1,720,989 research outputs found
Environmental policies in a Stackelberg differential game
No full textWe develop a Stackelberg differential game to analyze the economic effects of the reduction plan through two policy instruments, tradable permits and taxes on emissions. Emissions are a by-product of firm output. The authority acts as a Stackelberg leader, able to set the optimal instrument's level in the light of a finite-horizon environmental target. We show that the optimal solution of the game is dynamically consistent. Moreover, optimal environmental policies substantially impact the level and composition of economic activity. The differentiation between “clean” and “dirty” firms allows us to assess distributional effects and how environmental technology may influence the game's outcome. Results are shown to be robust under different parameterizations
Does the Nature of Goods Affect Bilateral Exchange of Technology and Location Choice in Stable Networks?
No full text
Quality-improving and cost-reducing strategic alliances
No full textWe develop a two-stage Salop-type model to examine quality-improving and process
innovation alliances in an oligopolistic context. In the first stage, a network of
alliances among firms is assumed while in the second stage firms set prices, product
quality and cost-reducing process innovation. We find that quality-improving networks
tend to be denser than networks characterized by process innovation sharing,
while the quality effort decreases with the number of connections. Furthermore, link
formation is welfare improving if both absorptive capacity and quality spillovers are
sufficiently small. Although the empirical evidence on cooperation in R&D is fragmentary
it nonetheless supports most of the theoretical predictions. We also formulate
some variants of the model to assess the robustness of the previous results
R&D Networks and Absorptive Capacity in a Salop model
No full textThe paper investigates the incentives of Salop-type oligopolistic firms to cooperate and the architecture of the resulting collaboration networks. We find that when spillovers are exogenous, firm profits are not affected by the network structure. On the contrary, with endogenous spillovers (absorptive capacity) firms tend to form less dense networks. We also seek out the architecture of socially efficient networks, showing that social welfare is maximised in the complete network. Also, given the network structure we conclude that a Salop industry could be characterized by a general tendency to under-connection.JRC.B.1 - Finance and Econom
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