1,721,767 research outputs found
The Myth of the Myth of the Rational Voter
No full textThis paper argues that Bryan Caplan’s Myth of the Rational Voter overstates in case against democracy by not dealing with what might be called the historical/instrumentalist argument for democracy. It argues that the case for democracy that he attacks is primarily an academic exercise, which makes his argument against that case also an academic exercise. It further argues that the supposed policy choice that Caplan presents between the market and democracy is not the correct choice, and that his proposals that economists should be given more voting weight in the democratic decision process is inappropriate.
Post Walrasian Macro Policy and the Economics of Muddling Through
No full textThis paper expands on my earlier discussion of Post Walrasian macroeconomics policy. (Colander and van Ess 1996) First, it defines what I mean by Post Walrasian macroeconomics. Second, it discusses some of the theoretical differences between Post Walrasian and Walrasian macro theorizing as they relate to policy. Finally, it discusses how an acceptance of Post Walrasian economics might change the focus of macro policy discussions.
The Wrong Type of Pluralism: Toward a Transdisciplinary Social Science
No full textWhen heterodox economists talk of pluralism they generally are talking about pluralism within the economics professionÑthey are asking: how can we have a more pluralistic economics profession? This paper argues that another, perhaps more useful, way to think of pluralism and economics is from the perspective of all the social sciences. When looked in reference to the social science profession rather than in reference to the economics profession, the amount of pluralism increases significantly, since different social sciences follow quite different methodologies. But looking at pluralism from the social science perspective reveals a different type of pluralism problem in social science. While there may be plenty of pluralism within social science as a whole, there is a serious question about whether it is appropriately distributed. This paper argues that heterodox economistÕs agenda should be a greater blending of all the social science departments. It summarizes proposals to do so on both the undergraduate level and graduate level, and explains why supporting variations of these proposals would be a strategy that would further the objectives of most heterodox economists more so than would their current strategy of pushing for more pluralism in economics.Pluralism; heterodox; social science; epistemic game theory
Creating Humble Economists: A Code of Ethics for Economists
No full textFrom the movie, Inside Job, one gets the sense that economists are ethically challenged because they take payments for writing papers that say what the funders of their research want them to say. This paper takes issue with that and suggests that the more serious ethical problem of economics has little to do with the funding of economic research. It has to do with lack of humility. It argues that economists have a tendency to convey more scientific certainty in their policy positions than the theory and evidence objectively would allow. Too many economists are willing to make seemingly definitive scientific statements about policy based on models, that they know, or should know, are highly imperfect. To deal with that problem, this paper suggests that applied economists should see themselves as engineers, not as applied scientists. It argues that doing so is important because engineering has a broader and more humble methodology than does science. Because applied economists are essentially engineers, the paper argues that an Economist’s Code of Ethics can be closely based on the National Society of Professional Engineer’s Code of Ethics.code of ethics; methodology; science; humility; applied; moral
What Was “It” that Robbins Was Defining?
No full textThis paper argues that Robbins’ famous definition of economics was of “economic science” which he saw as only a narrow branch of the field of economics. Moreover, it was descriptive, not prescriptive, and was simply a statement that that was what economists were then doing in the science of economics. His prescriptive message was that policy belonged in the “political economy” branch of economics, and that the science of economics should avoid value judgments, but that political economy should include value judgments. That prescriptive message has been lost.
Economists, Incentives, Judgment, and the European CVAR Approach to Macroeconometrics
No full textThis paper argues that the DSGE approach to macroeconometrics is the dominant approach because it meets the institutional needs of the replicator dynamics of the profession, not because it is necessarily the best way to do macroeconometrics. It further argues that this “DSGE-theory first” approach is inconsistent with the historical approach that economists have advocated in the past and that the alternative European CVAR approach is much more consistent with economist’s historically used methodology, correctly understood. However, because the European CVAR approach requires explicit researcher judgment, it does not do well in the replicator dynamics of the profession. The paper concludes with the suggestion that there should be an increase in dialog between the two approaches.methodology, macroeconometrics, general to specific, DSGE, VAR, judgment, incentives
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