937 research outputs found

    Global Initiatives in Reforming Rules and Regulations

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    This chapter first considers empirical evidence on the benefits of reforms and then addresses reform issues in particular markets. It examines patent mechanisms and R&D policies in innovation markets; optimal environmental regulations and their impact on innovation, investments, and prices; barriers to trade and competition, and the structure of regulatory agencies in telecommunications markets; and some key issues related to financial markets. The concluding section discusses alternative frameworks for assessing the functioning of markets and for evaluating rules and regulations

    On-Demand Provisioning of Data-Aggregation Sessions Over WDM Optical Networks

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    We consider efficient network provisioning algorithms for applications that aggregate large data files from multiple remote sites to a central facility (where the aggregated data is further processed). Many important bandwidth-hungry scientific applications use such data aggregation, and it is important to efficiently use network resources to meet their requirements. We term an entire large-scale data-aggregation session as a data-aggregation request (DAR). In this paper, we investigate the problem of on-demand provisioning of DARs over a wavelength-division multiplexing (WDM) backbone network infrastructure. Our DAR provisioning problem is challenging, as for each DAR we need to jointly identify lightpaths (route, assign wavelengths, and groom) for each of the to-be-transferred files, and schedule DAR’s file transfers in time. We first model our DAR provisioning problem mathematically as a mixed integer linear program (MILP); to solve our problem in practice, we propose a DAR provisioning algorithm (named DARP). From our numerical results, we find DARP to be efficient when compared with other benchmark algorithms. We study DARP’s performance for a varying number of aggregating sites deployed in the network (i.e., sites with supercomputer facilities) and perform a detailed sensitivity analysis on several parameters of our problem. We also investigate the effect of partitioning the data to be transferred into pieces and conclude that, if the partitioning method is carefully designed, slight improvement over the approach that transfers the whole file (DARP) is possible

    Dynamic Super Round Based Distributed Task Scheduling for UAV Networks

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    Networks of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are emerging in many application domains, e.g., military surveillance. To perform collaborative tasks, the involved UAVs exchange several types of information, e.g., sensor data and commands. The major question here is how to schedule the tasks under dynamic traffic flows to provide network services. Existing solutions use the Round-Robin Strategy (RRS), where the tasks are scheduled statistically by dividing the time into fixed-length rounds. However, the RRS wastes significant network and device resources due to task scheduling in each round. This paper proposes DROVE – a novel clustering approach that allows the UAVs for dynamic task scheduling. However, determining the task scheduling is crucial, as it significantly affects several network parameters, e.g., throughput. Therefore, we devise the problem of distributed task scheduling under dynamic traffic flow scenarios to optimize the throughput. We propose a clustering task scheduling algorithm to serve dynamic traffic flows. Particularly, we integrate the dynamic traffic flows into the Lyapunov drift analysis framework, and determine the throughput optimality of our proposed scheduling algorithm. We perform extensive simulations to validate the effectiveness of DROVE. The results show that DROVE outperforms the state-of-the-art solutions in terms of energy consumption, clustering overhead, throughput, end-to-end delay, flow success rate and packet drop rate. </p

    A security primer

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    Manfred Jantscher, Raja Ghosal, Alfio Grasso, Peter H. Col

    Rattus ranjiniae Agrawal and Ghosal 1969

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    Rattus ranjiniae Agrawal and Ghosal, 1969. Proc. Zool. Soc. Calcutta, 22:41. TYPE LOCALITY: SW Indian Peninsula, India, Kerala State, Trivandrum. DISTRIBUTION: Known only from the type locality and Trichur, also in Kerala. COMMENTS: Represented by the four specimens taken at the type locality and two others collected at Trichur. Most information about the species is meager and contained in the original description. Our study of two paratypes kindly loaned to us by Dr. S. Chakraborty revealed that R. ranjiniae is characterized by large claws relative to body size, very long and slender hind feet, large body size, long molar rows, small bullae, narrow incisive foramina, and a short bony palate that does not extend past the third molars. These traits combine in a morphology that is uniquely distinct compared with all other species now placed in Rattus. Phylogenetic relationships of ranjiniae are unknown; possibly this species should be removed from Rattus.Published as part of Guy G. Musser & Michael D. Carleton, 1993, Order Rodentia - Family Muridae, pp. 501-755 in Mammal Species of the World (2 nd Edition), Washington and London :Smithsonian Institution Press on page 658, DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.735309

    On the foundation of monopoly in bilateral exchange

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    We address the problem of monopoly in general equilibrium in a mixed version of a monopolistic two-commodity exchange economy where the monopolist, represented as an atom, is endowed with one commodity and “small traders,” represented by an atomless part, are endowed only with the other. First we provide an economic theoretical foundation of the monopoly solution in this bilateral framework through a formalization of an explicit trading process inspired by Pareto (Cours d’économie politique. F. Rouge Editeur, Lausanne, 1896) for an exchange economy with a finite number of commodities, and we give the conditions under which our monopoly solution has the geometric characterization proposed by Schydlowsky and Siamwalla (Q J Econ 80:147–153, 1966). Then, we provide a game theoretical foundation of our monopoly solution through a two-stage reformulation of our model. This allows us to prove that the set of the allocations corresponding to a monopoly equilibrium and the set of the allocations corresponding to a subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game coincide. Finally, we compare our model of monopoly with a bilateral exchange version of a pioneering model proposed by Forchheimer (Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirschafts im Deutschen Reich 32:1–12, 1908), known as a model of “partial monopoly” since there a monopolist shares a market with a“competitive fringe.” Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D42, D51

    The Law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information from Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels

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    I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firms’ core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally.cartels, enforcement, law and economics
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