1,721,038 research outputs found
Profit sharing under the threat of nationalization
A multinational corporation engages in foreign direct investment for the extraction of a natural resource in a developing country. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share of the profits. The host country provides access and guarantees conditions of operation. Since the investment is totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty in market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework, where the government holds an American call option on nationalization, we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining leads to a profit distribution maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment threshold but only the Nash bargaining solution set. Finally, we show that the optimal sharing rule results from the way the two parties may differently trade off rents with option values. © 2013 Elsevier B.V
Investment stimuli under government present-biased time preferences
This paper examines the net benefit accruing to a present-biased government contemplating the option of speeding up investment setting a lower tax rate on future profits or an investment subsidy as an incentive. The literature generally suggests the use of an investment subsidy rather than a reduced tax rate. However, this study shows that, depending on the degree of present-biasedness, it may be more advantageous for the government to set a lower tax rate. The government, in fact, when selecting the instrument to be used for speeding up investment, trades off the immediate and certain cost of a subsidy against the random tax revenues accruing from the investment. Hence, from the short-sighted perspective of current government, a lower tax rate may appear optimal as long as the consideration given to the earnings of future governments is small and/or the current government’s duration is short
Land-use change and solar energy production: A real option approach
Purpose – In this paper, a real option model is developed to examine the critical factors affecting the decision to lease agricultural land to a company installing a PV power plant. Subsidies introduced by governments for the production of renewable energies have increased the investments in this sector. Since ground-based solar cells need land for energy production, then potential trade-off with agriculture in terms of land exists. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses the real option approach in order to take into account for uncertainty and irreversibility of the farmer’s decision. Findings – By applying the model to the province of Bologna (Italy), the paper illustrates the possible land-use change scenarios in this area. The paper concludes by discussing the importance of PV energy production as a source of income for farmers and its implications from a social perspective. Originality/value – The research is applied to the province of Bologna (Italy) where investments in ground-based solar cells are becoming quite common. The originality lies in the fact of considering the investment as irreversible, since it is a 20-year commitment from the farmers. The paper also takes into account the uncertainty in agricultural commodities’ prices
Rural land development under hyperbolic discounting: a real option approach
This article presents a simple model of land development under uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting. Land kept in rural use pays an uncertain rent, while net returns from land development are known and constant. The landowner is viewed here as a sequence of selves with time-inconsistent preferences. We solve the underlying timing game under both naïve and sophisticated beliefs about the landowner’s time-inconsistency and show that (i) land development is accelerated due to his present-bias and (ii) a higher acceleration is associated with sophistication
Mechanism Design for Biodiversity Conservation in Developing Countries
In this paper the design of a voluntary incentive scheme for the provision of ecosystem services is considered, having in mind the forested areas in developing countries where a governmental agency plans to introduce a set-aside policy. Payments are offered to the landowners to compensate the economic loss for not converting land to agriculture. The information asymmetry between the agency and the landowners on the opportunity cost of conservation gives incentive to the landowners to misreport their own "type". A principal - agent analysis is developed, adapted and extended to capture real issues concerning conservation programs in developing countries. We show that the information asymmetry may seriously impact on the optimal scheme performance and, under certain conditions, may lead to pay a compensation even if any additional conservation is induced with respect to that in absence of the scheme
Optimal conservation policy under imperfect intergenerational altruism
In this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an intergenerational dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible harvest. Earlier harvest occurs and the option value attached to the forest clearing decision is eroded under both the assumptions of naïve and sophisticated belief about future time-preferences. This results in a bias toward the current generation gratification which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from harvesting and conserving a natural forest
Correction to: Investing in climate change adaptation and mitigation: A methodological review of real-options studies
Correction to: Ambio (2021) 50:229–241 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-020-01342-
Essays on information gathering and the use of natural resources
The objective in this thesis is to pose and to answer to some questions concerning the role played by information in decisions on the economic allocation of natural resources.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo
Financing flexibility: The case of outsourcing
We investigate the relationship between the extent and timing of vertical flexibility and the financial choices of a firm. By vertical flexibility we mean partial/total and reversible outsourcing of a necessary input. A firm simultaneously selects the vertical setting and the financial sources of investment in flexibility, in particular debt and venture capital. A loan may come from a lender that requires the payment of a fixed coupon over time and an option to buy out the firm in certain circumstances. Debt leads to the same level of flexibility of an unlevered firm. Yet investment occurs earlier. The injection of venture capital reduces the quest for vertical flexibility and speeds up investment. Then, there arises a fresh substitutability between a financial (venture capital) and a real variable (vertical flexibility)
Investing in biogas: timing, technological choice and the value of flexibility from inputs mix
In a stochastic dynamic frame, we study the technology choice problem of a continuous co-digestion biogas plant where input factors are substitutes but need to be mixed together to provide output. Given any initial rule for the composition of the feedstock, we consider the possibility of revising it if economic circumstances make it profitable. Flexibility in the mix is an advantage under randomly fluctuating input costs and comes at a higher investment cost. We show that the degree of flexibility in the productive technology installed depends on the value of the option to profitably re-arrange the input mix. Such option adds value to the project in that it provides a device for hedging against fluctuations in the input relative convenience. Accounting for such value we discuss the trade-off between investment timing and profit smoothing flexibility. © 2011 Elsevier B.V
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