1,720,963 research outputs found
Oggetti fittizi: un'indagine metafisica.
Full text linkIn questa tesi propongo di formulare una teoria artefattualista degli oggetti fittizi declinata secondo una versione moderna dell’ilemorfismo denominata amorfismo. L’obiettivo principale è quello di proporre una concezione dei ficta che sia rispettosa delle nostre intuizioni di parlanti, ma, allo stesso tempo, ne elimini le incoerenze. Per fare questo, introduco nella prima parte i termini del dibattito analitico sugli oggetti fittizi e le principali posizioni attualmente disponibili mostrandone i problemi principali. Nella seconda parte, introduco alcuni concetti che ho incontrato nel mio lavoro di ricerca consultando la letteratura appartenente alla corrente neo-aristotelica sempre di area analitica. Nello specifico, espongo la nozione di concetto sortale, di criterio d’identità, la dottrina dell’ilemorfismo ed una sua recente variazione proposta da S.J. Evnine denominata amorfismo. Nella terza parte propongo la mia personale teoria utilizzando l’amorfismo nel tentativo di formulare dei criteri d’identità da associare al sortale “Oggetto Fittizio” in termini di atti creativi. Sviluppo poi la teoria in modo da fornire una spiegazione convincente di cosa significhi per un autore creare un fictum, cosa significa affermare di un oggetto fittizio che non esiste e in che senso un oggetto fittizio possiede le proprietà che gli sono ascritte nelle storie che lo vedono protagonista.In this thesis I propose an artefactualist theory of fictional objects declined according to a modern version of hylomorphism called amorphism. The main goal is to propose a conception of ficta that is respectful of our intuitions as speakers, but, at the same time, eliminates their inconsistencies. In order to do this, I introduce in the first part of the thesis the terms of the debate about fictional objects and the main positions currently available showing the main problems undermining them. In the second part, I introduce some concepts belonging to the neo-Aristotelian philosophy, such as sortal concepts, criteria of identity, hylomorphism and a recent variation of this doctrine proposed by S.J. Evnine and called amorphism. In the third part I propose my personal theory using amorphism in an attempt to formulate identity criteria to be associated with the sortal "Fictitious Object” and formulated in terms of creative acts. I then develop the theory in order to provide a convincing explanation of what it means for an author to create a fictum, what it means to affirm of a fictional object that it does not exist and in what sense a fictional object has the properties that are ascribed to it in the stories to which it belongs
Fictional Objects
No full textThe article, in the first part, aims at providing a positive answer to the ontological question about fictional objects starting from semantic reflections on the negative existential statements containing terms purporting to refer to such objects and the principle of compositionality. In the second part is proposed a Meinongian account of ficta, showing how it handles the problem of negative existentials without giving up neither the principle of compositionality nor our way of talking about fictional characters in the natural languages. It is also considered a particular kind of Meinongianism, namely Modal Meinongianism which seems to be the best Meinongian theory in order to explore the modal properties of ficta
Political Identity
No full textPolitical communities are objects, and objects are entities falling under a sortal concept. Substances are entities the identities of which do not depend on anything else but that determine the identity conditions of other non-substantial entities. Political communities are compound objects the identities of which depend somehow upon the identities of their parts; hence they are not substances. Human beings are substances and can be considered the constituents of a political community. Being part of a political community for a human being means being a citizen, namely, among other things, sharing some values and acquiring some habits that can be seen as a development of human nature. One important role in the development of the political identity of an individual is played by narratives as vehicles for the acquisition of those values and habits that contribute to defining the membership in a certain community. In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between political communities and their members, and we focus on narratives as a means, on the one hand, to mould political identity and, on the other, to make citizens virtuous
Political Identity and the Metaphysics of Polities
No full textThe chapters in this volume clarify the notion of political identity by focusing on the metaphysics of polities. By analysing the notion of political identity, they provide the conceptual resources for a deeper understanding of the theoretical and practical debates on populism, the crisis of sovereignty, the feasibility of a world government, and ethical, religious, and cultural pluralism.
What is a political community? Any answer to this question lies at the intersection between three fields: metaphysics, philosophy of action, and political philosophy. The question concerns how and why a plurality of individuals becomes a political unity, what principles or forces keep that unity together, and what threats that unity can encounter. In this volume, the contributors investigate how different metanormative views affect the possible answers to this metaphysical question. They explore the role that the individual identities of agents play in grounding common practices that underpin political life. They investigate the individual identities of agents as the result of the interplay between natural and cultural factors. Finally, they observe the ways in which a political community, as a collection of individuals who hang together in an attempt to reach common purposes, demonstrate a certain metaphysical solidity.
Political Identity and the Metaphysics of Polities will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in metaphysics, political philosophy, political theory, and philosophy of action
Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities
No full textThe aim of this paper is to propose an exploratory artefactual theory of fctional
objects based on Evnine’s amorphism, with the goal of reconciling the inconsistent intuitions surrounding these entities. While not presenting a fully developed and
comprehensive theory, I aim to explore the possibilities of amorphism and to ofer
a preliminary investigation into the nature of fctional objects and the challenges
posed by our basic intuitions regarding their non-existence, creation, and property
attribution. I formulate a two-level criterion of identity-based on creative acts and
utilize the notion of internal predication to account for how fctional objects possess
the properties attributed to them in relevant stories. Additionally, I propose considering a subset of essential properties to fx the identity of fcta across stories. Lastly,
I address the challenge of negative existential statements by equating non-existence
with unreality, asserting that fctional objects are constituted by the properties attributed to them but do not fully exemplify them
A Place for Artifacts
Full text linkIn this paper, I show how it is possible to allow for the existence of artifacts within a neo-Aristotelian conceptual framework. In order to do this, I show the main features of the mainstream Quinean approach to ontology, I then expose the main features of the neo-Aristotelian metaphysics and introduce some key notions such as sortal concepts and criteria of identity, and finally, I propose a criterion of identity for artifacts based on Evnine’s doctrine of amorphism. I also propose a solution to a possible objection to amorphism
Frege, compositionality and existence
Full text linkIn this paper I show how Frege’s treatment of existence in terms of quantification clashes against the principle of compositionality and I attempt to provide a possible solution to the problem. I expose some of the main innovations introduced by Frege in logic in order to show his good reasons in favor of compositionality and I show how such principle is at odds with the quantificational account of existence. In the final part, I propose a Meinongian solution, namely to abandon the idea that existence is expressed satisfactorily by the particular quantifier and that all terms that succeed to refer, refer to existent objects
Di cos’è fatto un personaggio? Una prospettiva neo-aristotelica sugli oggetti fittizi
No full textThe way we talk about fictional objects in everyday language seems to presuppose insights that are inconsistent with each other. We say things like: “Sherlock Holmes does not exist” or “Sherlock Homes is a detective” or “Sherlock Holmes is a character created by Conana Doyle”. In this book I propose a realist theory of fictional objects employing the conceptual resources taken from the contemporary analytic neo-Aristotelian tradition with the aim of reconciling our conflicting intuitions about Sherlock Holmes and fictitious entities in general. Specifically, my theory is a new version of artefactualism based upon Evnine’s reformulation of hylomorphism called amorphism.Il modo in cui parliamo degli oggetti fittizi nel linguaggio di tutti i giorni sembra presupporre delle intuizioni che sono fra loro incoerenti. Diciamo, ad esempio, che Sherlock Holmes non esiste, ma anche che è un detective, oppure che è un personaggio creato da Conan Doyle. In questo libro propongo una teoria realista degli oggetti fittizi formulata utilizzando le risorse concettuali attinte dalla tradizione neo-aristotelica analitica contemporanea con l’obiettivo di conciliare le nostre intuizioni contrastanti relative a Sherlock Holmes ed alle entità fittizie in genere. Nello specifico, la mia teoria si propone come una nuova versione dell’artefattualismo, la posizione per cui gli oggetti fittizi sarebbero artefatti astratti, declinato secondo i principi dell’amorfismo, ovvero una recente riformulazione dell’ilemorfismo proposta da Simon Evnine
Introduction
Full text linkThe notion of ontological dependence can find application in distinct areas of philosophical research and can serve the purpose of better understanding the nature of the objects and phenomena at the center of such researches. What the present issue focuses attention on is the relation that subsists between our activities as human beings and certain types of entities that seem to depend on them
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