1,721,014 research outputs found
Daniel F.Spulber Christopher S.Yoo, Networks in Telecommunications—Economics and Law
No full textIn this review "Networks in Telecommunications" is shown to be a clear and quite comprehensive treatise on the economics of regulation in telecommunications which deeply scrutinizes the actual implementation of regulation in telecommunications. Limits and drawbacks are highlighted and possible improvements are suggested. However, had the work by Spulber and Yoo been only about the limits of the TELRIC pricing rule and the superiority of ECPR, then the book would have added little to the established literature on regulation in telecommunications. This is not the case, as they question the scope for regulation as a whole in telecommunication markets. In the light of technological convergence and the emergence of facility-based competition their arguments constitute an important challenge to other economic theories supporting regulation in this industry
Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection
No full textIn this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is generally worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive contraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. Monopoly is shown to provide better insurance but at the cost of driving some agents out of the market. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive market
On the FDI-attracting property of privatization
No full textIn the present paper we provide an explanation of why privatization may attract foreign investors willing to enter a regional market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a less aggressive competitor since profit-maximizing output is lower than the welfare-maximizing one. The drawback is that social welfare generally decreases. We also investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI and put forward its potentially positive role. On the one hand, it may reduce the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization. On the other hand, it may prevent a welfare-reducing investment by the foreign firm. This shows that privatization and fiscal policies may be either alternative or complementary instruments depending on the government's objective (i.e., country's attractiveness for foreign investors and domestic welfare)
Privatization and policy competition for FDI
No full textIn this paper, we provide an explanation of why privatization may attract foreign investors interested in entering a regional market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a less aggressive competitor since profit-maximizing output is lower than the welfare-maximizing one. The drawback is that social welfare generally decreases. We also investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI before and after privatization. We show that policy competition is irrelevant in the presence of a public firm serving just its domestic market. By contrast, following privatization, it endows the big country with an instrument which can be used either to reduce the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization or to protect the domestic industry from foreign competitors
Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investments and the Nature of the Incumbent Firm
No full textIn this paper we investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market. We investigate how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition between the two governments seeking to attract FDI. We show that the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare-maximizing firm, while its welfare may decrease when it is a private firm, as already shown by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). We also show that, contrary to the case of a private domestic incumbent, a public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare-maximizer location. Finally, an efficiency-enhancing role of policy competition may only arise when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, while tax competition is always wasteful when the incumbent is a public firm
Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly
No full textThis paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private -- domestic or foreign -- firm competes with a public, welfare-maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. From a methodological viewpoint we make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization
Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
No full textThis paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private -- domestic or foreign -- firm competes with a public, welfare-maximizing firm. A central goal of the paper is to present a unified and general treatment of the basic question of what constitutes the appropriate solution concept - Cournot or Stackelberg - in such duopolies. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We demonstrate that this result is due to the objective function of the public firm being increasing in the rival's output (instead of decreasing for a private firm). We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. We make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization
The impact of product designations on innovation : the case of breweries in the United Kingdom
No full textThe European Union has a number of interventions which are designed to encourage diverse agricultural production, to protect product names from misuse and imitation, and to help consumers by giving them information concerning the specific character of the products. The three schemes, collectively known as Protected Geographical Status (PGS) are Protected Designation of Origin (PDO), Protected Geographical Indication (PGI), and Traditional Speciality Guaranteed (TSG). [...] However, there has been limited analysis as to the possible impact of such interventions on the ability of enterprises to enhance their competitiveness through investment in innovation. The aim of the present work is to gain a better understanding of the impact of such policies on the types and levels of innovative activity in firms using PGS schemes
[Naloxone and naltrexone antagonism of various central effects of morphine].
No full textIl Naloxone ed il naltrexone bloccano l'attività analgesica della morfina, valutata tramite il test della piastra calda; il primo prodotto è attivo a 0,25-1 mg/kg s.c. ed il secondo a 0,5-1mg/kg s.c. I dati riportati mostrano che il naltrexone blocca gli effetti centrali della morfina ed il suo effetto è più prolungato di quello ottenibile con il naloxone
Reforming the banks in the UK. An impact assessment of the draft Bill and alternative capital requirements.
No full textWe develop an impact assessment of the banking reform bill recently proposed by the UK Government. The bill implements some of the recommendations put forward by the Independent Commission on Banking chaired by Sir John Vickers. The main purposes of the banking reform is to make banks more able to absorb losses in order to reduce the potential cost for the public, and to curb the incentives for excessive risk taking. The HM Treasury (2012b) estimates that the proposed reforms will require an increase for equity capital in the industry of roughly £19 billion. Using data made available by the HM Treasury (2012a, b) on private and social cost and benefit of the reform, as well as by The Bank of England (2012) on banks’ balance sheet, we compare the proposed reform with alternative hypotheses of lower and higher capital requirements
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