1,721,030 research outputs found
Medicare Part D: are insurers gaming the low income subsidy design?
No full textThis paper shows how in Medicare Part D insurers’ gaming of the subsidy paid to low-income enrollees distorts premiums and raises the program cost. Using plan-level data from the !rst !ve years of the program, I !nd multiple instances of pricing strategy distortions for the largest insurers. Instrumental variable estimates indicate that the changes in a concentration index measuring the manipulability of the
subsidy can explain a large share of the premium growth observed between 2006 and 2011. Removing this distortion could reduce the cost of the program without worsening consumer welfare
When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement
No full textIn this paper I study two methods often used in public procurement to deal with the risk that the winning bidder may default on his bid: augmenting the standard first price auction with an ex-post verification of the responsiveness of the bids and using an average bid auction. I show that when penalties for defaulting are asymmetric across bidders and when their valuations are characterized by a predominant common component, the average bid auction is preferred over the standard first price by an auctioneer when the costs due to the winner's bankruptcy are high enough. Depending on the cost of the ex-post verification,
the average bid auction can be dominated by the first price with monitoring. I use a new dataset of Italian public procurement auctions, run alternately using a form of the average bid auction or the augmented first price, to structurally estimate the bids' verification cost, the firms' mark up and the inefficiency generated by the average bid auctions
Competition in procurement markets: the case of medical devices in Europe
No full textThis paper analyzes how features of the procurement system laid down by the EU Procurement Directives affect the analysis of competition in public procurement markets. It presents the bidding systems allowed under the EU rules and provides a general framework to assess competition concerns for the public procurement auctions characterizing it. It concludes by applying this analytical framework to the case of the procurement of medical devices in Europe, a sector recently experiencing multiple mergers among the major manufacturers
Cronaca di un fallimento annunciato: l’impiego dell’esclusione automatica negli appalti di lavori pubblici
No full textL’aggiudicazione di appalti attraverso ‘‘aste’’ con l’esclusione automatica delle offerte anomale, ripetutamente giudicata lesiva della concorrenza dalla Corte costituzionale (da ultimo nella sentenza 10 giugno 2011, n. 184), e` stata nuovamente estesa dal ‘‘decreto sviluppo’’ (decreto legge 13 maggio 2011, n. 70) fino a ricoprire tutti gli appalti sotto la soglia comunitaria (circa 5 milioni di euro). In questo saggio gli strumenti dell’analisi economica sono impiegati per illustrare le gravi distorsioni della concorrenza generate dall’esclusione automatica e per quantificare i danni prodotti da piu` di un decennio di utilizzo di tale criterio negli appalti di lavori pubblici
Awarding price, contract performance, and bids screening: evidence from procurement auctions
No full textThis paper presents evidence on the perverse trade-off that first price auctions induce between low prices at the awarding stage and poor ex post performance when bids are not binding commitments. By exploiting the different timing with which first price auctions were introduced in Italy to procure public works, this study finds that at least half of the cost savings from lower winning prices are lost because of ex post renegotiation. Screening the lowest price bid for its responsiveness prevents performance worsening but also reduces the initial cost savings by a third and induces delays in awarding the contract
Effetti economici della democrazia. Un'analisi empirica
No full textThis research analyses through the use of instrumental variables estimation whether democracy has an effect on variables belonging to three different categories: fiscal policy, inequality in income distribution and political instability. It shows there is no stable relation between democracy and fiscal policy variables between countries of the sample in the 1978-1988 period. Democracy, on the other hand, significantly affects the difference in middle class income share (positively) and in changes at the top of the executive (negatively)
The unintended effects of the Medicare Part D low income subsidy
No full textMedicare Part D is the voluntary program that provides insurance for prescription drugs to 37 million US elderly. This form of public insurance is delivered exclusively through a choice-based private insurance market, where Medicare pays various types of subsidies. The objective of this paper is to analyze how the subsidy paid to low income enrollees induces insurers to distort their plan premiums.Methods: Combining both an analysis of the incentives created by the different regulations and empirical evidence obtained from plan level data for the years between 2006 and 2013,the paper evaluates the presence of premium distortions associated with insurers response to the low income subsidy.Results: The findings indicate that insurers cluster premiums at the value that maximizes the rents they earn on enrollees receiving the low income subsidies. Moreover, insurers use the possibility of offering multiple insurance plans to manipulate the amount of the subsidy and increase further their rents.Conclusions: This study indicates the need to reform the subsidy system in Medicare Part Dand offers guidance on the essential elements of the low income subsidy refor
Comparing public procurement auctions
No full textThis paper contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex-post screening of bid responsiveness and average bid auctions, in which the bidder closest to the average bid wins. In equilibrium, their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the average bid auction is typically less efficient. Using a dataset of Italian public procurement auctions run alternately under the two formats, a structural model of bidding is estimated for the subsample of first price auctions. Lower bound estimates of the efficiency loss under the counterfactual average bid auctions range between 11 and 41 percent
Il mercato di settore. Le soluzioni del codice
No full textNella stesura del nuovo Codice, il nostro ruolo di economisti e’ stato particolarmente innovativo. Questo saggio ne discute gli elementi caratterizzanti
Il contributo dell’analisi economica nei contratti pubblici
No full text1. Introduzione; 2. La scelta dello strumento di acquisto; 3. Elementi caratterizzanti dell’individuazione del contraente privato; 3.1 Il criterio dell’offerta economicamente più vantaggiosa; 3.2 Il criterio del prezzo più basso; 4. Elementi economici del Green Public Procurement; 5. Conclusioni
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