1,721,083 research outputs found
RECIPROCITA' SOCIALE, FIDUCIA DIFFUSA E CRESCITA ECONOMICA
No full textIn questo lavoro si discute il ruolo della fiducia diffusa come generatore di crescita economica. Il canale comportamentale attraverso il quale questo importante elemento del capitale sociale si traduce in progresso economico è quello della reciprocità sociale caratterizzata da anonimato
Civil society, widespread trust and growth theory: the role of the Charity Commission in the British experience
No full textAnonymous Contributions as Reciprocating Behaviors: a Model with Subjective Thresholds
No full textWe present a model of social reciprocity in which anonymous agents decide to contribute fairly if and only if the observed level of public good is greater than their personal threshold. The main results of the model can be summarized as follows: a) the equilibrium level of public good is higher than what implied by the traditional models; b) an exogenous donation may trigger a process of motivational crowding-in, with a multiplier effect on the equilibrium level of public good; c) when the size of the population increases, the set of positive contributors does not necessarily converge to the set of individuals with the highest preferences for the public good
Public good provision, punishment, and the endowment origin: Experimental evidence
No full textThis paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members have different sources of endowment. We compare the behavior of homogeneous groups, in which subjects are exogenously assigned the same endowments, with that of heterogeneous groups, in which half the group members have to exert effort to earn their endowments (effort subjects) and the other half are endowed with a windfall of equal value (windfall subjects).
If the opportunity to punish is absent, free-riding becomes the ubiquitous form of behavior over time both in homogeneous and in heterogeneous groups. If the opportunity to punish is present, contributions increase over time, although the two groups do not exhibit any differences in either the amount of contributions or the amount of punishment. Furthermore, effort and windfall subjects make similar contributions in heterogeneous groups.
Within the heterogeneous groups, over the entire time interval and conditional on the decision to punish, effort subjects punish (slightly) less severely than those who received windfall endowments
Common fate, game harmony and contributions to public goods: experimental evidence
No full textCommon fate, Game harmony, Public goods, Group identification, C91, C92, H40, H41,
We can be heroes: trust and resilience in corrupted economic environments
Full text linkWe use an original variant of the standard trust game, in order to study the effect of corruption on trust and trustworthiness. In this game, both the trustor and the trustee know that part of the surplus they can generate may be captured by a third “corrupted” player under different expected costs of audit and prosecution. We find slightly higher trustor’s giving in presence
of corruption, matched by a significant effect of excess reciprocity from the trustee. Both the trustor and the trustee expect on average corruption acting as a tax, inelastic to changes in the
risk of corruptor audit. Expectations are correct for the inelasticity assumption, and for the actual value of the “corruption tax”. Our experimental findings lead to the rejection of four standard hypotheses based on purely self-regarding preferences. We discuss how the apparently paradoxical excess reciprocity effect is consistent with the cultural role of heroes
in history where examples of commendable giving were used to stimulate emulation of the ordinary people. Our results suggest that the excess reciprocity component of the trustee makes
trustor’s excess giving a rational and effective strategy
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