7,773 research outputs found
X-efficiency Analysis of Commercial Banks in Pakistan: A Preliminary Investigation
No full textThe emergence of a fast-paced dynamic environment in the business world in general, and in the financial services sector in particular, has highlighted the significance of competition and efficiency. The need for deregulation has become a touchstone of success in fostering both competition and efficiency especially in the economies, which are exposed to structural reforms. In addition to that, intense competition both among domestic and foreign banks, rapid speed of innovations and introduction of new financial instruments, changing consumer’s demands and desire for product augmentation have changed the way a bank conducts business and services its customers. Larger the degree of competition, it is perceived that the firms would become more efficient. However, when the structure of an industry is product of the government regulations, the degree of competition is impaired markedly implying that the efficiency suffers negatively. Banking industry acts as life-blood of modern trade and commerce acting as a bridge to provide a major source of financial intermediation. Thus, appraisal of its efficiency is vital in context of an efficient and competitive financial system. Study of x-efficiency is believed to be important in particular as Berger, et al. (1993) found that x-inefficiencies account for around 20 percent or more of banking costs. Similarly, recent drive among banks towards downsizing, rightsizing and rationalisation of banking costs also implicates for the assessment of x-efficiency analysis of banks. It becomes vital in Pakistani context as there appears to be no study in literature on efficiency or x-efficiency analysis of banks in Pakistan. “A great deal more work is needed on x-efficiency research in banking. Managerial efficiency, the concept of x-efficiency, appears to be a much more important strategic and policy consideration” [Molyneux, et al. (1960), p. 273]. Given
Assessment of Community Banks in Nigeria
No full textThis study on community banks in Nigeria was undertaken in June 2004 by the FAO Investment Centre, with financial support from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department for International Development (DFID), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Ford Foundation (FF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank (WB), and in collaboration with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The objective of the study was to assess the past and present performance of community banks, in particular rural-based banks, and to propose a first framework for their support. --
Florea Banks Geochem Model Main.xlsx
No full textContinuous Monitoring data for Sarah Banks Masters thesis 2018. Includes primary data set for continuous monitoring of a karst spring within the Vadu Crisului cave system. For further information please contact author(s)
Risk facing U.S. commercial banks
No full textThe study examines the financial state of the U.S. commercial banks and of the main private borrowing sectors: corporate non-financial business and households. The study finds that the condition of the banks'loan portfolios exposes them to high losses. This risk together with the forthcoming increase of the required ratio of capital to assets suggests that banks will respond by slowing the growth of credit. One consequence would be weaker U.S. investment and consumption. Moreover, credit would probably be directed away from higher risk borrowers such as the highly indebted countries.Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism
Arresting Instances: the generative qualities of penal discipline and law in a Papua New Guinea prison
No full textEastern Europe's experience with banking reform : is there a role for banks in the transition?
No full textAre there lessons to be learned about how Eastern European countries have dealt with problems in their banking systems? What role have these countries assigned to banks during the transition? How have they used banks in dealing with the enterprise problem? The author addresses these questions by analyzing experience in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Most of these countries have made substantial progress in restructuring their banking systems, but few have used their banking systems to improve the allocation of credit and hence stimulate the supply response. The author finds the following. The problem is not whether banks hold nonperforming loans but how banks can avoid accumulating more nonperforming loans. The underlying problem is how to close loss-making and nonviable enterprises. The countries that have encouraged the establishment of new private banks, that have introduced regulation and supervision, and that have tried to make banks more competitive have been more successful at improving the allocation of credit and achieving more control over loss-making enterprises. Banks must focus on assessing risk - and for this, capital, private ownership, and adequate regulation are crucial. How quickly banks achieve independence in credit decisions depends on how fast new governance structures can be introduced. In this, the five countries have been less successful. The objectives of bank recapitulation should be to prevent banks from accumulating more nonperforming loans (that is, dealing with the enterprise problem) and to give them the governance structure that would prevent them from incurring new nonperforming loans. This requires introducing a system of risk and reward - by making banks comply with capital adequacy requirements, by privatizing a critical number of banks, and by introducing strong regulation and supervision. Government should see that banks provide efficient payment systems, the basis for trust in banking systems. Introducing adequate regulation and supervision has been difficult as it requires knowing what the banks'role should be. Evidence strongly supports the need to recapitalize and privatize a critical number of banks. Authorities cannot rely on banks to exert control on enterprises early in the transition. In the early stages, control over state-owned enterprises should be exercised by a semipublic institution.Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Municipal Financial Management,Banking Law
Before main banks : a selective historical overview of Japan's prewar financialsystem
No full textThe postwar experience of the Japanese banking system has received considerable attention recently partly because conditions in defeated Japan in 1945 (including high inflation and the need to switch from a military to a civilian economy) are similar to those in transition economies today. Policymakers in transition economies can learn a good deal from the experiences of Japan's postwar financial system but should remember that Japan also experienced extraordinary industrial growth and financial institution building in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Lessons to be learned from that experience include the following: Business conglomerates that did not continue to depend on government patronage were more successful than others in making the transition to a modern industrial economy. Banks that made a conscious effort to reduce their dependence on central bank credit were more successful than those that did not. The establishment of procedures for punishing defaulting borrowers helped the development of the payments system. Limits on the amount of lending to related parties appear to have contributed to financial stability (and could have contributed more if the newer"zaibatsu"had been as prudent as the older ones). Bank bailouts without accompanying reform (such as those the Bank of Japan undertook in 1920 and 1922) probably increased the likelihood of a more serious crisis, such as that of 1927. Capital standards - the minimum capital requirements established in the 1927 law - were a viable means of encouraging bank consolidation and more prudent lending. The public financial system served as a buffer when the banking sector was downsized.Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Decentralization,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Municipal Financial Management,Banking Law,Banks&Banking Reform
Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms
No full textSome of the most widely expressed myths about the German financial system are concerned with the close ties and intensive interaction between banks and firms, often described as Hausbank relationships. Links between banks and firms include direct shareholdings, board representation, and proxy voting and are particularly significant for corporate governance. Allegedly, these relationships promote investment and improve the performance of firms. Furthermore, German universal banks are believed to play a special role as large and informed monitoring investors (shareholders). However, for the very same reasons, German universal banks are frequently accused of abusing their influence on firms by exploiting rents and sustaining the entrenchment of firms against efficient transfers of firm control. In this paper, we review recent empirical evidence regarding the special role of banks for the corporate governance of German firms. We differentiate between large exchange-listed firms and small and medium sized companies throughout. With respect to the role of banks as monitoring investors, the evidence does not unanimously support a special role of banks for large firms. Only one study finds that banks’ control of management goes beyond what non-bank shareholders achieve. Proxy-voting rights apparently do not provide a significant means for banks to exert management control. Most of the recent evidence regarding small firms suggests that a Hausbank relationship can indeed be beneficial. Hausbanks are more willing to sustain financing when borrower quality deteriorates, and they invest more often than arm’s-length banks in workouts if borrowers face financial distress.relationship lending, Hausbank, universal banking, corporate finance, corporate governance
The role of foreign banks in post-crisis Asia: the importance of method of entry
No full textThis study examines the role of foreign banks in post-crisis Asia, focusing particularly on the four countries most affected by the Asian Crisis of 1997 - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. First, using data on the presence of foreign banks via branching as well as subsidiaries, the study shows that the presence of foreign banks in the four crisis-hit countries is actually much larger than has been previously reported once the presence of foreign branches is accounted for in the data. However, the percentage of assets controlled by foreign banks in Asia is still lower than that of other emerging economies, despite great increases in the post-crisis period. The author reviews regulations on foreign bank entry that may have limited the presence of foreign banks or influenced the method of entry (branching versus subsidiary). Given recent regulatory changes and the need for bank recapitalization in the region, the presence of foreign banks is expected to increase in the near future, so this study next takes up the policy implications of this trend. To date, foreign banks in most Asian countries appear to perform relatively worse than their domestic counterparts as measured by return on equity, cost to income ratios, and the ratio of problem loans to total loans. This finding contradicts previous research in other emerging economies, and may be due to the fact that foreign bank entry in Asia is still a very recent phenomenon, and has occurred mostly through the takeover of troubled banks in the region. The second policy issue examined here is the stability of lending by foreign banks relative to domestic banks. Macroeconomic data suggests that foreign bank lending may in some cases be more stable than domestic bank lending, particularly during crisis, but that the stability of foreign bank lending varies greatly by method of entry. Cross border claims of foreign banks are the most volatile, followed by foreign bank branch lending. Lending by foreign bank subsidiaries capitalized in the host country appear to be more stable than domestic lending, perhaps providing much needed capital during times of crisis. Therefore, foreign banks play an important role in Asia, not only in the traditional ways by providing new services and stimulating competition and efficiency, but also by contributing to stability of the banking sector in the face of macroeconomic fluctuations. However, the mode of foreign entry seems to have important implications for the contributions of foreign banks. Since lending by off-shore banks and foreign bank branches seems to be more volatile than locally capitalized foreign subsidiaries, policy makers in Asia should encourage foreign players to enter via fully-owned subsidiaries or joint ventures and move away from the previous pattern of branch-based entry.bank; Asia; foreign
Are failproof banking systems feasible? Desirable?
No full textIn recent years, instability of the banking system has returned as a major problem in many countries, particularly in the developing world. In many cases, this instability has been so threatening to financial intermediation and the functioning of the payments system that governments have felt compelled to intervene and restructure banks, often at considerable cost to the public budget. One response to these problems has been a proposal to create failproof banking systems - to radically transform the structure, priorities, and operation of the banking and financial system. Banks would be limited to issuing deposits, holding essentially riskless portfolios, and operating the payments system. To minimize the resulting disruptions to the financial system, banks would be authorized (and encouraged) to set up holding companies and then transfer to holding company affiliates all the functions - including lending - that banks would no longer be permitted to perform. So while the failproof banking proposal would severely restrict the activity of banks, it would not restrict the activities of banking organizations that convert to a holding company form of organization. This proposal would produce major public benefits. It would assure a nation of a smoothly functioning banking and payments system, would substantially reduce the resources committed to banking supervision, would prevent bank-type regulation from expanding to the rest of the financial system, and would place banking and nonbanking organizations on a level playing field for the financial activities in which they compete. There are two major problems with the proposal. First, it might be difficult to implement because of too few riskless assets in a nation's financial system. (The author suggests several modifications that would alleviate this problem in some countries.) Second, the proposal might hurt the financial market by: (a) increasing interest rates for higher-risk borrowers, forcing them out of the market; and (b) transfering greater risk to the nonbank sector of the financial system, making it more susceptible to crisis. Although the proposal would benefit developing countries (more prone to banking instability) more than industrial countries, it would also be more difficult to implement in developing countries. And the adverse effects of the proposal would be felt more severely in the financial markets of developing countries than in industrial countries, which have deeper, more responsive financial markets.Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banking Law,Settlement of Investment Disputes
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