1,720,983 research outputs found
Risk Anal
Full text linkOnly Pakistan and Afghanistan reported any polio cases caused by serotype 1 wild polioviruses (WPV1s) in 2017. With the dwindling cases in both countries and pressure to finish eradication with the least possible resources, a danger exists of inappropriate prioritization of efforts between the two countries and insufficient investment in the two countries to finish the job. We used an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and oral poliovirus (OPV) evolution model to simulate a proactive strategy to stop transmission, and different hypothetical reactive strategies that adapt the quality of supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) in response to observed polio cases in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To account for the delay in perception and adaptation, we related the coverage of the SIAs in high-risk, undervaccinated subpopulations to the perceived (i.e., smoothed) polio incidence. Continuation of the current frequency and quality of SIAs remains insufficient to eradicate WPV1 in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Proactive strategies that significantly improve and sustain SIA quality lead to WPV1 eradication and the prevention of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) outbreaks. Reactive vaccination efforts that adapt moderately quickly and independently to changes in polio incidence in each country may succeed in WPV1 interruption after several cycles of outbreaks, or may interrupt WPV1 transmission in one country but subsequently import WPV1 from the other country or enable the emergence of cVDPV outbreaks. Reactive vaccination efforts that adapt independently and either more rapidly or more slowly to changes in polio incidence in each country may similarly fail to interrupt WPV1 transmission and result in oscillations of the incidence. Reactive strategies that divert resources to the country of highest priority may lead to alternating large outbreaks. Achieving WPV1 eradication and subsequent successful OPV cessation in Pakistan and Afghanistan requires proactive and sustained efforts to improve vaccination intensity in under-vaccinated subpopulations while maintaining high population immunity elsewhere.U2R GH001913/GH/CGH CDC HHS/United States1U2RGH001913-01/GH/CGH CDC HHS/United States2021-02-03T00:00:00Z30239026PMC78571579087vault:3649
BMC Infect Dis
No full textBackgroundThe endgame for polio eradication includes coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), starting with the cessation of vaccine containing OPV serotype 2 (OPV2) by switching all trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV). The logistics associated with this global switch represent a significant undertaking, with some possibility of inadvertent tOPV use after the switch.MethodsWe used a previously developed poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to explore the relationships between the extent of inadvertent tOPV use, the time after the switch of the inadvertent tOPV use and corresponding population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission, and the ability of the inadvertently introduced viruses to cause a serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreak in a hypothetical population. We then estimated the minimum time until inadvertent tOPV use in a supplemental immunization activity (SIA) or in routine immunization (RI) can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak in realistic populations with properties like those of northern India, northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, northern Nigeria, and Ukraine.ResultsAt low levels of inadvertent tOPV use, the minimum time after the switch for the inadvertent use to cause a cVDPV2 outbreak decreases sharply with increasing proportions of children inadvertently receiving tOPV. The minimum times until inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA or in RI can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak varies widely among populations, with higher basic reproduction numbers, lower tOPV-induced population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission prior to the switch, and a lower proportion of transmission occurring via the oropharyngeal route all resulting in shorter times. In populations with the lowest expected immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission after the switch, inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if it occurs as soon as 9\ua0months after the switch with 0.5\ua0% of children aged 0\u20134\ua0years inadvertently receiving tOPV, and as short as 6\ua0months after the switch with 10\u201320\ua0% of children aged 0\u20131\ua0years inadvertently receiving tOPV. In the same populations, inadvertent tOPV use in RI leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if 0.5\ua0% of OPV RI doses given use tOPV instead of bOPV for at least 20\ua0months after the switch, with the minimum length of use dropping to at least 9\ua0months if inadvertent tOPV use occurs in 50\ua0% of OPV RI doses.ConclusionsEfforts to ensure timely and complete tOPV withdrawal at all levels, particularly from locations storing large amounts of tOPV, will help minimize risks associated with the tOPV-bOPV switch. Under-vaccinated populations with poor hygiene become at risk of a cVDPV2 outbreak in the event of inadvertent tOPV use the soonest after the tOPV-bOPV switch and therefore should represent priority areas to ensure tOPV withdrawal from all OPV stocks.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12879-016-1537-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users
Future Virol
Full text linkAim:Assess risks related to breaches of poliovirus containmentMethod:Using a dynamic transmission model, we explore the variability among different populations in the vulnerability to poliovirus containment breaches as population immunity to transmission declines after oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation.Results:Although using OPV instead of wild poliovirus (WPV) seed strains for inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) production offers some expected risk reintroduction of live polioviruses from IPV manufacturing facilities, OPV seed strain releases may become a significant threat within 5-10 years of OPV cessation in areas most conducive to fecal-oral poliovirus transmission, regardless of IPV use.Conclusions:Efforts to quantify the risks demonstrate the challenges associated with understanding and managing relatively low-probability and high-consequence containment failure events.U2R GH001913/GH/CGH CDC HHSUnited States
BMC Infect Dis
No full textBackgroundA small number of individuals with B-cell-related primary immunodeficiency diseases (PIDs) may exhibit long-term (prolonged or chronic) excretion of immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived polioviruses (iVDPVs) following infection with oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). These individuals pose a risk of live poliovirus reintroduction into the population after global wild poliovirus eradication and subsequent OPV cessation. Treatment with polio antiviral drugs may potentially stop excretion in some of these individuals and thus may reduce the future population risk.MethodsWe developed a discrete event simulation model to characterize the global prevalence of long-term iVDPV excretors based on the best available evidence. We explored the impact of different assumptions about the effectiveness of polio antiviral drugs and the fraction of long-term excretors identified and treated.ResultsDue to the rarity of long-term iVDPV excretion and limited data on the survival of PID patients in developing countries, uncertainty remains about the current and future prevalence of long-term iVDPV excretors. While the model suggests only approximately 30 current excretors globally and a rapid decrease after OPV cessation, most of these excrete asymptomatically and remain undetected. The possibility that one or more PID patients may continue to excrete iVDPVs for several years after OPV cessation represents a risk for reintroduction of live polioviruses after OPV cessation, particularly for middle-income countries. With the effectiveness of a single polio antiviral drug possibly as low as 40\ua0% and no system in place to identify and treat asymptomatic excretors, the impact of passive use of a single polio antiviral drug to treat identified excretors appears limited. Higher drug effectiveness and active efforts to identify long-term excretors will dramatically increase the benefits of polio antiviral drugs.ConclusionsEfforts to develop a second polio antiviral compound to increase polio antiviral effectiveness and/or to maximize the identification and treatment of affected individuals represent important risk management opportunities for the polio endgame. Better data on the survival of PID\ua0patients in developing countries and more longitudinal data on their exposure to and recovery from OPV infections would improve our understanding of the risks associated with iVDPV excretors and the benefits of further investments in polio antiviral drugs
BMC Infect Dis
No full textBackgroundThe endgame for polio eradication involves coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) with cessation of serotype 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) implemented in late April and early May 2016 and cessation of serotypes 1 and 3 OPV (OPV13 cessation) currently planned for after 2018. The logistics associated with globally switching all use of trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) represent a significant undertaking, which may cause some complications, including delays that lead to different timing of the switch across shared borders.MethodsBuilding on an integrated global model for long-term poliovirus risk management, we consider the expected vulnerability of different populations to transmission of OPV2-related polioviruses as a function of time following the switch. We explore the relationship between the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 at the time of the switch and the time until OPV2-related viruses imported from countries still using OPV2 can establish transmission. We also analyze some specific situations modeled after populations at high potential risk of circulating serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreaks in the event of a non-synchronous switch.ResultsWell-implemented tOPV immunization activities prior to the tOPV to bOPV switch (i.e., tOPV intensification sufficient to prevent the creation of indigenous cVDPV2 outbreaks) lead to sufficient population immunity to transmission to cause die-out of any imported OPV2-related viruses for over 6\ua0months after the switch in all populations in the global model. Higher Rn of OPV2 at the time of the switch reduces the time until imported OPV2-related viruses can establish transmission and increases the time during which indigenous OPV2-related viruses circulate. Modeling specific connected populations suggests a relatively low vulnerability to importations of OPV2-related viruses that could establish transmission in the context of a non-synchronous switch from tOPV to bOPV, unless the gap between switch times becomes very long (>6\ua0months) or a high risk of indigenous cVDPV2s already exists in the importing and/or the exporting population.ConclusionsShort national discrepancies in the timing of the tOPV to bOPV switch will likely not significantly increase cVDPV2 risks due to the insurance provided by tOPV intensification efforts, although the goal to coordinate national switches within the globally agreed April 17-May 1, 2016 time window minimized the risks associated with cross-border importations
Development Of Investment Cases For Globally-Coordinated Management Of Infectious Diseases
No full textAlthough developed countries tend to rapidly adopt and maintain commitments to interventions to manage infectious diseases, global adoption and maintenance varies significantly and depends on resources. Different national policies and preferences aggregate to the overall global path. The ability of infectious diseases to travel across borders makes countries interdependent with respect to managing their risks, and national, regional, and global health leaders demand information that can help to support global coordination, strategy, planning, and resource development and allocation decisions. The Global Vaccine Action Plan identifies the need to develop investment cases to support vaccine finance decisions. Building on prior generic discussions of global disease management investment case concepts, we developed an outline of specific attributes for inclusion in investment cases. We engaged motivated stakeholders in a process to evaluate the proposed content for inclusion in investment cases for global management of infectious diseases in a consultation process. This paper reports on the final proposed content for investment cases and the insights from the stakeholder consultation process. © 2012 Thompson KM, et al
Framework For Optimal Global Vaccine Stockpile Design For Vaccine-Preventable Diseases: Application To Measles And Cholera Vaccines As Contrasting Examples
No full textManaging the dynamics of vaccine supply and demand represents a significant challenge with very high stakes. Insufficient vaccine supplies can necessitate rationing, lead to preventable adverse health outcomes, delay the achievements of elimination or eradication goals, and/or pose reputation risks for public health authorities and/or manufacturers. This article explores the dynamics of global vaccine supply and demand to consider the opportunities to develop and maintain optimal global vaccine stockpiles for universal vaccines, characterized by large global demand (for which we use measles vaccines as an example), and nonuniversal (including new and niche) vaccines (for which we use oral cholera vaccine as an example). We contrast our approach with other vaccine stockpile optimization frameworks previously developed for the United States pediatric vaccine stockpile to address disruptions in supply and global emergency response vaccine stockpiles to provide on-demand vaccines for use in outbreaks. For measles vaccine, we explore the complexity that arises due to different formulations and presentations of vaccines, consideration of rubella, and the context of regional elimination goals. We conclude that global health policy leaders and stakeholders should procure and maintain appropriate global vaccine rotating stocks for measles and rubella vaccine now to support current regional elimination goals, and should probably also do so for other vaccines to help prevent and control endemic or epidemic diseases. This work suggests the need to better model global vaccine supplies to improve efficiency in the vaccine supply chain, ensure adequate supplies to support elimination and eradication initiatives, and support progress toward the goals of the Global Vaccine Action Plan
BMJ Open
Full text linkObjectiveTo characterise the costs, including for environmental surveillance (ES), of the Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) that provides laboratory support to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI).Design and participantsWe conducted a survey of the network across 92 countries of the 146 GPLN laboratories plus three non-GPLN laboratories that concentrate environmental samples to collect information about their activities, characteristics and costs during 2016. We estimate the total costs using regression of reported responses and complementing the findings with GPEI data.ResultsWe received responses from 132 (89%) of the 149 laboratories, with variable response rates for individual questions. We estimate that processing samples of patients with acute flaccid paralysis leads to total costs of approximately ) based on extrapolation from reported costs of 5.3\u2009million of recurring costs for ES activities performed by the laboratories. The reported costs do not include an estimated additional 43\u2009million (note that this estimate does not include any field or other non-laboratory costs of polio surveillance).ConclusionsAlthough countries contribute significantly to the GPLN financing, many laboratories currently depend on GPEI funds, and these laboratories also support the laboratory component of surveillance activities for other diseases. Sustaining critical global surveillance for polioviruses and transitioning support for other disease programmes will require continued significant funding after polio certification.001/World Health OrganizationInternational/30670511PMC63479141002
Risk Anal
Full text linkEradication of wild poliovirus (WPV) types 1 and 3, prevention and cessation of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses, and achievement and maintenance of a world free of paralytic polio cases requires active risk management by focusing on population immunity and coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). We suggest the need for a complementary and different conceptual approach to achieve eradication compared to the current case-based approach using surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) to identify symptomatic poliovirus infections. Specifically, we describe a modeling approach to characterize overall population immunity to poliovirus transmission. The approach deals with the realities that exposure to live polioviruses (e.g., WPV, OPV) and/or vaccination with inactivated poliovirus vaccine provides protection from paralytic polio (i.e., disease), but does not eliminate the potential for reinfection or asymptomatic participation in poliovirus transmission, which may increase with time because of waning immunity. The AFP surveillance system provides evidence of symptomatic poliovirus infections detected, which indicate immunity gaps after outbreaks occur, and this system represents an appropriate focus for controlling disease outbreaks. We describe a conceptual dynamic model to characterize population immunity to poliovirus transmission that helps identify risks created by immunity gaps before outbreaks occur, which provides an opportunity for national and global policymakers to manage the risk of poliovirus and prevent outbreaks before they occur. We suggest that dynamically modeling risk represents an essential tool as the number of cases approaches zero.U2R GH001913/GH/CGH CDC HHSUnited States
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