1,721,016 research outputs found
Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets: a comparison between two models
No full text
Nondictatorial Arrovian social welfare functions and integer programs (Working paper No 01-10_ eco Series in Economics, Dipartimento di Scienze economiche e Statistiche, Università di Udine)
No full textIn this paper, we use a respecified and simplified version of an
integer program characterization of Arrovian social welfare functions,
proposed by Sethuranam et al. (2003), to provide an alternative proof
of Theorem 2 in Kalai and Muller (1977).
Journal of Economic Literature Classifcation Number: D71
Characterization of domains admitting strategy-proof and non-dictatorial social choice functions: A reappraisal (Discussion paper no. 2007-1, CEPET - Central European Program in Economic Theory, Institute of Public Economics, Graz University)
No full textWe show, with an example, that the theorem on the characterization of domains admitting strategy-proof and non-dictatorial social
choice functions by Kalai and Muller (1977) does not hold when the
set of alternatives is infinite. Then, we introduce a class of social
choice functions for which it is possible to restore the validity of the
theorem also in this case.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D71
Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
No full textIn this paper, we reconsider the full characterization of two-agent Nash
implementation provided in the celebrated papers byMoore and Repullo (Econometrica
58:1083–1099, 1990) and Dutta and Sen (Rev Econ Stud 58:121–128, 1991), since
we are able to show that the characterizing conditions are not logically independent.
We prove that an amended version of the conditions proposed in these papers is still
necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability. Then, by using our necessary and
sufficient condition, we show that Maskin’s impossibility result can be avoided under
restrictions on the outcomes and the domain of preferences much weaker than those
previously imposed by Moore and Repullo (Econometrica 58:1083–1099, 1990) and
Dutta and Sen (Rev Econ Stud 58:121–128, 1991)
Cournot-walras and Cournot Equilibria in Mixed Markets - a Comparison
No full textIn this paper, we show that, in markets with a continuum of traders and atoms, the set of Cournot-Walras equilibria and the set of Cournot equilibria may be disjoint. We show also that, when the preferences of the traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the set of Cournot-Walras equilibria and the set of Cournot equilibria have a nonempty intersection
`Very nice' trivial equilibria in strategic market games
No full textFollowing Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or “legitimately” inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162–169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1–20], and we show that the trivial equilibrium, the unique NE of the associated strategic market game, is not “very nice,” in the sense that it is not “legitimately” trivial. This result has the more general implication that, under the Dubey and Shubik's assumptions, a Shapley NE may fail to exist
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