1,721,073 research outputs found
Competitive conditions in the Central and Eastern European banking systems
Full text linkThe aim of this study is to conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of the competitive conditions in the banking systems of Central and Eastern European countries. The well-known model of Panzar and Rosse (1987) is implemented on bank-level data over the period 1999-2006. The estimates based on the separate country panels suggest a wide variation in the competitive conditions of the banking systems examined, with some being characterized as (monopolistically) competitive and other as non-competitive. Finally, the results from the full sample indicate that bank revenue is substantially influenced by structural and macroeconomic conditions
Competitive conditions in the Central and Eastern European banking systems
Full text linkThe aim of this study is to conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of the competitive conditions in the banking systems of Central and Eastern European countries. The well-known model of Panzar and Rosse (1987) is implemented on bank-level data over the period 1999-2006. The estimates based on the separate country panels suggest a wide variation in the competitive conditions of the banking systems examined, with some being characterized as (monopolistically) competitive and other as non-competitive. Finally, the results from the full sample indicate that bank revenue is substantially influenced by structural and macroeconomic conditions.Market power; Central and Eastern European banks; Panzar-Rosse model
Competitive conditions in the Central and Eastern European banking systems
No full textThe aim of this study is to conduct an empirical analysis of the competitive conditions in the banking systems of Central and Eastern European countries. The well-known model of Panzar and Rosse [1] is implemented on bank-level data over the period 1999-2006. The estimates based on the separate country panels suggest a wide variation in the competitive conditions of the banking systems examined, with some being characterized as (monopolistically) competitive and other as non-competitive. Finally, the results from the full sample indicate that bank revenue is substantially influenced by structural and macroeconomic conditions.Market power Central and Eastern European banks Panzar-Rosse model
Bank competition, financial reform and institutions: The importance of being developed
Full text linkIn this paper we estimate the degree of market power at the bank-level for 84 banking systems worldwide. Subsequently, we analyze the sources of bank competition, placing emphasis on the impact of financial reform and the quality of institutions. We find that financial liberalization policies reduce the market power of banks in developed countries with advanced politico-institutional milieus. In contrast, banking competition does not improve at the same pace in countries with weaker institutions and a lower level of economic development. The results hold across a wide array of identification tests and estimation methods. The main policy implication to be drawn is that a certain level of institutional maturity is a precondition for the success of reforms aimed at enhancing competition and efficiency of banking markets
Interest rates and bank risk-taking
Full text linkIn a recent line of research the low interest-rate environment of the early to mid 2000s is viewed as an element that triggered increased risk-taking appetite of banks in search for yield. This paper uses approximately 18,000 annual observations on euro area banks over the period 2001-2008 and presents strong empirical evidence that low interest rates indeed increase bank risk-taking substantially. This result is robust across a number of different specifications that account, inter alia, for the potential endogeneity of interest rates and/or the dynamics of bank risk. Notably, among the banks of the large euro area countries this effect is less pronounced for French institutions, which held on average a relatively low level of risk assets. Finally, the distributional effects of interest rates on bank risk-taking due to individual bank characteristics reveal that the impact of interest rates on risk assets is diminished for banks with higher equity capital and is amplified for banks with higher off-balance sheet items.Interest rates; bank risk-taking; panel data; euro area banks
On-site audits, sanctions, and bank risk-taking: An empirical overture towards a novel regulatory and supervisory philosophy
Full text linkThis paper investigates the role of banking supervision, measured in terms of enforcement outputs (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions) in containing bank risk-taking. Our results on the direct banking supervision–risk-taking correlation show an inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site audits and bank risk, while the nexus between enforcement actions and risk appears linear and negative. With respect to the combined effect of efficient supervision and banking regulation (in the form of capital and transparency requirements) we find that effective supervision and disclosure prerequisites are important and complementary mechanisms in reducing bank fragility, by contrast to capital requirements which are proven rather futile in controlling bank risk, even when supplemented with a higher volume of on-site audits and enforcement actions
On-site audits, sanctions, and bank risk-taking: An empirical overture towards a novel regulatory and supervisory philosophy
No full textThis paper investigates the role of banking supervision, measured in terms of enforcement outputs (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions) in containing bank risk-taking. Our results on the direct banking supervision–risk-taking correlation show an inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site audits and bank risk, while the nexus between enforcement actions and risk appears linear and negative. With respect to the combined effect of efficient supervision and banking regulation (in the form of capital and transparency requirements) we find that effective supervision and disclosure prerequisites are important and complementary mechanisms in reducing bank fragility, by contrast to capital requirements which are proven rather futile in controlling bank risk, even when supplemented with a higher volume of on-site audits and enforcement actions.Bank risk; Regulation; Supervision; Enforcement; Sanctions; Audits
Bank competition, institutional strength and financial reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and the EU
No full textAbstract Following their EU15 counterparts, the banking systems of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries underwent extensive reform since the 1990s. In this paper we estimate the degree of bank market power during the periods of financial reform in each European country, and subsequently we analyze the political and institutional sources of bank competition distinguishing between the EU15 and CEE subgroups. A linear pattern in the relationship between bank competition and institutional strength is demonstrated for the EU15 group of countries, while for the CEEs this pattern is non-linear. Therefore, we suggest that relatively underdeveloped banking systems, in less advanced politico-institutional milieus, overall fail to benefit from reforms in their early stages. As a policy implication the results imply that a certain level of institutional maturity, combined with openness to foreign investors, is a precondition for reforms aiming at enhancing competition and efficiency of banking markets.Bank competition; Financial reforms; Institutional development; European Union; Central and Eastern European countries
The joint estimation of bank-level market power and efficiency
Full text linkThe aim of this study is to provide a methodology for the joint estimation of efficiency and market power of individual banks. The proposed method utilizes the separate implications of the new empirical industrial organization and the stochastic frontier literatures and suggests identification using the local maximum likelihood (LML) technique. Through LML, estimation of market power of individual banks becomes feasible, while a number of restrictive theoretical and empirical assumptions are relaxed. The empirical analysis is carried out on the basis of EMU and US bank data and the results suggest small differences in the market power and efficiency levels of banks between the two samples. Market power estimates indicate fairly competitive conduct in general; however, heterogeneity in market power estimates is substantial across banks within each sample. The latter result suggests that while the banking industries examined are fairly competitive in general, the practice of some banks deviates from the average behavior, and this finding has important policy implications. Finally, efficiency and market power present a negative relationship, which is in line with the so-called “quiet life hypothesis”.Efficiency; market power; local maximum likelihood
A new method to estimate the risk of financial intermediaries
No full textIn this paper we reconsider the formal estimation of the risk of financial intermediaries. Risk is modeled as the variability of the profit function of a representative intermediary, here bank, as formally considered in finance theory. In turn, banking theory suggests that risk is determined simultaneously with profits and other bank- and industry-level characteristics that cannot be considered predetermined when profit maximizing decisions of financial institutions are to be made. Thus, risk is endogenous. We estimate the model on a panel of US banks, spanning the period 1985q1-2010q2. The findings suggest that risk was fairly stable up to 2001 and accelerated quickly thereafter and up to 2007. Indices of bank risk commonly used in the literature do not capture this trend and/or the scale of the increase.Risk of financial intermediaries; Endogenous risk; Full information maximum likelihood, Profit function, Duality
- …
