521 research outputs found
Competition, competition policy, and the GATT
No full textThe authors argue that further moves to liberalize trade and to implement existing GATT rules and principles may have a greater impact on global competition than would the pursuit of harmonization of competition policy. They also suggest that current GATT rules and case law provide scope for disputes to be brought before the GATT that relate to both the application and the nonapplication of existing domestic competition laws of GATT contracting parties. This leads to de facto discrimination between domestic and foreign products. Little use has been made of the GATT in this connection. Perhaps existing indirect avenues for raising competition-related disputes in the GATT should be pursued more actively. This would help identify what specific government policies might be the subject of multilateral negotiations and explicitly incorporated into the GATT framework.Environmental Economics&Policies,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOMEAND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Economic Theory&Research,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access
Do rules control power? GATT articles and arrangements in the Uruguay Round
No full textMany complain and offer evidence that in recent years the GATT system has become more power-oriented, less stable, and less equitable. A concern to reverse this drift was one of the motives that brought the international community to agree to undertake the Uruguay Round. Rules control power, assumed the signers of the Punte del Este declaration, therefore elaborating and extending GATT rules would move the international community toward a fairer, more stable international trading system. Finger and Dhar contend that the opposite is true. Particularly in the 1980s, the elaboration and application of GATT rules has been an exercise in the application of economic and political power, not in its control. GATT rules, in theory, are there to limit national trade restrictions. Finger and Dhar contend that in fact things work the other way around: national practice comes first, and determines what the GATT rules mean. GATT's rules do not put limits on national practices, but provide international santion for these practices. Such rules are not part of the thereforelution but are part of the problem. Theirs is a situation-specific argument, say Finger and Dhar, not a generic one. Their target is not"rules", nor is it"GATT". Rather, it is the GATT rules.Rules of Origin,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Common Carriers Industry,Transport and Trade Logistics,Trade Policy
Special and Differential Treatment in the GATT: A Pyrrhic Victory for Developing Countries
No full textPreferential measures for developing countries implemented within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade failed to achieve their purported goal of facilitating economic development; this failure was due to their weak theoretical underpinnings and poor policy design. Not only were the demands developing countries made for discriminatory preferences largely ineffectual, their demands for preferential treatment, together with their forgoing full participation in the multilateral trading system, fundamentally reduced the obligation of developed countries to consider the interests of developing countries in future negotiation rounds. Thus the winning of preferences was rendered a pyrrhic victory for developing countries.Economic development, trade liberalization, GATT, special and differential treatment, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Development, International Relations/Trade, Political Economy,
Constraining and supporting effects of the multilateral trading system on U.S. unilateralism
No full textThe subject of this paper is Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 of the United States, a statute that for the past 35 years has allowed the U.S. to unilaterally handle its trade disputes. More specifically, the paper examines the constraining and supporting effects of the multilateral trading system (GATT and WTO) on the effectiveness of Section 301 in general (127 cases), and of retaliatory threats and sanctions in particular (44 cases). In contrast with previous empirical papers, the emphasis is on the gradual interaction between both instances, with special attention to the escalation of the multilateral dispute and the timing of retaliatory threats and sanctions (if any). The paper shows that contrary to conventional wisdom, Section 301 has been less about ‘aggressive unilateralism’ (Bhagwati and Patrick 1991) than about reinforcing the multilateral trading system and the U.S. agenda in it. Section 301 proceedings and retaliation were often used in contravention of international trade law; but they were also used as tools to enforce multilateral rulings or to advance the multilateral agenda upon non-Members or on new issues. To address the effectiveness question, a qualitative response model is used. Results confirm the hypothesis prevalent in the extant literature that a process of escalation at the GATT/WTO is correlated with a higher success rate of Section 301 investigations in changing the target country’s policy. However, the impact is not linear; a settlement is more likely early in the bargaining stages rather than after a ruling is issued by a GATT/WTO panel. The empirical estimation is based on a comprehensive dataset on all Section 301 cases and on the related GATT/WTO dispute(s); and on 45 case studies outlined in the Appendix which, supplemented by the case studies of Bayard & Elliott (1994), are the basis for the coding of the dependent variable.
La comunicazione tra insegnanti e bambini bilingui nella scuola dell’infanzia. Una ricerca pilota in Italia e a Malta.
No full textLo studio ha esaminato la comunicazione di insegnanti e bambini prescolari di lingua minoritaria.
Hanno partecipato a Malta e in Italia 26 bambini e le loro insegnanti. I genitori e le docenti
hanno completato un questionario sullo sviluppo, l’esposizione e la competenza linguistica dei
bambini a casa e a scuola rispettivamente. Un’interazione insegnante-bambino è stata osservata
per analizzare i comportamenti comunicativi di adulti e bambini. Il vocabolario ricettivo ed
espressivo dei bambini è stato misurato in italiano in Italia e in maltese e inglese per i bambini
a Malta. È emersa una relazione positiva tra lessico dei bambini e comportamenti comunicativi
tutoriali degli insegnanti. I risultati preliminari incoraggiano lo studio della relazione tra ambiente
comunicativo e competenza in L2 dei bambini con background migratorio, importante per il loro
adattamento e benessere.The study examined the communication between teachers and minority language preschool
children. 26 children participated in Malta and Italy with their teachers. Parents and teachers
completed a questionnaire on children’s development, exposure and language proficiency
at home and school respectively. A teacher-child interaction was observed to analyze the
communicative behaviors of teachers and children. The receptive and expressive vocabulary
of the children was measured in Italian in Italy and in Maltese and English in Malta. A
positive relationship emerged between children’s L2 vocabulary and teachers’ tutoring
communicative behaviors. The preliminary results encourage the study of the relationship
between the communicative environment and the L2 competence of children with migratory
backgrounds, which is important for their adjustment and well-being
The evolution of trade treaties and trade creation : lessons for Latin America
No full textThe author examines the main distinction between trade liberalization under the General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (GATT) and under regional trading agreements. Under the GATT, trade liberalization is based on the most-favored-nation principle. Under regional trade agreements, it is based on preferential trade. Establishing regional trade agreements does not necessarily lead to greater regional integration. The European Economic Community has been an exception, and with greater integration, regional trade has grown steadily. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a weak association, but trade among ASEAN members has increased rapidly because member countries have undertaken multilateral trade liberalization. The efforts of Latin American countries to create regional trade associations in the 1960s, based on protectionist policies, reduced trade not only regionally, but with the rest of the world. In contrast, the Latin American regional trading agreements of the 1980s and 1990s have liberalized trade among the groups. Proper regional trading agreements must conform to Article XXIV of the GATT, but nearly all the countries that have created regional integration schemes have not followed it. These regional trading agreements have not increased protection, but neither has there been across-the-board trade liberalization. Regional trading agreements carry with them the danger of trade diversion (when imports that used to come from third countries at lower prices become costlier because of preferential access granted to a higher-cost regional source). How can Latin American countries reduce trade diversion in their regional trading agreements? : 1) keep protection low in the first place; 2) have open regional trade associations (so that it is easy for new partners to join); 3) continue liberalizing trade with the rest of the world, following the most-favored-nation principle; 4) establish common markets rather than free trade areas (because rules of origin create new barriers, including bureaucracies); 5) coordinate regulatory and competition policies (eliminate laws that limit competition and adopt common external tariffs); and 6) improve roads, ports, and means of communications.TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade and Regional Integration,Trade Policy,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies
Stainless steel in Sweden : antidumping attacks, good international citizenship
No full textThis report analyzes the economics, legal, and business logic of the United States, Sweden, and the European Community regarding the stainless steel industry. Trade policies and legal cases are analyzed and presented to support the author's conclusion that good economics, international competitiveness, private ownership, and limited support from a government that demonstrates good international citizenship are not enough to defend an industry against the application of antidumping or other import-restricting policy.Water and Industry,Roads&Highways,Primary Metals,Banks&Banking Reform,Mining&Extractive Industry (Non-Energy)
NAFTA, GATT, AND AGRICULTURE IN THE NORTHERN ROCKIES AND GREAT PLAINS
No full textOver the past seven years, the U.S. government has been involved in trade negotiations that have led to one bilateral and two multilateral agreements whose provisions have substantive implications for U.S. agricultural trade. The first of these sets of trade negotiations led to the bilateral Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). The second resulted in the current multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was implemented on January 1, 1995. The third set of negotiations, initiated under the Bush Administration, led to the multilateral North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was approved by Congress in November 1993 and implemented on January 1, 1994. The three agreements signed by the U.S. since the late 1980's have been substantively different from most previous agreements because each explicitly addressed trade in agricultural commodities. The result has been that, to a greater or lesser degree, CFTA, NAFTA, and GATT have altered or will alter the structure and behavior of world and domestic markets for agricultural commodities. These commodities include wheat and barley, sugar, and cattle and beef products; such changes are of importance to many Montana producers. The purpose of this report is to provide a detailed description of the agricultural provisions of NAFTA and the recent GATT agreement for wheat, barley, sugar, and cattle and boxed beef, and to discuss possible implications for producers of these commodities. The report does not investigate the consequences of the CFTA. The report begins by describing the general nature of these types of agreements. Brief histories and descriptions of the provisions of NAFTA and GATT are presented as well as overviews of the general agricultural provisions of the two agreements. The final section contains more detailed discussions of the provisions and implications of the agreements that directly relate to wheat, barley, sugar, and livestock products. The author concludes that for U.S. wheat producers, the consequences of both NAFTA and GATT appear to be favorable. Due to NAFTA, Mexican imports of U.S. wheat are likely to rise moderately. How NAFTA will impact U.S. and Canadian competition for the Mexican wheat market is unclear. The implications of GATT for wheat are also modest but generally favorable. Some countries will reduce tariff rates for wheat over the implementation period and improve import access to domestic markets. These adjustments are likely to encourage slight increases in world demand for wheat exports that will provide modest benefits for U.S. wheat producers. Historically, Mexico has levied high tariffs and implemented quantity restrictions via import licensing arrangements for barley imports from Canada and the U.S. Under NAFTA, Mexico allocated an initial quota of 120,000 metric tons per year to U.S. barley producers. This duty-free quota will be increased to about 195,000 metric tons in 2004. Tariffs on over-quota imports will also be removed by 2004. U.S. and Canadian barley producers are likely to benefit from increased Mexican import demand. The implications of GATT for barley are modest but generally favorable. As with wheat, some countries will reduce tariff rates for barley over the implementation period and/or improve import access to domestic markets. These adjustments are also likely to encourage slight increases in world demand for barley exports, thereby benefitting U.S. barley producers. With respect to cattle and beef, under the NAFTA agreement, the U.S. and Mexico have simply exempted each other from their respective import quotas. Prior to NAFTA, Mexico did not impose tariffs on live cattle or beef imports but did levy a small tariff on imports of edible offal. This tariff will be phased out by 2003. The U.S. also abolished modest tariffs on imports of Mexican fresh, chilled, and frozen beef, and imported feed and feeder cattle. Under the GATT agreement, several major beef-producing countries made commitments to reduce trade restrictions and internal supports. The U.S. has agreed to increase access at a low rate of duty and to reduce tariffs on over-quota imports by 15 percent by the year 2000. Some beef-importing countries such as Japan and South Korea have agreed to reduce tariffs and subsidies for domestic producers. The Trade Research Center is sponsoring research to analyze the impact of changes on U.S. beef prices due to GATT and NAFTA. Upcoming publications will discuss that issue. Under NAFTA, trade in sugar and sugar-containing products is subject to extensive provisions. Gradually, over the transition period 1994-2009, Mexico's access to the U.S. market will be expanded to a quota of 250,000 metric tons, if Mexico becomes a net surplus producer. These trade policy adjustments are likely to have minimal effects on the U.S. sugar industry over the first six years of the fifteen-year transition period, but their long-run effects are likely to be much more substantial. The GATT agreement contained only small changes for U.S. sugar policy and is not expected to have much impact on the U.S. sugar market. This special report contains a detailed description of the agricultural provisions of GATT and NAFTA that are of particular interest to producers in the Northern Plains and Rockies. The Center is sponsoring research projects to analyze the economic impacts of these trade agreements on the economy of the region.NAFTA, GATT, agriculture, Agricultural and Food Policy, Q1, F1,
Protection, Not Protectionism: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT
No full textIn this Article, Dean Baker examines the compatibility of multilateral environmental agreements with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The author discusses the key provisions of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the GATT. The author then reviews the conflict between unilateral environmental protection and open and free trade under the GATT. The author concludes the collective interests represented by international environmental agreements, and the agreements themselves, should provide a refutable presumption of validity and GATT compatibility to the extent they are relied upon to justify a state\u27s seemingly unilateral actions to protect the environment
GATT TRADE RULES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
No full text"This paper addresses the alleged conflict between the GATT trade rules and the protection of the environment by GATT members. The author contends that the principal objective of the GATT rules on nontariff trade restrictions is to eliminate government interventions that promote the commercial interests of domestic producers and consumers in a manner that discriminates against foreign producers and consumers in either domestic or international markets. He further contends that this objective fundamentally does not conflict with protecting GATT members' domestic environment or the global environment. The GATT should explicitly recognize the objectives of environmental protection and natural resource consemation, either by an amendment to the GATT Articles or by resolution of the GATT Council. GATT members, in the interest of protecting their national and the global environment, should be free to impose restrictions on imports or exports so long as the interventions conform to the following conditions: (i) restrictions do not have the intent or signficant effect of discriminating against foreign producers or consumers in favor of domestic ones, (ii) restrictions are in the interest of protecting the global environment where the concerns are widely shared by other nations and do not simply reflect unique and parochial views of the individual member, and (iii) restrictions do not constitute an effort to force trading partners to adopt environmental standards of production that have no global or trans-border pollution implications". Copyright 1993 Western Economic Association International.
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