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The intellect superior to the imagination and the differential calculus― A momentum of Leibniz’s discovery ―
Get PDFLeibniz's differential calculus has been interpreted from a pragmatic point of view, and been regarded as contradictory but yet a useful instrument. This paper aims to give a new interpretation on his differential calculus through a study of his early philosophy and metaphysics. The followings are among our conclusions. Leibniz's differential calculus neither is theoretically contradictory nor was decisively described so by himself It has its own basis which employs the contextual definition of infinitesimal. And the discovery by Leibniz is closely connected to his philosophy, his idea on the intellect prior to the imagination. The intellect can comprehend the pure relational concept itself, which is not accessible for the imagination, whereas it is this concept that gives the foundation of his differential calculus
Deux aspects de la monadologie―Par la critique de Leibniz par Bayle―
Get PDFDans cet article, on considère deux aspects de la monadologie. Un des aspects est que monade a l'ordre pour unir une multitude de propriétés. L'autre est que monade a les relations avec les autres et les exprime. D'abord, on indique la double face de la monadologie par le dialogue entre Leibniz et Bayle. Contre l'opinion de Bayle que l'unité de monade n'est pas compatible avec les variations multiples, Leibniz soutint que l'ordre de monade produit modifications paticulières. Outre Bayle douta que sans l'interaction monade puisse avoir les experiences comme nous avons. Leibniz répondit que Dieu a mis dans chaque âme une concentration de monde, ou la force de representer l'univers. Qu'est ce-que la concentration? Russell et quelques personnes affirmerènt que l'action arbitraire de Dieu est nécessaire à la correspondance des monades. Contrairement à ce que ils dirent, on donne l'interpretation que monade renforme les relations et cette correspondance est essentielle sur lui. C'est-à-dire, Leibniz trouva la source de l'unité et la relation en l'essence de monade même
Leibniz on internal and external phenomena
No full textIn his letter to De Voider of June 30 1704, Leibniz notes that a body or matter is not a substance, but a phenomenon of a percipient being or perceiver (G2 270). The best commentators have been outspoken about this doctrine. Thus Louis Loeb reminds us that for Leibniz bodies do not exist outside of perceiving minds. According to Loeb, June 1704 marks a decisive claim in Leibniz's theory of body, from which we can understand that Leibniz is a phenomenalist. Another interpretation is made by Donald Rutherford, who admits that the thesis in the letter to De Voider may seem to support a phenomenalistic interpretation, yet insists that "phenomena" in that thesis can still be taken as "well-founded phenomena, " or aggregates of substances. In his interpretation, understanding bodies requires us to look at something external to our own perception, since bodies are aggregates of substances which are external to perceivers. Thus Rutherford claims that "the 'reality' of these phenomenal aggregates 'is located in the harmony of the percipients with themselves (at different times) and with other beings, ' i.e. in relations among the perceptual phenomena of the monads constituting the aggregate." Here Rutherford understands phenomenal aggregates as aggregates of substances rather than a mere appearance or perception. However, in this paper I will propose another kind of interpretation. First, I will interpret phenomena in that thesis as representational contents which are internal for perceivers. At that point my position is closer to Loeb's. Secondly, on the other hand, I admit that even after June 1704 Leibniz often emphasizes that bodies actually are aggregates of simple substances, and these aggregates cannot be reduced to perceptions of perceivers. Both Loeb and Rutherford seem to take the terms "phenomenon" and "body" too narrowly, since Loeb understands that phenomena must be internal perceptions while Rutherford always takes bodies to be aggregates of substances. In the first section, I introduce the notion of internal phenomenon, which is identified to the representational content of a perceiving mind. In the second section, I explain the notion of external phenomenon. Leibniz often regards aggregates of simple substances as "phenomena, " but this kind of phenomenon is clearly not internal since unlike representational contents aggregates are actually made up of many simple substances. But the existence of an aggregate of simple substances in some sense depends upon a mind even though it is constituted by many external simple substances (G2 256; G5 133 NE 2.12.7 etc.). Considering this dependence, Leibniz assigned the term "phenomenon" to an aggregate of simple substances. In the third and forth sections, I critically examine univocal interpretations of "phenomenon" and "body." Montgomery Furth, Loeb and Glenn Hartz were wrong in supposing that the term "phenomenon" only refers to representational contents. Also, despite Rutherford's interpretation, the term "body" sometimes refers to an internal phenomenon. In the fifth section, I contrast my approach with the interpretation made by Robert Adams, which takes an aggregate of substances to be internal for a perceiver. In the last section, I conclude that aggregates of substances are external objects of perceiving minds, and Leibniz is a realist in that he often regards bodies as things outside of perceivers
<書評>Maria R. Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2009, xxvii+623p.)
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<書評>Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad (Oxford University Press, 2009, xxi+428p.)
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Relational predicates and real relations ― Concerning the individual and individual notion in the philosophy of Leibniz ―
No full textThe notion of relational predicate, which was distinguished from relation itself in the philosophy of Leibniz, was first introduced in the interpretation of Leibniz's philosophy by J. Hintikka and H. Ishiguro. However, they argued it mainly from a logical point of view. Through a close study of Leibniz's metaphysics, this paper aims to make clear and evaluate the essential points of the interpretation of M. Mugnai, who recently regarded the relational predicate as an important element in Leibniz's philosophy, to sort out the points that can be agreed upon from those that cannot. In my view, Mugnai's interpretation is appropriate in that it emphasizes that the relational predicates of an individual notion must be based on the inner properties of the individual. But on the other hand, he distinguishes between the individual notion and the individual substance, attributing the relational predicates to the individual notion, not to the individual substance, which does not include anything relational. In view of Leibniz's ontology, this way of thinking is one-dimensional. The properties of an individual substance are formed through the relationships with other individual substances in the same universe and relational predicates express such relations, i.e. real relations
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