1,721,069 research outputs found
Van beleid naar recht ? Industriebeleid en het recht van de Europese Unie
No full textIn recent years, there has been a revived interest in industrial policy in the EU, which is evident from many EU and Member States’ policy documents, academic literature and public comment. However, the resulting picture is fragmented and largely non-legal. In view of the enormous impact of the EU’s ever-evolving legal order on the possibility of conducting industrial policy in Europe this is problematic. This thesis aims to introduce law in an area that has been dominated by non-legal discourse by uncovering and analysing the EU legal dimension of industrial policy.
In this study, the following (partly overlapping) EU law domains are addressed: the process of constitutionalising industrial policy in the EU treaties and (the principles underpinning) Title XVII of the TFEU on industry; the relationship between industrial policy, internal markets, competition and investment in the face of increasing pressure from economic nationalism; the issue of public support for industry and the emergence of a pattern of structural industrial changes being “policy-governed” to a considerable extent at the EU level in that regard; the interaction between industrial policy and antitrust policy in the face of a continuing lack of transparency regarding the objectives of the EU competition rules; and the interface between industrial policy and trade policy in in a world of protectionism, mixed or state-governed economies, imperfect markets and conflicting public opinion.
To analyse in a meaningful way the interaction between the multitude of legal domains that this thesis addresses and provide conceptual unity, three central themes underpin the analysis. The first theme is that the EU legal dimension of industrial policy depends first and foremost on the type of industrial policy in question. The second theme is that a balance between uniformity and diversity under EU law emerges in the context of industrial policy. The third theme is the extent to which the EU itself can, in light of its constitutional limits and the fact that industrial policy cannot be viewed in isolation from its other policies, be instrumental in advancing a supranational(ly) (coordinated) industrial policy.status: Publishe
Beleggen in schuld. In België krijgt effectisering langzaam maar zeker gestalte
No full textstatus: Publishe
From shared competences to institutional heteronomy. The constitutional architecture of supranationally structured market supervision
No full textThe European Union plays an ever increasing role in the institutional organisation of market supervision, by either creating new supranational supervisory bodies or by circumscribing Member States autonomy in designing national supervisory authorities. European Union law draws particularly volatile legal boundaries that create a playing field between supranational policymaking and national institutional choices. This dissertation aims to identify those legal boundaries. In doing so, it additionally seeks to analyse the role of European Union law in the determination and delineation of such boundaries as part of the EU s larger federalism project. The dissertation comprises two main parts.
The first part structures the key characteristics of supranationally structured market supervision in the European Union. To that extent, the dissertation studies whether and to what extent supervisory powers are being shared betweensupranational and national actors, the institutional actors responsibleand cooperative mechanisms created by supranational law across different sectors of market regulation. The part particularly focuses on two differently structured market supervision regimes: competition law supervision and financial market supervision.
The second part builds upon the key characteristics identified by structuring them into a constitutional framework of competence attribution and competence exercise engaged upon by EU institutions. In particular, this part seeks to assess to what extent the key characteristics reflect a translation of EU constitutional principles in accordance with a particular model of European federalism. Identifying that model allows to better explain and predict institutional evolutions across differently regulated market segments
Commitments and settlements in European competition law. Public enforcement through negotiation.
No full textDuring the past decade EU competition policy has had a clear focus: to punish and deter. The European Commission has increasingly imposed high fines and improved its leniency programme aimed at destabilizing cartels. However, enforcement with a focus on detection and punishment is costly and the administrative procedure is burdensome on both the undertakings under investigation and the Commission. Consequently, two formal procedures were introduced with a view to streamlining the administrative procedure and ensuring a swift solution through ‘negotiation’: the commitments procedure and the settlement procedure.
In principle these two procedures should work to the advantage of both the Commission and the undertakings. All parties want the procedure to be fast and simple, without the need for appeal, although their underlying motives and interests differ. However, even assuming that these two procedures are in fact more efficient, the negative implications of (over)using these procedures can be substantial. First, the commitments and settlement procedures may directly affect the procedural safeguards and rights of defence that ought to be attributed to the undertakings concerned. Second, the commitments and settlement procedures may indirectly affect the overall effectiveness of the Commission’s competition law enforcement.
In order to assess the effects of these two procedures on competition law enforcement, this research is based on two perspectives: (i) a micro perspective, evaluating the use of the commitments and settlement procedures to end investigations efficiently and the effect they will have on the rights of the undertakings; and (ii) a macro perspective, which will put the commitments and settlement procedures into a broader context and will evaluate the impact of these procedures on the overall competition law enforcement policy of the Commission. These two perspectives will form the basis for the conclusion, which will consist of a recommendation for a holistic approach towards this negotiated enforcement, which in essence will constitute a balancing act.status: Publishe
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