1,721,024 research outputs found
Prototypizing and archeotypizing ownership: A pilot study
No full textThe author’s point of departure is Alf Ross’s analysis of ownership as a tool of presentation for a set of disjunctive conditioning facts and conjunctive legal consequences. The author first analyses Ross’s conjunctive compo-nent, and shows that, if one adopts the perspective of Polish-Russian legal realism, it can be pro-vided with a full-blown meaning. Then, the disjunctive component is discussed. By drawing in-spiration from prototype theory, the author argues that a specific set of disjunctive conditioning facts and of conjunctive legal consequences can be regarded as making up the core – albeit in a gradual way - of ownership phenomena, provided that one restricts them to movables. Finally, the author presents two Freudian hypotheses that can explain the emergence of the prototype of own-ership. This explanation is based on the way babies conceive of their bodily parts and feces. Based on that, an archeotype (i.e., archaic conception) of ownership is proposed
What Concept of Morality for Sociology of Morality? From Ossowska's Rejection of Substantive Definitions to a Formal (Psychoanalytic) Cross-Disciplinary One
No full textOssowska contended that it is impossible to give a coherent definition of
morality but at the same time she refused to adopt a stipulative definition for
it. In § 1 the author illustrates Ossowska's official attitude towards stipulative
definitions. In § 2 he shows that Ossowska was not always consistent with her
programme of abstaining from using stipulative definitions. In § 3 the author
asks whether Ossowska's rejection of stipulative definitions of morality can be
somewhat compared with Bourdieu's concept of illusio. In § 4 the author con-
tends that Ossowska's failure in finding satisfactory descriptive definitions for
morality is to be explained by her searching exclusively for substantive defini-
tions. The author argues, instead, that a formal definition for morality can be
given. Such a proposal was first made by the Polish scientist of law and moral-
ity, Leon Petra¿ycki, who provided a purely formal definition for both, and his
definition is compatible with the findings of psychoanalysis in this regard. Thus
Fittipaldi proposes a Freudian-Petra¿yckian stipulative definition of a moral
evaluation as an evaluation backed by a superegoic emotion. Superegoic emo-
tions may be addressed to virtually whatever object (hence the formal nature
of the definition) and all of them stem from the archaic helplessness of the
child via-à-vis his caregivers, caregivers whom the child at once loves, fears
and admires. According to the author, this definition is heuristically fruitful
and makes it possible to cover all the areas that according to Ossowska should
be investigated by her science or sociology of morality.
Keywords: Maria Ossowska, Pierre Bourdieu, Leon Petrazycki, Psychoanalysi
ЭНРИКО ПАТТАРО ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНОСТЬ, НОРМЫ КАК ВЕРОВАНИЯ И ИХ ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТЬ
No full textPATTARO E. VALIDITY, NORMS AS BELIEFS, AND THEIR EFFICACIOUSNESS
In this essay, Enrico Pattaro proposes and elaborates upon new conceptualizations for
phenomena traditionally addressed by jurisprudence, philosophy of law, and sociology
of law: validity, norm, efficaciousness, etc. By drawing on the distinction of the American
Philosopher Charles S. Peirce between types and tokens, the author first defines validity
as whatever congruence of a token with a type, regardless of whether that type is contained
in a norm, or of whether the instantiation of that type is (α) obligatory, (β) permitted,
or (γ) prohibited, under a given norm. This move makes it possible, on the one hand, to
address the so-called typicality of law from a more general perspective — one capable
of encompassing all sorts of phenomena usually addressed by humanities, including literature
— on the other, it makes it possible to analyze in a normatively unbiased way the
role of types and tokens when it comes to norms (for example, in cases (α) and (β) the
author speaks validly right tokens of types, while in cases (γ) he speaks of validly wrong
tokens of types.) As for norms, the author defines them as a psychological phenomenon,
namely as the belief (opinio vinculi) that a certain type of action must be performed, in the
normative sense of this word, anytime a relevant type of circumstance gets validly instantiated.
Like any other belief, a norm cannot exist except in someone’s mind (or, better,
brain). The existence of a norm within one’s mind (i.e., its being believed in by its holder)
is called by the author doxía. Among several other distinctions and neologisms, doxía
is distinguished from the being a duty-holder under a given norm (called by the author
deontía). It is only when doxía and deontía concur that the author speaks of the being-inforce
of a certain norm within a subject (nomía of that subject as to that norm — to use
the author’s terminology). Finally, among other things, the efficaciousness of a norm is
distinguished from its effectiveness. A norm is called and conceptualized as effective if
it is complied with whatever the motives which stand behind that compliance. Instead, a
norm is called and conceptualized as efficacious if it is a motive of compliance (causa
agendi) for the duty-holder who believes in it (i.e., according to the terminology of the
author, for a nomic subject)
L’inclusività dell’italiano tra politica del linguaggio ed epistemologia comparativa
No full textIn this note the author first clarifies how he understands the notions of
inclusiveness and comparative epistemology. Then, in Section 2, he assesses the extent to which Italian is inclusive as compared with English and argues that Italian is more inclusive than English chiefly due to Italian being a pro-drop language and having a gender-neutral possessive adjective. According to the author, to assess the inclusiveness
of a given language one should focus on how often one cannot avoid producing a gendered sentence. In Section 3, the author discusses two types of strategies to make Italian even more inclusive: a gradualist and a maximalist strategy. The gradualist strategy consists of reducing the frequency of gendered sentences with a variety of tools as well as waiting for speakers and grammarians to come up with new solutions
for unsolved issues. The maximalist strategy consists of replacing the over-extended masculine with the over-extended feminine due to the connection of feminine with abstraction and collectiveness in many Indo-European languages (and even some non-Indo-European ones)
Love, Anankasticity, and Human Rights: The Perspective of a Petrazyckian continental legal realism
No full textIn this essay the author analyzes the social phenomenon of human rights from the perspective of Leon Petrażycki’s Continental legal realism (Petrażyckianism). After shortly presenting this approach in § 1, in § 2, the author argues that, from this perspective, that of human rights is to be regarded as a naïve concept – akin to the concept of vegetable. As a naïve concept, for its investigation the concept of human rights requires stipulative concepts. To this goal, in § 3, the author proposes the stipulative concept of a humane jural conviction. In § 4, by combining Petrażyckianism with the ideas of Gianluigi Palombella, on the one hand, and those developed within the Contean school (in particular, by Amedeo G. Conte and Giampaolo Azzoni), on the other, further stipulative concepts are proposed, namely, those (a) of a fundamental substantive-jural anankastic normative-factical conviction and (b) of a fundamental substantive-jural paranankastic normative-factical conviction. By the former term (a), the author understands an individual’s conviction concerning certain jural norms that it must be possible (or impossible) to extract from a normative fact for that normative fact to be experienced as binding. By the latter term (b), the author understands an individual’s conviction concerning the jural norms that it must be possible (or impossible) to extract from a binding normative fact1 for a certain authority (e.g., a constitutional body) not to be regarded as entitled (or as obliged) to enact a normative fact2 aimed at removing the psychosocial effects brought about by that normative fact1. In the last section, the author discusses the issue of a possible “foundation” of human rights, from the perspective of Petrażyckianism. In this section, also the connection of anankasticity and paranankasticity to the principle of proportionality is discussed
Per una definizione interdisciplinare di 'norma'
Full text linkThe author proposes a definition of norm suitable not only for sociology and anthropology, but also for ethology. The term norm is defined as the stable disposition to experience superegoic emotions: chiefly, though not exclusively, anger, indignation, shame, guilt and pride. Language plays no role in this defi-nition. Anger is the typical right-holder’s emotion. Thus, a legal obligation or prohibition is reduced to the right-holder’s stable disposition to discharge his aggressiveness in case of inaction or action, respectively, on the part of the perceived duty-holder. As for shame and guilt, these are the emotions that typically make up the illusion of being a duty-holder. Finally, indignation or contagious shame are typical of possible third spectators. According to the author, this analysis enables the conflicts in societies that are elicited by emotions to be framed more accurately. The author concludes by proposing a complete reversal of the traditional view of the connection between law and force, as well as by proposing to complete the opposition between shame and guilt cultures in a way that also allows for the theoretical possibility of cultures of anger and indignation
From Norms to Normative Behaviors
No full textSocial scientists often draw on “norms” to causally explain human behaviors, which behaviors are therefore referred to as “normative”. The author first proposes a provisional notion of “normative behavior” (as distinct from “economic behavior”) and briefly mentions the problems raised by the notions of “norm” commonly used. Then, he proposes a conceptualization of “norm” as disposition to experience a superegoic emotion with regard to a behavior and examines various types of norms and normative behaviors. Finally, he points to some issues that require further investigation
Praxeotropismo
No full textHans Albert has used German expressions such as Verhaltenswirksamkeit einer Norm and verhaltenswirksame Norm to refer to norms which somehow affect actions. A norm can therefore be called verhaltenswirksam not only in some cases of compliance, but also in some cases of behaviour that is non-compliant or insignificant (from the point of view of some author of the norm), such as in the famous instance of Max Weber’s thief. Amedeo G. Conte has proposed translating verhaltenswirksam and Verhaltenswirksamkeit into Italian as praxeotropico and praxeotropismo respectively. In this article, Fittipaldi tries to analyse the re-lations among the usage of these words and the usage of other technical expres-sions of the sociology of law such as norma (norm), enunciato normativo (normative proposition), efficacia (efficacy), (nomotropismo ) etc
Psycho-Sociology of Fundamental Rights: Two Petrażyckian Perspectives (Articolo in russo con abstract, titolo e parole-chiave in inglese)
No full textFITTIPALDI E. PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: TWO NEOPETRAŻYCKIAN
PERSPECTIVES
In this article the author tries to put the psycho-social phenomenon of human
rights (or fundamental rights) into a strict Petrażyckian framework. Since the naïve
concept of human rights is an incoherent and practical one, the author proposes
two possible non-exhaustive stipulative definitions aimed at selecting sets of
phenomena somewhat intersecting with the set of phenomena designated by the
term “human rights” in different languages. Both definitions are inspired by the main
tenets of Petrażyckianism, but the second one is also based on the ideas of the
Italian scholar G. Palombella, as well as on certain ideas developed by A. G. Conte
and his school. The first definition re-defines human rights as humane rights,
namely imperative-attributive convictions (and relevant “projections”) caused
by the emergence or spreading of affiliative emotions in a certain society. The
second definition re-defines human rights as substantive convictions of the Subject
concerning the conditions of a binding character of a normative fact (human
rights as a subclass of substantive anankastic normative-factual convictions).
In this connection the role of intuitive law is discussed. This second definition
also covers substantive convictions concerning the conditions at which a certain
Constitutional Court or the identical body is experienced as authorized to enact
a norm-annihilating normative fact directed at the removal of legal convictions
brought about by another normative fact (human rights as a subclass of substantive
paraanankastic normative-factual convictions).
KEYWORDS: human rights, Leon Petrażycki, affiliative emotions, anankasticconstitutive
convictions, Gianluigi Palombella, Amedeo G. Conte, intuitive law
Bonae fidei possessor fructus consumptos suos facit. Tentative answers to some questions left open by Petrazycki's Economic Analysis of law
No full textL. Petrażycki towards the end of 19th century was dealing with economic aspects of Roman law, namely the apportionment of fructus between its owner and its possessor. Petrażycki’s discussion of an apparent paradox in Roman law is then presented and commented. The analysis focuses on the question of relationship between the socio-economic functions of rules selected by case law and the cause of the fact that the rules have been selected. In the end two hypotheses are formulated, based on Patrażycki and Priest (1977): one that rule is selected that allows for more control or extension and second, that rules more balanced in regards to both parties. interests are selected. Author claims the hypotheses are falsifiable
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