2,321,632 research outputs found
The impact of EC-92 on developing countries'trade : a dissenting view
Full text linkMost benefits of the European Community (EC-92) program will probably not come from marginal changes in trade flows. Those changes are important to European policymakers, but are of remote interest to developing countries. The main threats to developing countries are the diversion of investment funds to EC countries and continued external barriers, especially nontariff barriers. The EC expects higher growth and lower prices as a result of EC-92. The net effect on developing countries of the removal of internal trade barriers depends on the country's income and price elasticities with the EC. Current estimates suggest the effect will be small. If new external barriers emerge, or if EC-wide barriers replace national barriers, EC firms may collaborate more with large US or Japanese firms. None of these developments will improve developing countries'trade in manufactures and services. Investment in EC countries may increase to meet the extra demand, growth, or trade diversion resulting from EC-92. This could lead to increased investments in developing countries but given heavy indebtedness in developing countries, is more likely to divert investment funds, thus limiting their future production and growth. Technical standards in EC-92 may also be tougher than national standards in member countries, which could hurt developing country exporters. Is"Fortress Europe"likely? The EC Commission says no, but the Community's record is not good.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade and Regional Integration,Trade Policy
EC Bananarama 1992 : the sequel - the EC Commission proposal
Full text linkSome European Community (EC) countries give preferred market access and high prices to bananas from selected developing countries or EC regional suppliers. This preferential status is regarded as a form of aid to these countries, most of which are developing small island economies. EC marketers of bananas from these preferred suppliers also benefit because of the high retail prices. Nonpreferred suppliers - mainly developing countries of Latin America - are hurt by the policies because access is denied or restricted and the lower demand depresses the world price for bananas. The Community's commitment to establish a single unified EC banana market on December 31, 1992 provides a timely opportunity to reform existing distortionary trade policies. The recently announced proposal of the Commission of ECs to regulate banana trade within a unified market relies on quotas to control imports. The proposal is extremely complicated. It is designed to severely restrict competition and to maintain the advantages of selected groups. The authors update their earlier analysis of world banana trade to reflect the market in 1993. They evaluate the implications of the Commission's proposal alongside existing and alternative policies. They find that current policies cost EC consumers about 0.3 billion a year to preferred suppliers. So, it costs EC consumers about 1.00 of aid toselect developing countries or regions. Additionally, every dollar of aid reaching preferred suppliers costs other developing country suppliers 5.30 cost to EC consumers, over 1.00 is lost in outright waste. Several plausible versions of the Commission's proposal are modelled. At best they are found to be slightly less costly than existing policies and at worst, considerably more costly. A 3.5 percent reduction in the quota allocation is estimated to lead to a 30 percent increase in the cost of the proposal. The authors conclude that the Commission's proposal for a unified EC banana policy appears to be little more than a way of replacing existing distortionary national policies with an almost equally distortionary single policy and market. The only difference: the costs would be borne by consumers in all EC countries rather than consumers in only some countries. Worse still, costs could increase. Markets that now gain the benefits of mostly open and competitive marketing such as Germany would face closed and uncompetitive conditions. For developing countries exporting bananas, the proposal offers little. At best conditions may be no worse than they are now. At worst the policy could hurt Latin American suppliers even more than current policies and introduce considerable confusion about the level of support to preferred suppliers. Under the proposed quota system aid will not be well targeted. A more efficient way of achieving the EC's aid commitment is through a small tariff of about 17 percent, used to fund a system of well-targeted deficiency payments or direct aid. The only reason for choosing the Commission's proposal over simpler, tariff-based options seems to be to maintain the vested interests of protected EC markteters. But this is contrary to the objectives of unification, which are to seek gains from increased competition and trade.Environmental Economics&Policies,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Consumption
Politically Acceptable Trade Compromises Between The EC and The US: A Game Theory Approach
Full text linkA model is developed to quantify the special status of agriculture in the US and the EC trade negotiations. The role of special interests are measured by a policy goals function (PGF) whose weights are estimated for each special interest group. The analysis searches for mutually acceptable, mutually advantageous trade agreements between the US and the EC using a partial equilibrium world trade model coupled with game theory. Results suggest that it is in the best interest of the US (resp. EC) 'for the EC (resp. US) to liberalize whi1e the other follows the status quo policies of 1986. Mutual gains in PGF values to both countries pursuing "large" liberalizations are unlikely to exist, although "small" liberalizations may give rise to "small" mutual gains. Altering each country's action space, and permitting compensatory payments to the most influencial groups yields trade liberalization, but free trade does not result.game theory, trade liberalization, trade negotiations, International Relations/Trade,
Changing Views of Competition and EC Antitrust Law
Full text linkDuring the last few years the application of EC antitrust law has been subject to a number of changes, aiming at giving a greater role to economic analysis. This is leading to the abandonment of the traditional ordoliberal inspiration of EC competition law. This paper explores how justi ed is this change. In particular it argues that economic analysis provides di erent views of how competition works and thet it may a ect the application of antitrust at di erent stages. From this point of view a more economic approach is not necessarily incompatible with a reformed ordoliberal paradigm. What appears incompatible is an approach which substitutes eciency for competition. Such an approach has gained a role in the US antitrust, but its extension to the EC legal context is bound to produce a number of problems, and to lead to results di erent from the desired ones.antitrust,models of competition,ordoliberal paradigm,EC competition law
EC agricultural trade policies towards developing countries
Full text linkApart from demand and supply conditions, todays EC trade in agricultural products is determined not only by classical trade policy instruments, e.g. customs or quotas, but in addition by numerous internal instruments influencing consumption, production and storage. The protective character originates from specific sectoral policy goals having a long tradition in most of the six founding members of the EC. With the first and second enlargement of the EC the protective effects on third countries (trade diversion) aggravated not only because of the geographical extension, but because more and more products had been included in the protective system, respectively protection rates for some products had been increased due to demands of new member countries. During this process conflicts in objectives between internal producer demands and that of trade partners, being not members of the EC, became apparent. They were tackled in different ways, depending on the commodities and countries involved. Trade relations with developed countries, competing on markets for basic food commodities, e.g. grains, sugar, beef and milk products became increasingly impaired and the first serious attempt for a general reduction of trade barriers is only now undertaken in the GATT-Uruguay Round. Trade policy towards DCs was characterized by more cooperative approaches. The reasons are twofold. First, and most importantly, agricultural commodities produced in DCs are substitutes to EC-produced goods only to a small extent, either in production or in consumption. Secondly, there are some political commitments towards DCs in general or with respect to specific country groups such as the former colonies of France and the UK (now ACP-countries) or the mediterranean countries, where in the latter case geopolitical objectives are on the background of trade concessions.
Fighting cartels: some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003
Full text linkThis paper investigates the effectiveness of the new Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 which replaces the mandatory notification and authorization system by a legal exception system. Effectiveness is operationalized via the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 81 EC Treaty and the probabilities of type I and type II errors committed by the European Commission. We identify four different types of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria: fullcompliance, zero-compliance, positive-compliance and full-deterrence. We show that the Commission can, in principle, hit the full-compliance equilibrium, where the cartelizing firms fully obey the requirements of Art 81(3) EC Treaty and both error probabilities are zero. --competition law,cartel law enforcement,legal exception,imperfect
Norm Evolution in EC Environmental Law
Full text linkWill the next generation experience the same quality of natural environmental beauty as that of former generations? Environmental protection is one of the most serious tasks to be dealt with in the days and years ahead, and in tackling this issue, the question of how environmental norms evolve is an essential topic for consideration. With regard to the above, the EC has demonstrated a number of interesting institutional practices. This paper illuminates a role of law in the EC institutional practices, which have brought about the evolution of environmental norms. This role is argued in terms of the discursive power of law. In order to elucidate this discursive viewpoint, this paper offers a conceptual framework as follows: 1) Law catalyses normative discourse during the process of the creation, application and interpretation of norms. Laws in and of themselves are also normative discourses; 2) The concept of governance frames is referred to as the shared meanings of core norms, key concepts and regulative principles in a specific issue-area; 3) The accumulation of discourses around and of laws (re)creates a frame, and these discourses are contextualised within the preceding frames. This interaction causes norms to evolve; Lastly, 4) the concept of regime is referred to, and the institutional setting that supports normative discourses and frames is described. Regimes are defined as institutional complexes which procedurally reproduce normative discourse and substantively establish a policy agenda upon which a frame is built. In this way, this paper understands the development of EC environmental law as an example of norm evolution in a regime, in which the interaction of normative discourses and governance frames occurs. Building on this conceptual framework, this paper describes the norm evolution in EC environmental law. Before the legal base for environmental secondary legislation was provided by the SEA in 1987, the institutional practices of the EC had already led to: the ECJ judgments concerning environmental matters; legislation orientated towards environmental protection; and international environmental conventions to which the EC is party. On the basis of normative discourses around and of these laws, a governance frame has been transformed from a market supporting frame into a holistic and ecosystem-oriented frame. This paper thus illuminates a role of law in EC institutional practices which have brought about the evolution of environmental norms, from the viewpoint of discursive power of law in issue-framing.environmental policy; European law; neo-institutionalism; governance; European Court of Justice
The Singer or the Song? Developments in Performers' Rights from the Perspective of a Cultural Economist
No full textOver the last century, performers gradually acquired statutory protection of their economic and moral
rights. These rights are not copyright in the legal sense but neighboring rights and until recently, they
were mainly remuneration rights that are collectively administered. With the WPPT (WIPO
Performers and Phonograms Treaty), performers now have individual exclusive rights for digital
performances; this leads to the question: what has motivated this change – is it a change in the
perception of the value of performer or a change brought about by the changing technology of copying or,
indeed, a change that reflects different economic costs and benefits? The paper discusses the role of
copyright law as an incentive to performers and asks if the economic role of the performer is so different
from that of the author. The conclusion is that a complex interaction of the legal regulations, economic
conditions and institutional arrangements for administering these new rights will determine the outcome
Characterising EC regulation: emulation, innovation, re-regulation
No full textThe thesis characterises European Community (EC) regulation in terms of three levels of ideas, namely that: (a) the EC regulatory process is best understood by particular styles or processes of regulation that the thesis terms emulation, innovation and re-regulation; (b) there are particular determinants or causes of regulation that are best understood as regulatory competition, consensus and co-operation; and (c) a hypothesis can be derived from the review of associated literature to the effect that diffusion of ideas and policy learning leading to consensus and co-operation are often of greater significance than regulatory competition in the EC regulatory process. To this end, taking as a frame of reference the characterisation of styles or processes of regulation as emulation, innovation and re-regulation, the thesis challenges the assumption, prevalent in much of the literature, that the main determinant or cause of EC regulation is regulatory competition among member states seeking to enhance their own competitive position in the European market and reduce the costs associated with legal adjustment. Using evidence from case study material relating to EC regulation of insurance services and drinking water quality the thesis tests the hypothesis that, although the literature has stressed regulatory competition as the main determinant or cause of EC regulation, in practice diffusion of ideas and policy learning are likely to occur, leading to co-operation between actors in a manner that ensures the emergence of a broad consensus on the preferred EC regulatory approach without recourse to regulatory competition at all. The thesis finds that regulatory competition is not, in fact, the only determinant or cause of EC regulation. Instead, diffusion of ideas and policy learning leading to consensus and co-operation are of crucial importance and should be accorded greater significance in the literature than has been the case in the past
- …
