1,721,019 research outputs found
The pseudo-steady-state approximation of zero-order gas solid reaction: the dead-core problem
No full textCompetition in the Presence of Counterfeiters. The Case of Fines Imposed on Counterfeiters and Pocketed by the Genuine Firm
No full textA firm sells a luxury product
protected by conventional intellectual property rights laws (IPR). However, a counterfeiter can illegally copy and sell the product without the permission of the brand-name producer. Fines are imposed on caught counterfeiters and pocketed by the genuine firm. Stackelberg equilibria resulting from the competition between the genuine firm and the counterfeiter are computed.
It is shown that, whenever the production cost of the genuine item is not too low, then the genuine firm can benefit from counterfeiting presence.
Furthermore, the amount of the fine and the level of enforcement that maximize the genuine company's profit is calculated
A NOTE ON A COUNTERFEITING MODEL WITH FINES POCKETED BY THE GENUINE FIRM
No full textA monopolist sells a luxury genuine product protected by conventional intellectual property rights laws (IPR). However, a competitive fringe of counterfeiters can illegally copy and sell the product without the permission of the monopolist. Fines are imposed on counterfeiters and pocketed by the genuine firm. It is shown that when the genuine producer can shape the amount of sanctions, he will not necessarily seek to eliminate all counterfeiters
The effect of diffusion on the global stability of equilibrium in reaction-diffusion systems. An application to a class of epidemic models
No full textDoes counterfeiting benefit genuine manufacturer? The role of production costs
No full textA monopolist sells a luxury genuine product which can be illegally copied and sold by a competitive fringe of counterfeiters. Fines imposed on caught counterfeiters are pocketed by the genuine firm. We prove that if production costs are low, then the genuine manufacturer would lobbying for high penalties so that counterfeiters should be thrown out of the market. In this case, the presence of counterfeiters does not provide any benefit to the producer of the original product. Whenever the production cost is neither too high nor too low, the optimal fine guarantees a positive demand for the genuine product as well as for the fake; the genuine producer is better off than in a world without counterfeiters. If production costs are too high, the genuine firm has no more incentive to produce. Its remaining goal is to collect penalty money from counterfeiters. Again, the presence of counterfeiters provides a benefit to the genuine manufacturer. Finally, a comparison between full protection and null protection policies is performed
A note on the existence of large invariant regions for linear nondiagonal reaction-diffusion systems
No full textA S-I-R vector disease model with delay
No full textAbstractWe analyze a deterministic epidemic model with delay derived by the Kermack-McKendrick model. This model is suitable to describe infections transmitted by a vector. Existence, uniqueness, stability and asymptotic behavior of the solutions are studied. A threshold theorem is also proved
PRICE AND TREATMENT DECISIONS IN EPIDEMICS: STACKELBERG AND BARGAINING GAME. THE ROLE OF COST FUNCTIONS.
No full textThe shape of cost functions significantly influences the solution of optimization problems related to the treatment of infectious diseases. The classical linear or quadratic cost functions are widely used in the literature more to make the problems tractable than for their relevance with the model studied. For example, they do not seem appropriate when expensive therapies are required to treat a large number of patients, as in the case of the treatment of hepatitis C by sofosbuvir. In this paper, we study the strategic interactions between pharmaceutical companies and public authorities to determine the price of patented drugs and the number of treated infected people. A Stackelberg game and a Nash bargaining game are studied. In particular, we analyse the relationship between the different cost functions and the equilibria of the games
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