177,136 research outputs found
Abiti, tecniche corporee e stili di vita
No full textIl saggio di Roberta Dreon sottolinea la rilevanza del ruolo della corporeità umana come modo primario nel quale ci troviamo ad appartenere e a rapportarci al mondo fin dalla nostra nascita, a praticarlo dall'interno, con la convinzione di fondo che l'esperienza non sia riducibile alla cognizione. Per articolare un approccio esistenziale o antropologico di questo tipo la studiosa propone di ricorrere alla costellazione dei concetti di abito, tecniche corporee, stile di vita. Appoggiandosi a Dewey, Dreon sostiene il carattere strutturale degli abiti di comportamento per organismi che dipendono fin dalla loro nascita da un ambiente naturale e sociale e che appaiono irriducibili a coscienze disincarnate. Con Mauss, sottolinea l'intreccio non districabile tra aspetti naturali, culturali e sociali rinvenibile nelle tecniche corporee più ordinarie e minute. Il concetto di stile è interpretato come possibilità di ripensare l'emergenza dell'individualità in un contesto largamente prepersonale (Merleau-Ponty) e sociale, ma anche per assumere criticamente alcuni aspetti largamente opachi del nostro agire, che appaiono implicitamente legati a forme di preferenza o di rifiuto stilistico, piuttosto che a intenzioni esplicite e a deliberazioni razionali
Wittgenstein and pragmatism: habits, rules and forms of life
No full textRoberta Dreon, Foreword
Luigi Perissinotto, Concept-formations and facts of nature in Wittgenstein
Garry L.Hagberg, Peirce, Wittgenstein, and the sense of pragmatism
Anna Boncompagni, «I’ll show you a thing we humans do». Facts of life in Wittgenstein and Peirce
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Can Wittgenstein be called a pragmatist?
Rosa M.Calcaterra, The ambiguity of norms. Steps towards a new pragmatic anthropology
Roberta Dreon, Understanding rules as habits. Developing a pragmatist anthropological approach
Guido Baggio, The concept of “behavior” in psychology, epistemology, and economics. Starting from G.H.Mea
The aesthetic, pleasure and happiness: or why freedom is not enough
No full textDo the aesthetic aspects of our experience play a role in our happiness or must we avoid any aesthetic conditioning of our freedom in order to lead a good life? This paper is based on some philosophical ideas derived from John Dewey's thought, which are examined in the light of the debate on happiness, well-being and human flourishing that has productively been conducted on the threshold between philosophy and economics.
Setting out from Dewey's thesis that aesthetic aspects are structural traits of every experience which concern our dependence on the surrounding environment, the paper suggests that the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and autonomy are not enough to develop a morally and politically good life, because a good life must also be a full, satisfactory one, that is an inclusive, expanding life, emotionally and imaginatively rich, capable of final consummations and not only of analytical reflections.
In particular, the author argues that Dewey's suggestions allow us to consider a further option in addition to those presently discussed: one strictly related to the structurally aesthetic or qualitative traits of our human interactions with the environment and capable of not being confined to an idea of happiness as something totally consisting in momentary sensory pleasure, but also of not neglecting or expunging our sensibility
Dewey’s Fully Embedded Ethics
No full textCompared to any aprioristic treatment of morality, Dewey’s Ethics (both in its 1908 edition and in the 1932 revised version) stands out for its emphasis on the fact that reflective and intelligent evaluations, as well as individual decisions, do not come first, i.e. are not made in a vacuum. Rather, they arise out of a background of largely pre-personal and habitual, qualitatively, affectively or aesthetically configured ways of reacting to environmental circumstances and other people’s conducts, which have to be taken into account both as the source of more reflective behaviours, intelligent and voluntary decision-making, evaluations and judgments, and as their ultimate point of arrival.
This position was enhanced and became more coherent in the shift from the first to the second edition because in the meantime Dewey was able to develop a conception of human nature and behaviour according to which both habitual features and the qualitative or aesthetic characters of experience are seen as pervasive and structural in each phase of a moral processes. While sharing Edel’s preference for an anthropological treatment of ethics (Edel 2001), this paper endorses the thesis that such an approach must be rooted not only in Dewey’s theory of habits –which is more fully developed in Human Nature and Conduct – but also in his idea of primarily qualitative, aesthetic or affective meanings of experience, which was explicitly expounded in Experience and Nature. By pointing at this second anthropological root of Dewey’s treatment of ethics, this approach helps reveal that Dewey’s position strongly contrasts with the traditional divide between ethics and aesthetics characterizing modern thought (Gadamer 1960/90), insofar as it highlights a common source between the ethic and the aesthetic dimensions of human experience
Merleau-Ponty: una concezione non soggettocentrica dell'empatia?
No full textL'articolo indaga l'emergere del concetto di empatia nei tesi di Merleau-Ponty, rilevando come esso nasca quale categoria primariamente ontologica, per dire l'appartenenza umana a un natura comune, piuttosto che come categoria epistemologica, per cui il nostro trovarci in rapporto con altri viene tradizionalmente impostato nella forma della domanda che chiede se e come possiamo conoscerli.
La risposta di Merleau-Ponty è quella di una via sensibile della comprensione altrui, di una vicinanza e condivisione corporea – per altro già significativa, orientata e affettivamente connotata.
Ma il testo suggerisce che, anche alla luce del dibattito attuale, sia possibile rinvenire nelle riflessioni del fenomenologo francese un paradigma di comprensione dell'empatia di tipo non soggettocentrico, che non presupponga sempre una proiezione soggettiva della mia sensibilità su quella altrui, ma che possa sia consistere in un sentire comune, prepersonale, che fa da sfondo alla sensibilità propria cosciente, sia che possa procedere dall'altrui al proprio, per cui spesso avverto e comprendo me stesso per differenziazione dagli altri, che si impongono ai miei sensi e alle mie parole
Le soglie e i custodi delle arti. Una nota introduttiva
No full textIntroduction to the special issue devoted to philosophy and art theory of the art system
How to do different things with words: why Dewey's aesthetics is peculiar
No full textIn this paper I am going to argue that Dewey's approach to aesthetics can exert a peculiarly 'refreshing' effect on the traditional analytical debate in the philosophy of art. Furthermore it presents some advantages compared to the deeply critical continental approaches toward aesthetic productions.
The thesis of the paper will be articulated through a brief inquiry into three strictly related concepts that shape Dewey's distinctive point of view – that is “aesthetic experience”, “aesthetic quality” and “consummation”.
The first concept appears far removed from both traditional continental pursuits of aesthetic autonomy and unsuccessful analytical attempts to define art, while serving – broadly speaking – ethical or political goals.
The second concept is based on the recognition that qualitative aspects are basically part of our common experiences, that they are modes of meaning of our environment and cannot be reduced to subjective phenomena or be restricted within special compartments.
The third concept concerns the consummatory phase of our experiencing and the basic anthropological need to enjoy what we are doing and the way we are doing it, in contrast to a certain ascetic trend in continental aesthetics
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