357 research outputs found
Wirtschaftliche Integration und der Sozialstaat
No full textIn seiner Rede beim 3. Munich Economic Summit am 18. Juni 2004 setzte sich Prof. David E. Wildasin, University of Kentucky, mit der Zukunft des Sozialstaates auseinander. Er analysiert die Auswirkung der wirtschaftlichen Integration, vor allen Dingen der Integration von Arbeits- und Kapitalmärkten, auf die europäischen Sozialsysteme
Wirtschaftliche Integration und der Sozialstaat
No full textIn seiner Rede beim 3. Munich Economic Summit am 18. Juni 2004 setzte sich Prof. David E. Wildasin, University of Kentucky, mit der Zukunft des Sozialstaates auseinander. Er analysiert die Auswirkung der wirtschaftlichen Integration, vor allen Dingen der Integration von Arbeits- und Kapitalmärkten, auf die europäischen Sozialsysteme.Sozialstaat, Wirtschaftsintegration, Finanzpolitik, Arbeitsmobilität, Europa, Welt
State Corporation Income Taxation; An Economic Perspective on Nexus
No full textActing in the interest of their residents, within limits imposed by Federal statute and by the Constitution, states have incentives to impose taxes on the profits of corporations owned by nonresidents. This paper presents a model within which a state, using an apportionment formula that includes a sales factor, would choose to tax the income of out-of-state corporations that derive revenues from the sale or licensing of intangible assets to in-state customers, provided that such corporations have sufficient nexus to be taxable. Although such policies enable states to capture rents from nonresidents, they also introduce tax distortions by imposing implicit tariffs on sales by out-of-state firms.
Pre-Emption: Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxation
No full textThis paper examines the implications of Federal statutory restrictions on state government taxing powers. Such pre-emption can prevent states from pursuing policies that are best adapted to their economic circumstances and objectives, inefficiently constraining decentralized state tax policymaking. States policy choices may, however, harm the efficient operation of the US federation as a whole; in such cases, the “visible hand” of Federal pre-emption may lead to improved policy outcomes. Existing and proposed statutes that regulate state taxation of retail sales, retirement savings distributions, and corporation income illustrate the potential advantages and disadvantages of pre-emption.
Disaster Policy in the US Federation: Intergovernmental Incentives and Institutional Reform
No full textThe devastation resulting from the hurricanes of 2005 could largely have been avoided at modest cost, evidence of a policy failure that may stem from misaligned incentives among levels of government. In particular, Federal government provision of ex post disaster relief means that subnational governments are not rewarded for costly but socially efficient policies that limit disaster losses. A system of Federally-mandated, state-funded disaster reserves would strengthen subnational government incentives to implement more disaster-averse policies. Illustrative calculations show that the costs of such reserves would vary widely by state but would not impose undue burdens on state fiscal systems.
Local Government Finance in Kentucky: Time for Reform?
No full textThis is a time of increased interest in local government finance in Kentucky, as evidenced by the creation of a Task Force on Local Taxation, established by the General Assembly. The final report of the Task Force offers significant recommendations, including an amendment of the state constitution that would provide the General Assembly with the flexibility to institute new instruments of local government finance. The present paper reviews the status of local government finance in Kentucky and discusses some of the key findings and recommendations of the Task Force. As the Task Force report clearly recognizes, informed analysis of local tax policy in Kentucky is hampered by inadequate data on local government finances. This paper identifies some of these deficiencies and a number of important policy issues that require further policy analysis, particularly if the General Assembly entertains significant reforms of local taxation.
Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking
No full textIn this paper, we analyze a class of models in which there are interjurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, as illustrated for instance by CO2 emissions that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction’s emissions depend upon the local stock of private capital. Capital is interjurisdictionally-mobile and may be taxed to help finance local public expenditures. We show that decentralized policymaking leads to efficient resource allocations in important cases, even in the complete absence of corrective interventions by higher-level governments or coordination of policy through Coasian bargaining. In particular, even when the preferences and production technologies differ among the agents, the decentralized system can still result in globally efficient allocation.
Fiscal Competition
No full textThe theory of fiscal competition seeks to ascertain how fiscal policymaking is affected by competitive pressures faced by governments. This requires a theory of policy choice, and, as such, the theory of fiscal competition lies squarely in the realm of political economy. This essay presents a concise overview of some of the principal themes that have figured prominently in economic analyses of fiscal competition and identifies significant gaps that warrant further attention and that may occupy the attention of investigators in the years to come. It first sketches a model that has been used frequently in theoretical and empirical analyses of fiscal competition, emphasizing how fiscal policies affect the welfare (real incomes) of various groups and how these impacts depend on the mobility of resources. Subsequent sections address parts of the subject that are less well-settled, highlighting, for example, the fact that exit (or entry) options for mobile resources alters the payoffs from alternative fiscal policies among those who participate actively in the political process and, thus, participation incentives. Two intertemporal aspects of fiscal competition are emphasized: the determination of the "degree" of factor mobility, especially for the purposes of empirical analysis, and the issue of time-varying policies, commitment, and dynamic consistency. The paper also discusses the role of institutions, and particularly of higher- and lower-level governments (i.e., the vertical and horizontal structure of government), in fiscal competition.Fiscal Competition, Political Economy
The Dynamics of Municipal Fiscal Adjustment
No full textThe dynamic fiscal policy adjustment of local jurisdictions is investigated empirically using a panel of more than 1000 U.S. municipalities over a quarter of a century. Distinguishing own-source revenue, grants, expenditures, and debt service, the analysis is carried out using a vector error-correction model which takes account of the intertemporal budget constraint. The results indicate that a large part of the adjustment in response to fiscal imbalances takes place by offsetting changes in future expenditures. In addition, the results show that fiscal imbalances are financed to a significant extent by subsequent changes in grants. Decomposition of the sample according to average city population reveals that the basic pattern of fiscal adjustment is robust, although intergovernmental grants play a much more pronounced role in maintaining budget balance for large cities.
Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
No full textCentral government matching grants can, in principle, induce socially- efficient provision of local public goods that produce spillover benefits. Local underprovision of public goods may however elicit direct central-government provision and finance (a ``bailout") that makes local residents better off than under grant-subsidized local provision; local underprovision that induces bailouts reveals the local budget constraint to be ``soft." Simulations suggest that the ability of a locality to extract a welfare-improving bailout depends positively on its size: budget constraints are more likely to be ``hard" for small localities.fiscal federalism intergovernmental transfers
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