202 research outputs found
Book review on Michalis Drouvelis: "Social preferences: an introduction to behavioural economics and experimental research"
No full textRezension zu: Social preferences: an introduction to behavioural economics and experimental research, by Michalis Drouvelis, Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing, 2021, 205 pages, £22.99, ISBN 978-1-78821-417-9 (paperback)
Cooperation in a fragmented society:experimental evidence on Syrian refugees and natives in Lebanon
Full text linkLebanon is the country with the highest density of refugees in the world, raising the question of whether the host and refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public goods game without and with punishment. We randomly assign participants to Lebanese-only, Syrian-only, or mixed sessions. We find that randomly formed pairs in homogeneous sessions, on average, contribute and punish significantly more than those in mixed sessions, suggesting in-group cooperation is stronger. These patterns are driven by Lebanese participants. Further analysis indicates that behavior in mixed groups is more strongly conditioned on expectations about the partner’s cooperation than in homogeneous groups
Feedback quality and performance in organisations
Full text linkThe provision of feedback is fundamental for promoting employee performance in modern organisations; however, little is known about how the quality of feedback affects performance. We report an experiment where subjects perform a real-effort task repeatedly in a flat-wage environment which varies the quality of feedback across treatments. In the baseline treatment, subjects receive no feedback about their rank in their group. In the two main treatments, feedback quality varies in that subjects know (“High-Quality Feedback”) or do not know (“Low-Quality Feedback”) their exact rank in their group. We show that the quality of feedback is an important driver of productivity. Average performance is significantly higher for high-quality feedback than for low-quality or no feedback, where no significant overall performance differences are observed. Our results have significant implications for designing and implementing cost-effective policies within organisations
Competition and the role of group identity
Full text linkThe emergence of competition is a defining aspect of human nature and characterizes many important social environments. However, its relationship with how social groups are formed has received little attention. We design an experiment to analyze how individuals’ willingness to compete is affected by group identity. We find that individuals display substantially stronger competitiveness in within group (ingroup) matchings than in between group (outgroup) matchings or in a control setting where no group identity is induced. We also find that the effect of group identity is stronger for subjects who participated more actively in the team-building task
Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: testing for order effects
Full text linkWe investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment. We discuss how these results compare with those reported in the existing literature
Alleviation and Sanctions in Social Dilemma Games
Full text linkThis paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game with punishment in which subjects are given the opportunity to punish other group members (democratic punishment regime) and (ii) a public goods game environment where all group members exogenously experience an automatic reduction of their income (irrespective of their behaviour) and are given the opportunity to alleviate the automatic penalty (undemocratic punishment regime). We employ a within-subjects design where subjects experience both environments and control for order effects by alternating their sequence. Our findings indicate that average contributions and earnings in the undemocratic punishment environment are significantly lower relative to the standard public goods game with punishment. We also observe that in the undemocratic environment average contributions decay over time only when subjects have experienced the standard public goods game with punishment. As a result, alleviation is significantly less when subjects have experienced the standard public goods game with punishment compared to when they do not have such experience. However, the assignment of punishment is robust irrespective of the order in which the games are played
Dictator giving and taking:Evidence from Africa
Full text linkReplication lies at the heart of economic analysis and is of crucial importance for science progression. Previous studies find evidence that framing significantly matters in dictator games. These findings mostly rely on societies considered as being WEIRD. We explore the generalizability of these results by collecting data from 165 dictators in Botswana. Our findings show that average giving is significantly reduced when the action set includes taking, but by substantially less than what has been found previously in a WEIRD society. We calculate the post-study probability estimates showing how our priors change with the results reported here. Our study further highlights the importance of institutions and has significant implications for future research
Group identity and leading-by-example
Full text linkWe study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a public goods game experiment. A common identity between the leader and her followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher than in a treatment where no identity was induced. In two further treatments we study the effects of heterogeneous identities. We find no effect on cooperation when only part of the followers share the leader's identity, or when followers share a common identity that differs from that of the leader. We conclude that group identity is an effective but fragile instrument to promote cooperation
Are happier people less judgmental of other people's selfish behaviors? Experimental survey evidence from trust and gift exchange games
Full text linkWhat determines people's moral judgments of selfish behaviors? Here we study whether people's normative views in trust and gift exchange games, which underlie many situations of economic and social significance, are themselves functions of positive emotions. We use experimental survey methods to investigate the moral judgments of impartial observers empirically, and explore whether we could influence subsequent judgments by deliberately making some individuals happier. We find that moral judgments of selfish behaviors in the economic context depend strongly on the behavior of the interaction partner of the judged person, but their relationships are significantly moderated by an increase in happiness for the person making the judgment
Leadership under the shadow of the future: Intelligence and strategy choice in infinitely repeated games
Full text linkWe examine the impact of intelligence on decision making in an infinitely repeated sequential public goods game. Using a two-part experiment, we collect data on subjects’ intelligence and a wide range of preference characteristics, and match these to their full contingent strategy profiles. We find that leaders are less likely to play a free-riding strategy as their intelligence increases. Followers are less likely to play a grim-trigger strategy as intelligence increases. Performing simulations using players’ strategies, we find that groups contribute more and are more profitable as intelligence increases. Our results have implications for the design of policies promoting group success
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