1,737,187 research outputs found

    Generations - Interview with Constantinos Economos

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    Constantinos Economos, Priest at St. George's Greek Orthodox Cathedral in Arbutus Ridge, describes the character of the different generations of Greek Canadians in Vancouver and speculates about the future of the church and the culture

    Priest in the Community - Interview with Constantinos Economos

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    Constantinos Economos is currently the Priest at St. George's Greek Orthodox Cathedral in Arbutus-Ridge, after having been tied to the church and community his whole life

    Hagios Constantinos

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    Michaud Jean-Pierre. Hagios Constantinos. In: Bulletin de correspondance hellénique. Volume 96, livraison 2, 1972. p. 708

    Wedding portrait of Constantinos and Dimitra Panagos.

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    Photo is a wedding portrait of Constantinos and Dimitra Panagos, probably early-mid 20th century

    Constantinos Apostolos Doxiadis Honorary Degree Citation

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    1 p.Architect Constantinos Apostolos Doxiadis received an honorary Doctor of Laws degree at Commencement in 1968. This is the text of the degree citatio

    Mogou, Constantinos Peters, [No Service Number]

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    This record was harvested from a previous catalogue system and will be withdrawn in 2025. Information in this record may be superseded or incomplete. Visit this record in UMA's new catalogue at: https://archives.library.unimelb.edu.au/nodes/view/405607Surname: MOGOU. Given Name(s) or Initials: CONSTANTINOS PETERS. Military Service Number or Last Known Location: [No Registration Number]. Missing, Wounded and Prisoner of War Enquiry Card Index Number: 49096.243711 Item: [2016.0049.37884] "Mogou, Constantinos Peters, [No Service Number]

    Trade in the Shadow of Power

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    In this chapter, we examine how some of the main results in international trade theory fare when we abandon the traditional assumption of third-party enforcement of property rights. Without such enforcement, countries arm and exercise power to secure resources used in production or to secure the output from that production. Because arming is endogenous and takes scarce resources to produce, the production of final goods is also endogenous. Consequently, prices in either domestic or international markets reflect not only preferences, endowments or technologies of production as predicted by traditional models, but also arming and the power that comes from that. As we show in the context of a Ricardian model, those countries that produce the most socially valued goods tend to arm less, giving them a "comparative disadvantage" in power. Accordingly, the level of welfare obtained by these countries could be lower than that obtained in a competitive economy with perfect security. In the context of a Heckscher-Ohlin model, we find that free trade need not be preferred to autarky, as the costs of conflict or self-enforcement swamp the familiar gains from trade for a certain range of world prices. Finally, trade in the shadow of power can distort comparative advantage.Trade openness; Property rights; Interstate disputes; Conflict
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