1,721,074 research outputs found
On the Hypothetical Given. Experiences, Views, and Proofs
No full textAnil Gupta’s Conscious Experience. A Logical Inquiry is an opus magnum. Its breadth and depth are unique in the extant philosophical literature on the nature and role of perception, the rationality of empirical reasoning, the nature of disagreement, empiricism, and the realist/anti-realist debate in the philosophy of science. There is also much to learn from it regarding key philosophical figures such as Russell and Sellars. Equally commendable are the style and clarity of the book. Here I will focus on two interconnected themes on which Gupta and I are in disagreement. Namely, the nature and role of experience in the hypothetical given, and the role of empirical dialectic and proofs
Are there mathematical hinges?
No full textIn this paper I argue that, contrary to what several prominent scholars of On Certainty have claimed, Wittgenstein did not maintain that simple mathematical propositions like "2 ~ 2 = 4"or "12 ~ 12 = 144,"much like G. E. Moore's truisms, could be examples of hinge propositions. In particular, given his overall conception of mathematics, it was impossible for him to single out these simpler mathematical propositions from the rest of mathematical statements, to reserve only to them a normative function. I then maintain that these mathematical examples were introduced merely as objects of comparison to bring out some peculiar features of the only hinges he countenanced in On Certainty, which were all outside the realm of mathematics. I then close by gesturing at how the distinction between mathematical hinges and non-hinges could be exemplified and by exploring its consequences with respect to (Wittgenstein's) philosophy of mathematics
Hinges, philosophy and mind: on Moyal-Sharrock’s certainty in action
No full textCertainty in Action is an invaluable collection of Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s papers appeared after her seminal Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (2004). It focuses on the centrality of action and claims that this is the distinctive trait of “the third Wittgenstein” – the one that, after the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the one of the Philosophical Investigations, wrote the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, the Remarks on Colour and On Certainty
“Wittgenstein et le pragmatisme. Réflexions sur Le Doute en question de Claudine Tiercelin”
No full textA critical discussion of Claudine Tiercelin, Le doute en question
Precis of Relativism
No full textPrecis of the book by M. Baghramian and A. Coliva Relativism, Routledge, 2020
Hinge trust*
Full text linkTrust is central to epistemology, particularly in accounts of testimony, where it describes the relationship between a hearer and a speaker (or trustor and trustee), enabling the acquisition of information. The speaker's trustworthiness—marked by sincerity and knowledge—is essential for testimony to transmit knowledge or justified belief. However, trust's nature and role remain conceptually elusive, as the current debate highlights. This paper addresses the foundational question of what trust entails, rather than the conditions under which one is trustworthy. Specifically, we examine Wittgenstein's On Certainty to propose a characterization of trust in its most fundamental form, termed “hinge trust.” Hinge trust is a stance preceding the ability to form justified beliefs, directed not only at people but also at perceptual faculties, objects, and the environment. It underpins our epistemic practices, particularly in acquiring epistemic hinges essential for reasoning and inquiry. Building on this, we advocate a “trust-first” framework, analogous to the “knowledge-first” approach in epistemology. Trust is conceptualized as a primitive stance, distinct from “reliance +” a reactive attitude, or goodwill or commitment. These elements, while significant, are not constitutive of trust. Additionally, we explore the interplay between trust and distrust, arguing that trust is both conceptually and axiologically prior to distrust. Finally, we address the role of trust in testimony and hinge epistemology, demonstrating its foundational significance
Doubts, philosophy and therapy
No full textThere is nowadays a tendency, to be dated back to Gordon Baker’s reading, to interpret the later Wittgenstein as proposing a thoroughly
therapeutic view of philosophy. Accordingly, he was not dealing with philosophical problems to show how they originated in a misunderstanding of
our language. For that would have presupposed his advancing theses about
how language works. Rather, his therapeutic method was in the service of
liberating philosophers from the kind of intellectual prejudices that would
prompt them to ask philosophical questions. The article examines the complex interconnections between Wittgenstein and Waismann to show how
the thorough-going therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein proposed by Baker
is in fact a projection of Waismann’s ideas onto Wittgenstein. Moreover, by
looking at Wittgenstein’s complex anti-skeptical strategies in On Certainty,
it shows that his aim was not to provide therapy against philosophers’ inclinations, but to show that skeptical doubts are misguided and nonsensical
Hysteria, Hermeneutical Injustice and Conceptual Engineering
Full text linkIn this paper, we look at what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls “hermeneutical injustice” as it arises in the medical context. By drawing on the history of hysteria, I argue that the concept of hysteria has been held in place by power structures affected by negative prejudice against women. In this sense, the concept of hysteria fits the central conditions of the concept of hermeneutical injustice as characterized by Fricker. Yet, reflection on the case of hysteria also signals the need for widening the understanding of hermeneutical injustice. I thus propose to ameliorate the concept of hermeneutical injustice and show how, once thus ameliorated, it can be used as a powerful tool to advocate for the amelioration of the concept of woman. I then return to the concept of hysteria and argue that it is still in use in everyday contexts, where it embodies identity prejudice against women and constitutes a particularly pernicious form of put-down that perpetrates various forms of epistemic injustice. I conclude that also in that kind of context the concept of hysteria should be abandoned. Like with other loaded concepts, the only admissible uses of that concept would then be in contexts of reclaiming or re-appropriation
More and Happier Women: On the Political Significance of Wittgenstein and Hinge Epistemology
Full text linkThe paper presents a Wittgensteinian account of the concept WOMAN, in terms of family resemblance. This approach is deemed superior to the Carnapian account, championed by Sally Haslanger, in that it allows for more inclusivity and to locate the source of sexism not so much in the very concept of woman but in the beliefs sexist people have about women. The compatibility of this account with semantic externalism is explored, as well as its relationship with stereotypes and paradigmatic examples of women. It is further shown how present-day attempts to extend the application of the concept of woman beyond human females may be made sense in terms of a change of hinges—that is, of the rules of evidential significance, which a community of speakers brings to bear on the determination of whether a person is a woman. Finally, it is argued that, despite Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical quietism, such an account is politically significant. This in turn shows that in fact Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical pronouncements far from being inimical to political and societal change may in fact be conducive to it
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