1,721,024 research outputs found
Cooperation in a fragmented society:experimental evidence on Syrian refugees and natives in Lebanon
Get PDFLebanon is the country with the highest density of refugees in the world, raising the question of whether the host and refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public goods game without and with punishment. We randomly assign participants to Lebanese-only, Syrian-only, or mixed sessions. We find that randomly formed pairs in homogeneous sessions, on average, contribute and punish significantly more than those in mixed sessions, suggesting in-group cooperation is stronger. These patterns are driven by Lebanese participants. Further analysis indicates that behavior in mixed groups is more strongly conditioned on expectations about the partner’s cooperation than in homogeneous groups
Group identity and leading-by-example
Get PDFWe study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common identity between the leader and her followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher than in a treatment where no identity was induced. In two further treatments we study the effects of heterogeneous identities. We find no effect on cooperation when only part of the followers share the leader's identity, or when followers share a common identity that differs from that of the leader. We conclude that group identity is an effective but fragile instrument to promote cooperation
Are happier people less judgmental of other people's selfish behaviors? Experimental survey evidence from trust and gift exchange games
Get PDFWhat determines people's moral judgments of selfish behaviors? Here we study whether people's normative views in trust and gift exchange games, which underlie many situations of economic and social significance, are themselves functions of positive emotions. We use experimental survey methods to investigate the moral judgments of impartial observers empirically, and explore whether we could influence subsequent judgments by deliberately making some individuals happier. We find that moral judgments of selfish behaviors in the economic context depend strongly on the behavior of the interaction partner of the judged person, but their relationships are significantly moderated by an increase in happiness for the person making the judgment
Leadership under the shadow of the future: Intelligence and strategy choice in infinitely repeated games
Get PDFWe examine the impact of intelligence on decision making in an infinitely repeated sequential public goods game. Using a two-part experiment, we collect data on subjects’ intelligence and a wide range of preference characteristics, and match these to their full contingent strategy profiles. We find that leaders are less likely to play a free-riding strategy as their intelligence increases. Followers are less likely to play a grim-trigger strategy as intelligence increases. Performing simulations using players’ strategies, we find that groups contribute more and are more profitable as intelligence increases. Our results have implications for the design of policies promoting group success
Reciprocity and the tragedies of maintaining and providing the commons:A replication and an extension to income inequality
Get PDFSocial cooperation often requires individuals to exhibit restraint for the greater good, incurring costs for maintaining public goods or establishing them through generosity. Will cooperative behaviors differ between maintenance and provision dilemmas? We replicate findings showing that low cooperation is more likely in maintenance than provision scenarios among a non-student sample with reciprocity being the main reason behind cooperative differences. A separate experiment reports similar effects in the case of income inequality, also suggesting dilemma-specific reciprocity is vital in averting the 'tragedy of the commons'. Our findings reinforce and broaden previous conclusions in the literature
Luck-based versus merit-based income shifts fairness perceptions and promotes cooperation in a public goods game
Get PDFWe experimentally study the impact of merit- and luck-based inequalities on cooperative behaviour and fairness perceptions. Using a sample from non-student populations (N = 542), we examine behaviour in one-shot public good games (PGG) in treatments where individuals’ income is randomly allocated (‘Luck’) or performance dependent (‘Merit’). In line with our theoretical framework, we find that groups with merit-based inequality contribute less to the public goods than groups with luck-based inequality. To explore the underlying mechanism, we elicit fairness judgments from the perspective of a neutral, uninvolved arbitrator. Individuals in groups with merit-based inequality perceive it fairer to cooperate less, and these fairness perceptions account for their lower contributions. The effect on cooperation and fairness perceptions is driven primarily by rich individuals in merit-based societies. Our findings provide causal evidence that the source of inequality shapes cooperation through perceived fairness, with important implications for policy making targeted at promoting public good contributions
Does revealing personality data affect prosocial behaviour?
Get PDFMany modern organisations collect data on individuals’ personality traits as part of their human resource selection processes. We test experimentally whether revealing information on personality data impacts on pro-social behaviour as measured in a one-shot modified dictator game and a public goods game. Our focus is on the personality trait of agreeableness which has been shown to be a significant determinant of pro-sociality. We provide new evidence that revealing personality information for disagreeable individuals has detrimental effects on their pro-social behaviour as compared to the baseline no-information benchmark. This is not the case, however, for agreeable individuals when they are matched with agreeable individuals. Agreeable individuals become less pro-social when matched with disagreeable individuals and are aware of this. Our results suggest that information cues about personality significantly affect economic behaviour and have implications for employees’ personality assessments as part of standard hiring processes
Prosociality Spillovers of Working with Others
Get PDFGroup compensation and public announcement of performance are two common aspects of working with other people. We randomly assign these aspects to real-effort tasks. Following task completion and payment, subjects are given an unexpected opportunity to donate to a local charity. Group compensation and public announcement of performance have little effect on work performance but striking spillover effects on subsequent donations. Public announcement of performance doubles the amount donated to charity, and group compensation significantly increases the share donating. The results suggest that interpersonal interactions in the workplace environment may have important spillover effects on prosocial behavior outside of work
Alleviation and Sanctions in Social Dilemma Games
Get PDFThis paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game with punishment in which subjects are given the opportunity to punish other group members (democratic punishment regime) and (ii) a public goods game environment where all group members exogenously experience an automatic reduction of their income (irrespective of their behaviour) and are given the opportunity to alleviate the automatic penalty (undemocratic punishment regime). We employ a within-subjects design where subjects experience both environments and control for order effects by alternating their sequence. Our findings indicate that average contributions and earnings in the undemocratic punishment environment are significantly lower relative to the standard public goods game with punishment. We also observe that in the undemocratic environment average contributions decay over time only when subjects have experienced the standard public goods game with punishment. As a result, alleviation is significantly less when subjects have experienced the standard public goods game with punishment compared to when they do not have such experience. However, the assignment of punishment is robust irrespective of the order in which the games are played
Social framing effects in leadership by example:Preferences or beliefs?
Get PDFWe study the impact of framing on leading‐by‐example. Our 2 × 2 design consists of group level frames (Wall Street vs. Community) and individual level frames (First/Second Movers vs. Leader/Followers). We report on two studies where we elicit participants' beliefs allowing us to evaluate whether framing effects are driven by beliefs or preferences. Across both studies, average contributions are significantly lower in the Community—First Mover frame. This is primarily because leaders contribute less, pulling down followers' contributions. We find that contributions are strongly related to first order and second order beliefs but framing effects remain once we control for beliefs
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