy can only be guaranteed by an adequate method that is grounded in logic and semantics, there is no single universally accepted method of doing philosophy. However, the conclusion that is reached in this paper, drawing from a reflection on Bochenski’s thought and insights from an intercultural perspective is that, an authentic philosophical method that rest on the phenomenological analysis and proceeds through analysis. Finally, whichever method one elects to use in doing philosophy, it must be guided by logic, and it must be complementary and not confrontational
The Question of Method in Philosophy
Full text linkIn this paper, we have elected to reflect on the method of doing philosophy. This reflection proceeds from a preliminary discourse on the various methods that have been deployed in doing philosophy in the past to a discourse on the lessons from Josef Maria Bochenski’s thought. In our investigation, we found out that such methods as the phenomenological, analytical, dialectical, hermeneutical methods have been used in doing philosophy. We argued that there is no single universally accepted method of doing philosophy. Arising from our analysis of Bochenski’s thought and insights from an intercultural perspective, we conclude that an authentic philosophical method is that which rests on phenomenological analysis and is guided by logic.
Keywords: Philosophy, Method, Methodology, Complementarity, Logi
Towards cultural democracy : contradiction and crisis in British and U.S. cultural policy 1870-1990
Full text linkThis study examines the theoretical contradictions of 'cultural democracy' in
Britain and the United States. Cultural democracy here refers to the claim
that community participation in cultural activities (artistic production and
consumption) leads to participation in a democratic society. In Britain
'cultural democracy' has been associated especially with the 'community arts'
movement of the 1970s and 1980s.
Using Gramsci's theory of 'hegemony' as a framework for analysis, I will
argue that the theoretical inconsistencies of 'cultural democracy' in the 1970s
and 1980s can be traced back to a fundamental contradiction in British and
U.S. cultural policy, between 'materialist' and 'idealist' conceptions of
culture. This contradiction has resulted in moments of crisis in British and
U.S. cultural policy, followed by periods of 'unstable equilibrium'. In
support of this argument I will focus on four of these moments of
contradiction and crisis. First I will develop my hypothetical model of
contradiction, crisis and equilibrium in relation to the British community arts
movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Then I will apply this model to three
successive 'moments of crisis' in British and U.S. cultural policy: the
'civilising mission' of the late nineteenth century public cultural institutions
in Britain and the U.S., particularly the settlement house; the U.S. federal
arts projects of the 1930s; dilemmas of access and accountability in recent
media policy. I will conclude by exploring some alternative theoretical
formulations of the relationship between 'culture' and 'community' and their
possible application to cultural policy and cultural democracy
