289 research outputs found
The fine-grained metaphysics of artifactual and biological functional kinds
In this paper we consider the emerging position in metaphysics that artifact functions characterize real kinds of artifacts. We analyze how it can circumvent an objection by David Wiggins (Sameness and substance renewed, 2001, 87) and then argue that this position, in comparison to expert judgments, amounts to an interesting fine-grained metaphysics: taking artifact functions as (part of the) essences of artifacts leads to distinctions between principles of activity of artifacts that experts in technology have not yet made. We show, moreover, that our argument holds not only in the artifactual realm but also in biology: taking biological functions as (part of the) essences of organs leads to distinctions between principles of activity of organs that biological experts have not yet made. We run our argument on the basis of analyses of artifact and biological functions as developed in philosophy of technology and of biology, thus importing results obtained outside of metaphysics into the debate on ontological realism. In return, our argument shows that a position in metaphysics provides experts reason for trying to detect differences between principles of activities of artifacts and organs that have not been detected so far.Engineering and reflectionTechnology, Policy and Managemen
Two ontology-driven formalisations of functions and their comparison
In this paper, we give formalisations of two engineering concepts of technical function and present in more general terms the project of supporting functional description translation by ontological analysis. The formalisations are given within the foundational dolce ontology and the concepts formalised are as follows: (1) the function as defined in the Functional Representation approach by Chandrasekaran and Josephson and (2) the function as defined in the Functional Basis approach by Stone and Wood. These two concepts represent two main ways of understanding functions in engineering: the first by means of the behaviour of artefacts, and the second by means of operations on flows as performed by artefacts. We analyse the similarities and differences between these concepts by means of the formalisations and show how the formalisations support the automated translation between functional descriptions based on these two concepts. In addition, we compare our strategy of formalising different engineering concepts of function within one foundational ontology with other strategies in the ontology-driven formalisation, such as defining a single formalised concept of function, either for replacing existing engineering concepts, or for use as a reference by which such existing concepts can be related. We compare these strategies and sketch the merits and shortcomings of our strategy
The ICE-function theory
With our use-plan approach to artefact using and designing, and with the review of existing function theories, we have collected the means to formulate a function theory that is adequate to the technical domain. This theory is constructed against the background of, specifically, our use-plan analysis of designing, and incorporates elements from the intentional, causal-role and evolutionist function theories. For this reason, we call this central result of our work the ICE-function theory.</p
Function theories
In the previous chapter we analysed the using and designing of artefacts in terms of the goals, beliefs and actions of the agents involved. In this chapter we switch to a perspective on artefact teleology that is more common in philosophy and engineering. This object-oriented perspective brings us to our central project of developing an adequate theory of technical functions.</p
Malfunctioning
Going from desiderata to phenomena serves a dual purpose. First, it increases the phenomenological appeal of our theory. We show in the course of this chapter that the ICE-theory can account for many different aspects of malfunctioning. We do not give a full description of malfunctioning. Yet our investigations make clear how intricate such a description must be, and which ingredients — social, epistemic, practical and action-theoretical — constitute it. Thus, second, we show that much of the phenomenological work is, in fact, done by the theory of using and designing and not by the theory of functions.</p
Using, designing and plans
We start this book by presenting the action-theoretical background for our theory of technical functions. To this effect, we study two commonplace actions that involve artefacts: using and designing. We analyse both of these activities in terms of one central concept, that of use plans, i.e., ways of manipulating objects in order to realise practical goals.</p
Towards an Ontological Representation of Functional Basis in DOLCE
We present a formalization of the notion of function of devices as set forward by Robert
Stone and Kristin Wood in the Functional Model approach. This formalization is part of a larger project
to analyse functional descriptions of technical artifacts within an ontology. The result is a formal system in
which engineering notions of functions are expressed in terms of denitions grounded in the foundational
ontology dolce
The formalisation of functional modeling functions within the DOLCE ontology
In this paper we give formalizations of two engineering
concepts of technical functions and present
in more general terms the project of supporting engineering
functional reasoning by means of ontological
analyses. The concepts that we formalize
are the concepts of function as defined in the Functional
Representation approach by Chandrasekaran
and Josephson and in the Functional Basis approach
by Stone and Wood. These two concepts represent
two main ways of understanding functions in engineering:
the first by means of the behavior of artifacts,
and the second by means of operations on
flows as preformed by artifacts. Both formalizations
are given within the foundational DOLCE ontology.
Our choice to formalize existing concepts of functions
within a single foundational ontology, is one
strategy towards the goal of ontological analyses of
functions. This goal of enabling the development of
tools for automated functional reasoning, may be realized
by other strategies as well, such as defining a
single formalized concept of function, either for replacing
existing concepts or for use as a reference to
which existing concepts should be related. We compare
these strategies briefly and discuss the merits
and shortcomings of our strategy
The nature of artefacts
In this book we have presented our philosophy of artefacts. We started from an action-theoretical perspective, clarifying the intuitive connection between artefacts as useful objects and the goals, beliefs and actions of agents. After analysing artefact using and designing, we focussed on the characteristic of artefacts that has drawn most philosophical attention: their functions. We criticised existing function theories on the basis of our desiderata and we presented our alternative. This ICE-function theory analysed how functions are justifiably ascribed to artefacts, and connected function ascriptions to the goals and actions for which objects are employed, and to the physicochemical structure of these objects. Then, we argued that our account meets the desiderata and finally explored how our ICE-theory applies to other domains than the technical.</p
Introduction
Technology is no stranger to the city. Cities are planned, built, maintained, governed, demolished, and destroyed by technical means. Yet, the city has yet to receive much attention within the philosophy of technology. This volume addresses this gap, and in doing so contributes to the much-needed discussion on technology-enabled urban futures from the perspective of the philosophy of technology. In this introductory chapter, the larger volume is introduced by reflecting on the rationale and need for such a collection, sketching the main themes analyzed throughout, and providing an overview of the contributions.</p
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