26,139 research outputs found
Government R&D Subsidies as a Signal for Private Investors
No full textGovernment subsidies for R&D are intended to promote projects with high returns to society but too little private returns to be beneficial for private investors. This may be caused by spillovers or a low appropriability rate. Apart from the direct funding of these projects, government grants may serve as a signal for good investments for private investors. We use a simple signaling model with different types of R&D projects to capture this phenomenon. In a setup where the subsidy can only be used to distinguish between high and low risk projects, government agency’s signal is not very helpful for banks. However, if the subsidy is accompanied by a quality signal, it can lead to increased or better selected private investments.Subsidies, Innovation, Asymmetric Information, Signaling
A note on duplication of R&D and R&D subsidies
No full textWe show that the presumed incompatibility of uncoordinated R&D and competition is not fundamental, but hinges on the nature of R&D spillovers. As a consequence, R&D subsidies may be more effective than previously thought.Duplication
R&D cooperation versus R&D subcontracting: empirical evidence from French survey data.
No full textThis paper uses a survey of French firms active in R&D to identify the determinants of R&D outsourcing and of the ensuing trade-off between R&D subcontracting and R&D cooperation. Internal R&D expenditures increase both the probability of outsourcing and the number of R&D partners. Investment in fundamental R&D, group belonging, and the sector’s high R&D intensity positively influences the probability of R&D outsourcing but have less impact on the number of partners. R&D subcontracting is more likely than R&D cooperation when the relationship deals with generic, standardized R&D processes, as reflected in the influence of several qualitative proxies.R&D cooperation, R&D subcontracting, organizational choices.
Chimpanzees and human evolution/ edited by Martin N. Muller, Richard W. Wrangham, and David R. Pilbeam.
No full textIncludes bibliographical references and index.Although chimpanzees and other primates are frequently used as models to reconstruct the behavior of extinct human ancestors, this is rarely done in a consistent or methodologically rigorous fashion. This volume brings together leading scholars to explore how knowledge about chimpanzees can be used to understand both what is unique about our own species, and how these traits evolved. The first part of the book makes the case that the last common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans was chimpanzee-like. This inference is based not on an assumption that chimpanzees are a model species, but on morphological, developmental, and genetic data, together with evidence from the hominin fossil record. The second part of the book provides the first detailed record of the similarities and differences between humans and chimpanzees, including those in social system, mating system, diet, social behavior, hunting, tool use, culture, cognition, and communication.--Martin N. Muller -- Reconstructing the last common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans / David R. Pilbeam and Daniel E. Lieberman -- Brian Hare and Richard W. Wrangham -- Martin N. Muller -- Michael D. Gurven and Cristina M. Gomes -- Melissa Emery Thompson and Peter T. Ellison -- Herman Pontzer -- Sherry V. Nelson and Marian I. Hamilton -- Rachel N. Carmody -- Brian M. Wood and Ian C. Gilby -- Martin N. Muller and David R. Pilbeam -- Bernard Chapais -- Michael l. Wilson and Luke Glowacki -- Richard W. Wrangham and Joyce Benenson -- Adrian V. Jaeggi, Paul l. Hooper, Ann E. Caldwell Hooper, Michael D. Gurven, Jane B. Lancaster and Hillard S. Kaplan -- Martin N. Muller -- Campbell Rolian and Susana Carvalho -- Joseph Henrich and Claudio Tennie -- Alexandra G. Rosati -- Christopher Boehm -- Katie E. Slocombe and Thom Scott Philips. Was the last common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans chimpanzee-like? -- Introduction: chimpanzees and human evolution / Equal, similar, but different: convergent bonobos and conserved chimpanzees / Chimpanzees and the evolution of human uniqueness -- Introduction: chimpanzees and human uniqueness / Mortality, senescence, and lifespan / Fertility and fecundity / Locomotor ecology and evolution in chimpanzees and humans / Evolution of the human dietary niche: initial transitions / Evolution of the human dietary niche: quest for high quality / From pan to man the hunter: hunting and meat sharing by chimpanzees, humans, and our common ancestor / The evolution of the human mating system / From chimpanzee society to human society: bridging the kinship gap / Violent cousins: chimpanzees, humans, and the roots of war / Cooperative and competitive relationships within sexes / Cooperation between the sexes / Sexual coercion in chimpanzees and humans / Tool use and manufacture in the last common ancestor of pan and homo / Cultural evolution in chimpanzees and humans / Chimpanzee cognition and the roots of the human mind / Ancestral precursors, social control, and social selection in the evolution of morals / Communication and language1 online resource (ix, 837 pages)
Stable R&D cooperation between asymmetric partners.
No full textThe Impact of asymmetries between partners on the stability of R&D cooperation is assessed analytically in a supergame setting. Two asymmetric firms are repeatedly taking sequential R&D and production decisions, whereby they coordinate their R&D decisions, in order to maximise joint profits. The asymmetries are specified in terms of absorptive capacity (i.e. size of the spillovers), R&D efficiency (i.e. ability to implement know how) and productive efficiency or market size (i.e. net demand intercept).First of all, it is shown that these asymmetries may not be too large, in order to guarantee that the disadvantaged firm remains interested in joining an R&D cooperative agreement. Furthermore, each asymmetry is shown to make the advantaged firm more inclined to stick to the cooperative outcome (than in the symmetric case), while the reverse holds for the disadvantaged firm. Finally, these asymmetries, when occurring, simultaneously, mutually reinforce each other. All in all, R&D cooperation between asymmetric partners will typically be beneficial for the advantaged firm and will only be attractive for the disadvantaged firm if the asymmetries are not too large.Cooperation; R&D; R&D cooperation;
Research Joint Ventures and Optimal Emissions Taxation
No full textThis paper performs a comparison of two well known approaches for modelling R&D spillovers associated with investment in E-R&D, namely dAspremont-Jacquemin and Kamien-Muller-Zang. We show that there is little qualitative difference between the models in terms of total surplus delivered when selecting the optimal tax regime when there is precommitment under cooperative regimes in which firms coordinate expenditures to maximize joint profits. However, under non-cooperative regimes there is marked difference, with the model of Kamien- Muller-Zang leading to higher taxation rates when firms share information. Furthermore, we argue that the Kamien-Muller-Zang model is of questionable validity when modelling R&D on emissions reducing technology due to counter intuitive results showing a positive relationhip between R&D spillovers and emissions taxes.
Market Share, R&D Cooperation, and EU Competition Policy
No full textCurrent EU policy exempts horizontal R&D agreements from antitrust con- cerns when the combined market shares of participants are low enough. This paper argues that existing theory does not support limiting the exemption to low market shares. This is done by introducing a set of non-innovating outside firms to the standard framework to assess what link might exist between the market share of innovating firms and the product market benefits of cooperation. With R&D output choices, the market share criterion, while it rules out the most socially harmful R&D cooperation agreements, also hinders the most beneficial ones. With R&D input choices, cooperation may actually be desirable in concentrated industries, and harmful in more competitive ones. If R&D cooperation does have anti-competitive effects in product markets, it seems that these are therefore best addressed by other tools than market share criteria.R&D; Cooperation; Competition; Regulation
Environmental impact of technology policy: R&D Subsidies versus R&D cooperation.
No full textIn this paper we study a neglected aspect ofteclmology policy, namely the adverse impact it might have on the envirol1Il1ent through increased production when R&D expenditure leads to cost reduction. Although teclmology policy measures that encourage finns to reduce their production costs would usually reduce energy inputs and therefore generate less pollution per unit of output production, we explore here the case where with reorganisation of production output gene rally increases. So even if per unit of production pollution is less, total pollution generated by the increased production induced by the innovative efforts of films increases. In this context it is therefore necessary to address the issue of tying-in teclmology and environmental policy, which is the issue we raise in this paper. We show that, irrespective of whether teclmology policy takes the fonn of R&D subsidies or R&D cooperation, R&D would gene rally lead to increased pollution and thus have a negative impact on the environment. Policies that might be optimal in the absence of concem for the enviroJUllent ceas e to be so. We claim that not only is a comparison between policy instruments more delicate but the optimal R&D subsidy might be negative. FinalIy, we propose and evaluate a speeific poliey in the form of a targeted subsidy tied-in to abatement activities and show that it is welfare improving.Technology policy; Process innovation; Pollution; R&D cooperation; R&D subsides;
Cooperation v/s Non-cooperation in R&D Competition with Spillovers
No full textThis paper seeks to analyse a case in which firms choose to divide their R&D expenditures into two components: competitive R&D and Joint-Venture R&D. The analysis is motivated by the fact that R&D outputs can have different degrees of non-excludability. It is therefore reasonable to expect that a firm will allocate a part of its funds to competitive R&D; this is the case in areas in which research is non-excludable to a smaller degree, and part of it to Joint-Venture R&D, in cases where R&D output is highly non-excludable. This issue is addressed in a three-stage model of a duopoly, in which joint-venture R&D and competitive R&D are chosen in the first and second stages while the quantity of the product is chosen in the third stage. The results confirm that allocation of expenditure to the joint-venture component increases as the spillover rate on the competitive component increases. Furthermore, if firms are able to coordinate their joint-venture R&D levels, there is greater incentive to increase this allocation. However, for these results to obtain, it is crucial that the two types of R&D are chosen sequentially; a simultaneous choice would lead to a corner solution in which only competitive R&D is chosen.
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