425 research outputs found
Pairwise stable and stochastically stable networks in the four-person co-author model
No full textThe co-author model is introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, Journal of Economic Theory) as a typical example of the models of network formation. In this note, we study which network is pairwise stable and/or stochastically stable when the number of players is four.
Dynamics of Network Formation Processes in the Co-Author Model
No full textThis article studies the dynamics in the formation processes of a mutual consent network in game theory setting: the Co-Author Model. In this article, a limited observation is applied and analytical results are derived. Then, 2 parameters are varied: the number of individuals in the network and the initial probability of the links in the network in its initial state. A simulation result shows a finding that is consistent with an analytical result for a state of equilibrium while it also shows different possible equilibria.Dynamics, Network, Game Theory, Model,Simulation, Equilibrium, Complexity
Bilateral Oligopoly
No full textIn intermediate goods markets, both buyers and sellers normally have market power, and sales are based on bilaterally negotiated contracts specifying both price and quantity. In our model, pairs of buyers and sellers meet in bilateral but interdependent Rubinstein-Ståhl negotiations. The outcome has a simple characterization (a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargaining solutions) suitable for applied work. Equilibrium quantities are efficient regardless of concentration and also with few “trading links”. The law of one price does not hold. In addition to relation-specific characteristics, prices depend on both upstream and downstream concentration and on the structure of trading links. The requirements necessary for Walrasian prices are stronger than usually believed.Bilageral Oligopoly; Bargaining; Intermediate Goods; Decentralized Trade; Walrasian Outcome
Co-author model with homophily
No full textEn el presente trabajo se muestra una extensión del conocido modelo del coautor desarrollado en (Jackson y Wolinsky, 1996). En este documento puede encontrarse una modificación de este modelo donde se toma en cuenta la marcada tendencia del ser humano a relacionarse con otros individuos similares. Se propone esta adición con la intención de encontrar redes cuya estructura cumpla con las definiciones de eficiencia y estabilidad por pares al mismo tiempo. El principal objetivo del modelo es mostrar que la homofilia permite lidiar con el conflicto existente en el modelo del coautor con respecto a las estructuras en redes socialmente optimas y redes individualmente óptimas.This work shows an extension of the well-known model of the co-author developed in (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). In this document a modification of this model can be found where the marked tendency of the human being to relate to other similar individuals is taken into account. This addition is proposed with the intention of finding networks whose structure meets the definitions of efficiency and stability in pairs at the same time. The main objective of the model is to show that homophily makes it possible to deal with the existing conflict in the co-author’s model regarding the structures in socially optimal networks and individually optimal networks
MSJ881761_supplementary_appendix – Supplemental material for Diroximel fumarate (DRF) in patients with relapsing–remitting multiple sclerosis: Interim safety and efficacy results from the phase 3 EVOLVE-MS-1 study
No full textSupplemental material, MSJ881761_supplementary_appendix for Diroximel fumarate (DRF) in patients with relapsing–remitting multiple sclerosis: Interim safety and efficacy results from the phase 3 EVOLVE-MS-1 study by Robert T Naismith, Jerry S Wolinsky, Annette Wundes, Christopher LaGanke, Douglas L Arnold, Dragana Obradovic, Mark S Freedman, Mark Gudesblatt, Tjalf Ziemssen, Boris Kandinov, Ilda Bidollari, Maria Lopez-Bresnahan, Narinder Nangia, David Rezendes, Lili Yang, Hailu Chen, Shifang Liu, Jerome Hanna, Catherine Miller and Richard Leigh-Pemberton in Multiple Sclerosis Journal</p
MSJ-19-0334.R2_Supplemental_Figure_1 – Supplemental material for Diroximel fumarate (DRF) in patients with relapsing–remitting multiple sclerosis: Interim safety and efficacy results from the phase 3 EVOLVE-MS-1 study
No full textSupplemental material, MSJ-19-0334.R2_Supplemental_Figure_1 for Diroximel fumarate (DRF) in patients with relapsing–remitting multiple sclerosis: Interim safety and efficacy results from the phase 3 EVOLVE-MS-1 study by Robert T Naismith, Jerry S Wolinsky, Annette Wundes, Christopher LaGanke, Douglas L Arnold, Dragana Obradovic, Mark S Freedman, Mark Gudesblatt, Tjalf Ziemssen, Boris Kandinov, Ilda Bidollari, Maria Lopez-Bresnahan, Narinder Nangia, David Rezendes, Lili Yang, Hailu Chen, Shifang Liu, Jerome Hanna, Catherine Miller and Richard Leigh-Pemberton in Multiple Sclerosis Journal</p
MSJ-19-0334.R2_Supplemental_Figure_2 – Supplemental material for Diroximel fumarate (DRF) in patients with relapsing–remitting multiple sclerosis: Interim safety and efficacy results from the phase 3 EVOLVE-MS-1 study
No full textSupplemental material, MSJ-19-0334.R2_Supplemental_Figure_2 for Diroximel fumarate (DRF) in patients with relapsing–remitting multiple sclerosis: Interim safety and efficacy results from the phase 3 EVOLVE-MS-1 study by Robert T Naismith, Jerry S Wolinsky, Annette Wundes, Christopher LaGanke, Douglas L Arnold, Dragana Obradovic, Mark S Freedman, Mark Gudesblatt, Tjalf Ziemssen, Boris Kandinov, Ilda Bidollari, Maria Lopez-Bresnahan, Narinder Nangia, David Rezendes, Lili Yang, Hailu Chen, Shifang Liu, Jerome Hanna, Catherine Miller and Richard Leigh-Pemberton in Multiple Sclerosis Journal</p
Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
No full textThe Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game is reconsidered under the assumption that each player is loss averse and the associated reference point is equal to the highest turned down offer of the opponent in the past. This makes the payoffs and therefore potential equilibrium strategies dependent on the history of play. A subgame perfect equilibrium is constructed, in which the strategies depend on the history of play throughthe current reference points. It is shown that this equilibrium is unique under some assumptions that it shares with the equilibrium in the classical model: immediate acceptance of equilibrium offers, indifference between acceptance and rejection of such offers, and strategies depending only on the current reference points. It is also shown that in this equilibrium loss aversion is a disadvantage. Moreover, a relation with asymmetric Nashbargaining is established, where a player’s bargaining power is negatively related to own loss aversion and positively to the opponent’s loss aversion.mathematical economics;
When frictions favour information revelation
No full textWe study information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. First, we reconsider the one-sided case within constant entry flow model. The same question has been studied in an identical framework in Serrano and Yosha (1993). We prove that there exists an additional equilibrium not detected by Serrano and Yosha (1993). We show that this equilibrium is characterized by incomplete information revelation. Until now, no equilibrium with incomplete revelation of information was known in this model. Our second main result is that, at this new equilibrium, information revelation is worse when frictions are weaker. One prove also that increasing the frictions is a Pareto improvement. Finally, we show that those properties should also characterize some equilibria of the two-sided case studied by Wolinsky (1990).
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