1,721,075 research outputs found
Recommended from our members
PTSD Symptoms: Romantic Relationships with Individuals Who Have Narcissistic and Psychopathic Traits
No full textResearch has only begun to explore the mental health implications of being involved in romantic relationships with individuals who have narcissistic and psychopathic traits. Current research indicates that involvement in romantic relationships with individuals who have narcissistic or psychopathic traits may contribute to posttraumatic symptomology as well as other mental health difficulties. This study recruited 1,294 voluntary participants who self-reported being in these relationships to take a comprehensive survey measuring their partner's personality traits and their own symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) related to the relationship.
Instruments such as PTSD Checklist for DSM-5, the Informant Five Factor Narcissism Inventory and the Modified Self-Report Psychopathy Scale were used to investigate the associations among PTSD, partner vulnerable narcissism, partner grandiose narcissism and partner psychopathy. The study also explored the impact of mediating and moderating variables such as the presence of various forms of abuse, manipulative tactics, and previous abuse history such as childhood abuse, to determine whether partner personality traits were still unique and significant predictors to PTSD symptoms related to the romantic relationship when these other variables were taken into account.
Multiple linear regressions revealed that both grandiose and vulnerable narcissism were significant and unique predictors of PTSD symptomology for those who had already left the romantic relationship, even when variables such as previous abuse, physical abuse and abuse frequency were accounted for, and that grandiose narcissism was the largest predictor of posttraumatic symptomology. These partner traits were more predictive than abuse frequency, previous abuse, or physical abuse which were also significant predictors. Manipulative tactics such as jealousy induction and love bombing showed smaller but significant effects, indicating that they were also predictive of posttraumatic symptomology. Correlation analyses also revealed that jealousy induction, love bombing and stonewalling were all significantly correlated with all three partner traits, while gaslighting was significantly correlated with grandiose narcissism.
For individuals who were still in the romantic relationship with individuals with narcissistic or psychopathic traits, only psychopathy, abuse frequency and previous abuse remained significant predictors, with psychopathy and abuse frequency being the largest predictors. Furthermore, additional regression analyses exploring which facets of PTSD dimensions were most affected by these partner personality traits revealed that grandiose narcissism, vulnerable narcissism, and psychopathy were most predictive of PTSD intrusion and avoidance symptoms specifically, with grandiose and vulnerable narcissism being the most significant predictors of avoidance and intrusion symptoms. For PTSD cognition and mood symptoms, grandiose narcissism was the most significant predictor, followed by vulnerable narcissism which was also significant. Psychopathy was not a significant predictor for PTSD changes in cognition and mood symptoms. For PTSD hyperarousal symptoms, all three predictors were significant but vulnerable narcissism showed the largest effect size, while grandiose narcissism had the smallest effect size for this facet of PTSD.
This study establishes an important and highly significant association between both grandiose and vulnerable forms of partner narcissism and PTSD symptomology, clarifies the association between partner psychopathy and PTSD symptomology, and offers further understanding regarding which PTSD diagnostic categories may be most closely associated with which partner personality traits
Recommended from our members
Exacerbating Perceptual Blindness in an Era of Continual Stimulation From Social Media
No full textPerceptual, or inattentional, blindness is the failure to notice a fully visible but unexpected object because attention was engaged on another task, event, or object. This study aims to answer the role of social media in people's lives: broadly, what is its role in influencing attention, and specifically, does spending time on it affect inattentional blindness? Through a series of self-response surveys, we aim to determine what people are processing visually, particularly after spending time on social media, which is rich with pictures, stories, news, and links--all of which, together, can tax cognitive resources. Participants in this study were recruited online using Mechanical Turk to target individuals who used social media. A self-report questionnaire format was used to capture information about the participants’ age, gender, social media usage, and their preferred networks. To determine implicit cognition, participants were asked to perform a specific task by viewing a video, which also contains unexpected stimuli. At the conclusion of the video, they were asked to name any unexpected stimuli that also appeared, to determine their level of inattentional blindness. Findings provide initial evidence that exposure to social media exacerbates inattentional blindness. This study also begins to answer a series of follow-up questions. For instance, now that people are living increasingly more hours on a social media paradigm, how are people's ability to focus getting affected, if at all? And if it is being affected, what's good or bad about that shift?inattentional blindness, attention, social medi
Recommended from our members
Hacking Moral Code: Can Cognitive Stimulation Impact Moral Semantic Processing?
No full textCan targeted cognitive stimulation impact the semantic processing of moral words like “fair?” When individuals apply a word like “fair” to different situations, do they make these judgements consistently or can they be altered with the activation of different cognitive functions within the brain? Recent research has demonstrated that semantic processing, in which the brain attributes meaning to words, may be composed of numerous cognitive functions also used in other mental processes, and that processing different kinds of words and concepts requires different component functions. Perhaps this theory can be extended to the meaning of individual words; that a word’s distinct meaning may come from a unique “package” of cognitive components. Thus, if the cognitive component “package” used by an individual to process a word is somehow modified, then the individual will interpret the meaning of that word differently. The researcher hypothesized that exposing individuals to cognitive stimulation activities, such as word analogy exercises, would activate cognitive functions related to perceiving equality and – in a phenomenon known as cognitive process priming – encourage the individuals to apply the word “fair” to more options presented in a spectrum of possible distributive justice outcomes for different business ethics dilemmas. In two “pre- and post-test” design experiments, each involving roughly 120-participants, results indicate significant word analogy effect on the application of the word “fair” in business ethics dilemmas related to intellectual property and company co-founder disputes. In the first experiment, using a quasi-experimental design with no randomized question order or control, intellectual property case responses (Dilemma 1) produced statistical scores of p=.021 and Cohen’s d = -.185, while company co-founder cases (Dilemma 2) produced p=.045 and Cohen’s d =-.155. In the second experiment, fully randomized in question order and with a control group, Dilemma 2 responses produced p=.040 and Cohen’s d = -.323 for all six trials, and scores of p=.015 and Cohen’s d = -.572 for the first three trials. Meanwhile, Dilemma 1 responses were significant, p=.040 and Cohen’s d = 1.063, only in the second trial. This data suggests that the word analogies did impact the semantic processing of the word “fair,” but only in the ethics dilemmas making cognitive demands similar in structure to those made in the analogy exercises, and that the effect dissipates quickly. If this phenomenon can be demonstrated for other cognitive functions and moral concepts, it could lead to new techniques in semantic measurement and computational modelling of complex social behavior, and new protocols for calibrating ethical discourse in public and professional forums. This phenomenon could also provide the foundation for a new paradigm of psychological warfare
Recommended from our members
Modern Family’s influence on viewers’ explicit attitudes toward same-sex marriage and implicit attitudes toward gay people
No full textPrevious research found that people who oppose short-term mating orientation and associate homosexuality with promiscuity were most likely to oppose same-sex marriage. This study aimed to test three main hypotheses based on these assumptions and the Parasocial Contact Hypothesis. The Parasocial Contact Hypothesis assumes that prejudices against a social group can be eliminated by a relationship between a media consumer and a fictional personality which embodies a member of that social group on a television show. The tested hypotheses predicted that (H1) the depiction of a loyal gay couple on the television show Modern Family changed people’s explicit beliefs that gay people are promiscuous and, hence, (H2) shifted their explicit attitude toward same-sex marriage from opposing to supporting and (H3) had an impact on their implicit attitudes toward gay people. This study addressed the first two hypotheses in an online survey asking participants to complete a questionnaire. The third hypothesis was tested in a sexuality implicit-association test (IAT) to evaluate potential implicit preferences for straight people compared to gay people.
The collected data provided significant support for all three hypotheses. Viewing Modern Family predicted peoples’ beliefs regarding the promiscuity of gay people, peoples’ explicit attitudes toward same-sex marriage, and peoples’ implicit attitudes toward gay people. This study also uncovered unexpected findings. The Viewing Frequency of Modern Family does not linearly predict people’s explicit beliefs that gay people are promiscuous, or their explicit attitude toward same-sex marriage, but instead predicts these in a quadratic manner. Additionally, and unexpectedly, people who have a more favorable attitude towards casual sex were more likely to oppose same-sex marriage, and the stronger the Parasocial Interaction with the characters with Cam, Mitchel, and Jay is, the more likely viewers are to oppose same-sex marriage. Furthermore, this study found evidence that different kinds of information affect implicit versus explicit. In order to better understand the conditions under which circumstances Parasocial Contact is able to reduce prejudice, and what role homophily, viewing frequency, and authority support play, it is important to conduct further research
Recommended from our members
The Adaptive Logic of Moral Luck: Punishment’s Function Shapes the Processes Supporting It
No full textMoral luck is a peculiar aspect of our moral psychology – why do we condemn unintended outcomes (i.e. accidents)? In this dissertation, I present a novel analysis of moral luck, focusing on the argument that moral luck serves an adaptive purpose. First, I demonstrate a key aspect of moral luck – that accidental outcomes have a particularly strong influence on punishment judgments, compared to other moral judgments. Here, I contrast punishment with a partner choice decision and find that whereas punishment is sensitive to moral luck, partner choice is almost totally insensitive to accidental outcomes. Why then might punishment be uniquely sensitive to moral luck? I argue that moral luck is a consequence of punishment’s ultimate adaptive purpose: To change others’ behavior. I next test a key prediction of this hypothesis: We should observe moral luck only when the agent causing accidental harm could change their behavior. When behavior cannot be changed, punishment cannot serve its adaptive function, and so moral luck should be lessened. Focusing on manipulations of behavioral control as a test case, I find supporting evidence – when an agent had no control over their behavior, punishment in cases of moral luck is reduced. Finally, I focus on the implications the pedagogical hypothesis has for the motivations underlying punishment. This perspective predicts that punishment in contexts where pedagogy is most effective need not be motivated through other means – the benefits of changing a partners’ behavior are sufficient motivation. In contrast, we might be expect to find punishment motivated externally in cases in which pedagogy is less effective. Borrowing from the distinction between punishing as a harmed victim (2nd party punishment) and as an observer (3rd party punishment), I explore this question using both behavioral economic and vignette-based methods. I predict that punishment as an observer will be externally motivated – others will punish observers who fail to punish, thus motivating such 3rd party punishment. In contrast, 2nd party punishment will not be externally motivated, given that it is intestinally motivated by the benefits of pedagogy. Across both methods, I find the predicted pattern of results: Punishment as a 3rd party is externally motivated, whereas punishment as a victim is not. In total, I shed light on the adaptive logic of moral luck – we punish others to change their behavior and so punishment is sensitive to (unintended) outcomes. In other words, punishment’s adaptive purpose shapes the psychological processes supporting it.PsychologyMoral psychology;
Morality;
Punishment;
Intention;
Causatio
Recommended from our members
The cognitive contours of punishment
No full textPeople have many ways of influencing others, and one powerful method is through punishment. Punishment can be used to correct the misaligned values of those who commit moral infractions and to instill new values in those learning new things. We have a natural inclination to punish others and quickly learn from the punishments that we receive. In this dissertation I explore the cognitive mechanisms that allow us to learn from and teach with punishment successfully. Specifically, I ask how we conceptualize and structure punishments, how we learn from them, and how punishments modify our subsequent thoughts and behaviors. I examine two possibilities. The first suggests that we view punishments purely as a form of reinforcement and respond to it by using our cognitive ability for reinforcement learning. On this view, punishment is effective in changing behavior simply because it is inherently unpleasant. The second process suggests that we view punishment as a form of communication and engage with it by relying on our capacity for theory of mind. On this perspective, punishment serves as an informative signal conveying the punisher's values and goals. Its efficacy in modifying behavior stems from the message it conveys and the inferences it enables learners to draw. Across various chapters of this dissertation, I explore the distinct roles each of these processes plays in shaping our experiences with punishment. Chapter 1 shows that people generally engage with punishment through communicative inference, wherein teaching and learning from punishment entail expressing and inferring communicative intent. Chapters 2 and 3 identify scenarios where the direct and inherent unpleasantness of punishment plays a crucial part in eliciting the desired behavioral change. Finally, Chapter 4 demonstrates that when imparting novel information to another person, instead of simply reinforcing good or bad actions, people structure their punishments communicatively to influence the learner's belief in a way that minimizes uncertainty and prioritizes establishing common ground. Taken together, this dissertation provides valuable insights into the cognitive processes that shape our experiences with punishment and highlights the roles they play in facilitating our use of punishment for social control and social pedagogy
Recommended from our members
Inference in relational reasoning: A case study of Relational-Match-to-Sample
No full textAdult humans are uniquely proficient in reasoning with abstract relations (relational reasoning) - a capacity which underpins much of human-unique cognition, including scientific analogies, artistic metaphors and many phrases in day-to-day language and thought. An important question for cognitive science, therefore, is exploring the nature of this uniqueness - that is identifying the nature of population differences in relational reasoning between older children and adults, on the one hand and younger children and non-human animals on the other. The classic paradigm used to test for even the most rudimentary capacity for relational reasoning is Relational-Match-to-Sample (RMTS, Premack, 1983). RMTS involves matching pairs of objects on the basis of the relations same and different. As such, success on RMTS is evidence not only of a rudimentary capacity for relational reasoning, but also of representations of sameness and difference in unitary, symbolic format. If these representations are available early in life and/or across species, this would suggest that they may constitute primitives in an innate language of thought which underpins the combinatorial capacities of human language (and potentially non-human thought as well). Previous work has shown that non-human animals and children under the age of five struggle with RMTS, succeeding only after paradigms which may have led them to generate same/different representations for the first time. If this is the case, these populations are simply not able to engage in relational reasoning without special training. In contrast, a successful training paradigm used with crows and parrots provides a model of training (using simple Match-to-Sample, MTS tasks) which cannot have produced new relational representations. The effects of the original training were not, however, conclusive since other training mechanisms were also used with birds and these latter may have led them to generate same/different representations. The first paper demonstrates that MTS training can increase relational responding in human adults by changing inductive biases alone (since adults already have all of the necessary representations and capacities). This sets up the hypothesis that population differences in RMTS performance may sometimes not be differences in the availability in same/different representations, but rather differences in inductive biases alone, i.e. what bases of matching are inferred to be relevant - and that MTS training can bridge at least some population differences by changing these inductive biases alone. The second paper tests and confirms this hypothesis with four-year-old children, further predicting that children’s failure on RMTS are in some cases due to inductive biases leading them to specifically seek partial shape and/or color matches. The third paper tests and confirms this final predictions by making shape and color unlikely bases of matching by holding them constant across pairs in RMTS, which results in unprecedented wholly spontaneous success by four-year-olds on the task. In sum, these results demonstrate that population differences in relational reasoning performance, and RMTS specifically, are sometimes differences in inductive biases alone. This implies that relational reasoning and same/different representations may be available earlier in ontogeny and phylogeny than previously thought - and highlights the crucial role of inductive biases in the development and deployment of relational reasoning capacities
Recommended from our members
The Cultural Evolution of Political Institutions
No full textHumans, uniquely among organisms, rely on norms, or socially learned rules of behavior enforced by a community. Norms, and institutions, or packages of norms, are a major determinant of human ecological success. My dissertation studies norms and institutions using three approaches. First, I ask how norms requiring costly behaviors can be stabilized. Previous work emphasizes the role of punishment in stabilizing norms, however ethnographic work frequently describes occasions where directed punishment is absent and norm violators are instead ostracized. I study ostracism using an evolutionary game-theoretic model and find that unlike has been suggested, ostracism is not an alternative to punishment. Instead, ostracism is best understood as a form of punishment. Additionally, I show that strategies that punish defectors and then ostracize repeat defectors are far more efficient than simple sanctioning strategies. Second, kinship institutions are an omnipresent feature of human societies and, as empirical work indicates, a major determinant of human behavior and psychology. Explaining the distribution of institutions then helps us to understand human psychological and behavioral variation. I study the spatial distribution of a historically relevant kinship institution, the Chinese lineage. I hypothesize that Chinese lineages were risk-ameliorating institutions and that they grew in regions that experienced a high risk of shocks to agricultural production. I test this hypothesis using an econometric approach and find support for it. Finally, Chinese lineages were not only social institutions but political institutions; lineages often adopted state roles when they grew powerful. I argue that lineages actively competed with the Chinese state over control of lineage members' behaviors and that powerful lineage managers may have generated an anti-state culture. I test this hypothesis using a national Chinese survey and find that respondents from regions where lineages were historically prominent are less trusting of state officials, more critical of the state, and more likely to say that the state is too strong
Recommended from our members
Theory-based reinforcement learning: A computational framework for modeling human inductive biases in complex decision making domains
No full textThroughout our day-to-day lives we are faced with a wide assortment of complex environments to master. Whether we have to work out the functions of a new device, the transportation options of a new city, or the norms of a new workplace, we are often able to extract the hidden principles of a new domain with surprisingly little instruction or exploration. This kind of learning would be im- possible without structured representations to compact the complexity of the world and inductive biases to help narrow down the set of plausible explanations.
Yet while we have a solid understanding of many of the representations and biases that guide human learning in relatively simple domains, our knowledge of how humans make sense of the deeply interconnected systems of the real world is less precisely specified. In this work we study how humans learn to play video games in order to develop a clearer picture of the cognitive mechanisms that guide our behavior in more realistically complex domains.
Complex task domains pose a key challenge for computational cognitive scientists. Models that precisely describe human decision making in simple tasks do not necessarily scale well to more com- plex domains. For tasks like video games, a single task instance (i.e., a game) can involve far more po- tential states and actions than can be reasonably stored in memory. Yet humans are often capable of generalizing knowledge of a few example states to choose rewarding actions from anywhere in these vast state spaces. In Chapter 1, we describe a novel task that highlights this kind of generalization in human decision making and demonstrate how the task representations in several existing modeling approaches fail to capture this behavior. We then integrate a broad literature on structured repre- sentation in human cognition to propose a new framework for modeling human decision making, which we refer to as “theory-based reinforcement learning,” that better accounts for human behav- ior in complex domains.
Learning representations that are rich enough to capture complex environments introduces a second challenge. Any space of task representations large enough to capture the variety of envi- ronments that humans are capable of learning likely contains a plethora of representations capable of explaining the same observations. Identifying the most plausible of these theories thus requires inductive biases to better direct learning behavior. In the second portion of this dissertation, we ex- plore the kinds of inductive biases that guide learning by extending our theory-based framework of human decision making to incorporate structure learning. Chapter 2 presents a formal overview of theory-based RL, a novel computational framework for studying the inductive biases underlying human behavior in more realistically complex task domains. In particular, we demonstrate how this framework can be used to formally incorporate both syntactic biases about the structure of theory- based representations and semantic biases about the content of those representations.
Finally, Chapter 3 provides an example of how theory-based RL can be used to empirically evalu- ate the inductive biases that humans use to learn in complex domains. We find evidence that human task learning is consistent with a range of syntactic and semantic biases, and that incorporating these biases into theory-based RL agents results in more human-like learning behavior. We then conclude with a brief discussion of how our framework can be further extended to help us understand the biases that guide human learning in day-to-day life
- …
