197 research outputs found
Trade in the Shadow of Power
No full textIn this chapter, we examine how some of the main results in international trade theory fare when we abandon the traditional assumption of third-party enforcement of property rights. Without such enforcement, countries arm and exercise power to secure resources used in production or to secure the output from that production. Because arming is endogenous and takes scarce resources to produce, the production of final goods is also endogenous. Consequently, prices in either domestic or international markets reflect not only preferences, endowments or technologies of production as predicted by traditional models, but also arming and the power that comes from that. As we show in the context of a Ricardian model, those countries that produce the most socially valued goods tend to arm less, giving them a "comparative disadvantage" in power. Accordingly, the level of welfare obtained by these countries could be lower than that obtained in a competitive economy with perfect security. In the context of a Heckscher-Ohlin model, we find that free trade need not be preferred to autarky, as the costs of conflict or self-enforcement swamp the familiar gains from trade for a certain range of world prices. Finally, trade in the shadow of power can distort comparative advantage.Trade openness; Property rights; Interstate disputes; Conflict
Data for: Arming in the Global Economy: The Importance of Trade with Enemies and Friends
No full textDescription of data and codes used to create the estimation results in “Arming in the Global Economy: The Importance of Trade with Enemies and Friends” by Garfinkel, Syropoulos and Yotov. The code file "Replication_Code_GSY.do" which produces all estimates, tables, and Stata trade cost figures that appear in the paper. The file includes notes that explain each step and calls the main data file, Replication_Data_GSY.dta, which is described next.The data file "Replication_Data_GSY.dta" is the main data file that is called by "Replication_Code_GSY.do". The names of the variables in this file are self-explanatory, the variables are also labeled, and they as well as the data sources are described in the main text of the paper and in the Supplementary Empirical Appendix
Globalization and Domestic Conflict
No full textWe examine how globalization affects trade patterns and welfare when conflict prevails domestically. We do so in a simple model of trade, in which a natural resource like oil is contested by competing groups using real resources (”guns”). Thus, conflict is viewed as ultimately stemming from imperfect property-rights enforcement. When comparing autarky with free trade in such a setting, the gains from trade have to be weighed against the possibly higher resource costs of conflict. We find that importers of the contested resource gain unambiguously. By contrast, countries exporting the contested resource will lose under free trade, unless the international price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what price obtains in international markets, countries tend to over-export the contested resource relative to what we would observe if there were no conflict; for some range of prices, the presence of conflict even inverts the country's comparative advantage. We find further that an increase in the international price of the contested resource over an even wider range reduces welfare, an instance of the "natural resource curse".globalization, trade openness, property rights, enforcement, insecurity, conflict
Bargaining Versus Fighting
No full textI examine the determinants of conflict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a bargaining framework. Different costly enforcement efforts (e.g., arming, litigation expenditures) induce different disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for settlement, I demonstrate how different division rules and bargaining norms have real, economic effects. I then analyze some sources of conflict. I emphasize long-term, strategic considerations by examining an illustrative model and discussing particular historical examples.Conflict; Negotiation; War; Settlement; Arming; Litigation
Warlord Competition
No full textwarlord competition, conflict, cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour
When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"
No full textThe conventional wisdom in political science is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this paper we show that this wisdom is seriously incomplete because it considers absolute, not relative payoffs. Although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the probability of winning a fight. Thus in a situation where all groups have a high chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural model, we show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy may only be stable when one group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our model using data from "La Violencia", a political conflict in Colombia during the years 1946-1950 between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Consistent with our results, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that fighting between the parties was more intense in municipalities where the support of the parties was more evenly balanced.
Employment protection and product market competition
No full textA firm facing employment protection will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. For the benchmark case of contest competition, the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. -- Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, verteidigt seine Marktposition stärker als ein konkurrierendes Unternehmen, das ohne derartige Restriktion agiert. Ex ante wird es jedoch vorsichtiger sein, seine Marktposition auszudehnen, da es die potentiellen Kosten im Falle einer späteren Verschlechterung der eigenen Marktposition vermeiden möchte. Für den Benchmarkfall, in dem der Wettbewerb zwischen den Unternehmen die Form eines Contests annimmt, überwiegt der defensive Effekt: Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, hat langfristig eine stärkere Position im Markt als ein Wettbewerber der frei von solchen Restriktionen agiert.Employment protection,contests,all-pay auction
DISPATCHES FROM THE TOMATO WARS: THE SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF TRADE BARRIERS
No full textMost trade barriers are, by their very nature, bi-lateral. Since most countries trade with more than one country in more than one product, these bilateral measures can have spillover effects, changing trading patterns among other countries and products. This paper looks at the effect of a bilateral trade barrier on trade flows within a three-country free-trading area. Specifically, this paper examines the trade distortion effects of the 1996 voluntary export restraint (VER) placed on tomato exports from Mexico to the United States. Has Mexico shifted its exports from the Unites States to Canada, and has Canada increased its exports to the United States? Has the VER caused Mexico to divert fresh tomatoes to the processing sector?International Relations/Trade,
Essays on International Trade and International Political Economy
No full textMy graduate research has been organized around two main themes: (i) the causes and consequences of trade integration and (ii) the strategic nature of armed conflict. The expansion of international trade over the past sixty years has played a major role is determining the fates of nations, both for better and for worse, and likewise has the potential to shape our futures in ways we need to be able to anticipate. Similarly, the death, destruction, and diversion of productive resources associated with violent conflict continue to present a critical obstacle to shared prosperity. The papers I am presenting as the chapters of my dissertation are representative of the contributions I am interested in making in these important research areas. My research on trade integration spans both the micro-level of what forms trade integration may take as well as higher level concerns about how freer trade will affect both the world economy as well as the individual economies within it. Two chapters of my dissertation, "Beyond Tariffs: Quantifying Heterogeneity in the Effects of Free Trade Agreements" and "Finding the Influence of Communication on Trade" are devoted to this subject. In "Beyond Tariffs", for example, I show, using NAFTA as an empirical case study, that the effects of free trade agreements on individual nations may not be what we might expect to observe ex ante based on tariffs. Relying solely on tariffs to project NAFTA’s effects not only greatly underestimates the overall welfare increases for all three NAFTA countries---Mexico's in particular---but also overstates the positive effects of NAFTA on U.S. producer prices. It follows that "heterogeneity" in the effects of free trade agreements, both within and across agreements, may not be well-understood. In "Finding the Influence of Communication", I investigate whether the sharing of a common language promotes trade in a way similar to trade policy and, if so, what the consequences of increased language learning will be for global trade. Most notably, I find the effect of communication in native languages on trade tends to be underestimated in the absence of controls for communication in non-native languages. Surprisingly, while I find strong evidence for the causal impact of foreign language acquisition on manufacturing trade, I do not find similarly strong evidence for services trade. I also find that, unsurprisingly, adding to the world's population of English speakers has by far the largest impact on trade of any major world language. Interestingly, however, when I remove all non-language barriers to trade, I find the forces of geography and history may have greatly impeded the relative appeal of Chinese as a competing global language. The third chapter of my dissertation, "The Problem of Peace: A Story of Corruption, Destruction, and Rebellion", joint with Constantinos Syropoulos, deals with a different kind of question: what are the economic incentives that drive the emergence of destructive conflicts, and of intra-state conflicts ("civil conflicts") in particular? Specifically, we investigate how the central presence of state (fiscal) institutions in civil conflicts generates unique explanations for the emergence of conflict itself. International trade plays an important role in this chapter as well, but mainly as a backdrop for illustrating the unique trade-offs between "peace" and "welfare" that may arise in this context. It is possible for changes in international prices to move in favor of promoting settlements, but such settlements can be associated with (socially wasteful) increases in arming and/or taxation. We also explore, among other things, how limiting the government’s fiscal capacity may tilt the balance towards peaceful settlement.Ph.D., Economics -- Drexel University, 201
Globalization and Domestic Conflict
No full textWe examine how globalization affects trade patterns and welfare when conflict prevails domestically. We do so in a simple model of trade, in which a natural resource like oil is contested by competing groups using real resources (“gunsâ€). Thus, conflict is viewed as ultimately stemming from imperfect property-rights enforcement. When comparing autarky with free trade in such a setting, the gains from trade have to be weighed against the possibly higher resource costs of conflict. We find that importers of the contested resource gain unambiguously. By contrast, exporters of the contested resource lose under free trade, unless the world price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what price obtains in the world market, countries tend to over-export the contested resource relative to what we would observe if there were no conflict; for some range of prices, the presence of conflict even reverses the country’s comparative advantage. For an even wider range of prices, an increase in the international price of the contested resource reduces welfare, an instance of the “natural resource curse.â€Globalization; Trade openness; Property rights; Enforcement; Insecurity; Civil wars
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