4 research outputs found
Report of occupation of Southern Honshu and Kyushu, 15 August 1945 – 3 October 1945.
No full textThis operation, for the Fifth Amphibious Force, had its inception on 8 August. The plan provided that the force would be charged with landings in the Fifth Fleet area of responsibility and that Commanding General 6th Army would be the Army commander for these landings
Blacklist operation, 6th Infantry Division, field order 1 and administrative order 1.
No full textThe Sixth Army, by joint overwater operations in conjunction and as arranged with the Commander, Fifth Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, will occupy Kyushu, Shikoku, and western Honshu and adjacent offshore islands within the zone of Sixth Army responsibility; and will establish military government and impose within the Sixth Army zone of responsibility those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action. Contains illustrations of Central Honshu (enemy strength and dispositions, I Corps area), Tsuruga approach map, and an annex 3 to field order 1- operations map
Norm Hatch Photograph Collection
No full textPhotograph of Marine generals discussing the situation on Iwo Jima at the Fighting Fourth's Division headquarters. Left to right are Major General Clifton B. Cates, commanding the Fourth Marine Division; Major General Harry Schmidt, commanding the Fifth Amphibious Corps; Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, commanding general of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; and Brigadier General Frank Hart, Assistant Fourth Marine Division Commander. They all wear Marine uniforms. Cates and Hart wear hats and binoculars around their necks while Schmidt and Smith wear helmets. Smith has a cigar in his mouth. They stand around a table with a large map on it
Making vision into power : Britain's acquisition of the world's first radar-based integrated air defence system 1935 - 1941
Get PDFThis thesis represents the first application of a current conceptual model of defence acquisition to analyse the historical process, the 1935 - 1941 British acquisition of an integrated air defence system pivoted upon the innovative technology of radar. For successful acquisition of a military capability, the model posits that balanced attention must be focused acoss eight 'lines of developmen' - not only equipment, but also doctrine and concepts, logistics, structures, personnel, organisation, training and information with an overarching requirement for interoperability. This thesis contrasts what turned out to be a successful acquisition, of radar to achive air interception capability by day in the Battle of Britain, with less successful acquisition, or radar to achieve the same capability at night, where an effective system arrived too late to ward off the Blitz. The results establish the validity of the model and its attendant lines of development concepts, and furnish new insights into acquisition processes and military history. Acquisition lessons are derived for the capability-based involvement of industry, for the experience and personality necessary for key managers at different 'life stages' of an acquisition and for the avoidance of over-rapid 'dysfunctional diffusion' of innovative technologies. Historical insights for the Battle of Britain include the sub-optimal performance, for trivial reasons, of key South Coast radars, and the critical importance of the human elements of the radar-based air defence system. For the Blitz, airborne radar hardware has previously been identified as a key problem, whereas research here exposes the greater need for accurate ground control radar, the sound selection and training of pilots and operators in new tactics, and provision of equipment maintainers and test gear. New evidence illustrates that pursuit of an alternative to radar significantly delayed the optimal solution, and throws fresh light both on personalities and on development process management
